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Abstract
The first chapter analyzes incentives and quality in hospitals with physician-investors. Propo-
nents of physician ownership argue that it improves care; opponents claim that physician-investors
"cherry-pick" profitable patients. This paper uses new data on physician-owned hospitals to esti-
mate a model that allows for both cherry-picking and quality effects. The data contain information
on the distribution of physician ownership across hospitals and I develop a probabilistic discrete
choice framework to examine the selection behavior of physician-investors. A structural approach
with instrumental variables provides estimates of hospital quality both on average and varying
with patient characteristics. I estimate the model using a sample of non-emergency cardiac pa-
tients obtained from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. I find evidence of a significant
mortality improvement for patients treated at physician-owned hospitals, which primarily holds
for moderate-severity patients. There is no strong evidence of physician-owner cherry-picking of
healthier patients. The distribution of patients across hospitals is primarily driven by physicians'
average preferences over hospitals.
The second chapter explores price transparency in health care. Many U.S. states have recently
begun requiring that hospitals publish prices, citing the need for consumer search. This paper
uses two sources of longitudinal hospital data to evaluate the effects of Web-based price-posting
requirements and on-site price-posting requirements on the distribution of hospital prices in nineteen
states with such regulations. I find that transparency regulation is associated on average with small
price increases, which is inconsistent with transparency enhancing consumer search. The effects
are smaller among for-profit hospitals and in areas with a greater self-pay patient population.
The third chapter (co-authored with Glenn Ellison) examines differences in the frequency with
which students from different schools reach high levels of math achievement. Data from the Amer-
ican Mathematics Competitions is used to produce counts of high-scoring students from public
U.S. high schools. High-achieving students are far from evenly distributed. There are strong de-
mographic predictors of high achievement, but there are large differences among seemingly similar
schools. The unobserved heterogeneity across schools includes a thick tail of schools that produce
many more high-achieving students than the average school. Gender-related differences and other
breakdowns are discussed.
Thesis Supervisor: Glenn Ellison
Title: Gregory K. Palm Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Jonathan Gruber
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Physician Ownership and Incentives:
Evidence from Cardiac Care
1.1 Introduction
In recent decades, physician ownership of hospitals has been a great source of controversy among
both academics and politicians. Proponents argue that physician-owned hospitals, which are often
specialized in the treatment of orthopedics or cardiac illness, are "focused factories" that provide
high-quality, efficient care. However, opponents claim that investing physicians use their influence
over treatment choice and location to "cherry-pick" profitable patients. Recent studies in the
economics and health literatures have found evidence of improvements in patient outcomes in
physician-owned hospitals relative to comparison hospitals.1 Physician ownership of hospitals may
impact the quality of care through technology and staffing choices as well as overall culture of
care. However, it is difficult to associate differences in outcomes across hospitals with underlying
differences in quality because patient illness may be correlated with patient selection. Patient
health characteristics also impact the profitability of hospital services, as patients requiring more
costly services will not necessarily entail greater hospital reimbursements. Physicians may factor
any such differences in profitability into their decision-making if they have an ownership interest
in a hospital, so that physician ownership may lead to cherry-picking if physician investors find it
optimal to treat unprofitable patients at community hospitals and profitable patients at their own
facilities. The goals of this project are to disentangle quality measures of physician-owned hospitals
from patient selection and to explore the effects of ownership incentives on the hospitals where
physicians choose to admit their patients.
Previous papers have attempted to control for differences in patient populations in order to
'See, e.g., Cram, Rosenthal, and Vaughan-Sarrazin's (2005) comparison of outcomes from two cardiac procedures
in general and cardiac specialty hospitals; Nallomothu, et al.'s (2007) analysis of outcomes subsequent to acute
myocardial infarction (AMI) and congestive heart failure (CHF).
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assess the impact of physician-owned hospitals on patient outcomes. 2 Differences in patient charac-
teristics between physician-owned and competitor community hospitals have often been interpreted
as evidence of cherry-picking. 3 A starting point for this project is the observation that economists
would not necessarily regard differences in patients treated as evidence of a distortion for at least
two reasons. First, patient populations may differ across hospitals simply based on the demographic
and health characteristics of the communities near physician-owned hospital locations. One would
want to control for such differences when estimating a model of mortality, but the existence of
demographic differences does not imply any distortion in where patients are being treated. Second,
patient characteristics could differ because of "optimal matching" - different hospitals may be better
suited to treating different types of patients. For example, cardiac patients with additional, non-
cardiac illnesses such as diabetes may not be well-suited to treatment in specialized environments
such as physician-owned cardiac hospitals. Again, one would want to control for such matching
when assessing a hospital's effectiveness, but these types of differences would signal that a market
is working effectively.
In order to investigate distortions due to hospital ownership, I develop a joint model of hospital
choice and patient outcome that accounts for optimal matching, and I compare the choice behavior
of physician-owners to that of non-owners to provide evidence of ownership incentives and, in
particular, of potential "cherry-picking" behavior on the part of investors. I then estimate the
model parameters using Medicare claims data for a large sample of non-emergency cardiac patients
treated in 29 U.S. markets containing specialized cardiac and/or physician-owned hospitals in 2005.
In order to capture the effect of patient characteristics on overall expected outcome, optimal
matching to hospitals, and cherry-picking behavior, I use a rich set of patient demographic and
clinical characteristics obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). I also
allow for potential unobserved illness heterogeneity to impact both choice and outcome using instru-
mental variables (IV) in combination with a structural method similar to the random coefficients
approach commonly used in the discrete choice literature. 4 My instrumental variable approach is
designed to consistently estimate hospital quality measures by using geographic location relative
to physician-owned hospitals (POHs) as an instrument for treatment at a POH. The structural
methodology assumes that, conditional on all included patient characteristics, the distribution of
residual illness severity does not differ between the patients of physician-owners and those of non-
owners, so that I may estimate selection on unobservables by owners and non-owners by comparing
unaccounted-for patient mortality outcomes across physician and hospital type. Robustness of the
2 E.g., Cram, et al. (2005) and Nallomothu, et al. (2007) use patient characteristics to generate risk-adjusted
quality measures.
3 See Mitchell (2005) and Chollet, et al. (2006), which explore patient characteristics explicitly to investigate
cherry-picking.
4 Throughout this paper, when I refer to "unobserved illness heterogeneity" I am speaking of heterogeneity in
patient health that is observed by physicians but not by the econometrician. This type of heterogeneity may impact
both patient outcome and hospital choice.
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IV and structural assumptions is explored in Section 1.7; the results do not suggest the presence of
bias.
A factor which has hampered research in this area is an unfortunate lack of data on physician
ownership. I have collected a unique dataset on physician ownership of 24 physician-owned hospitals
providing cardiac care. The data include aggregate physician ownership shares as well as the number
of physician owners. Although individual physician-investors are not identified, I use a probabilistic
approach to distinguish the behavior of owners from that of non-owners. In particular, the CMS
data allow me to identify all physicians treating patients at each physician-owned hospital. There
are some physician-owned hospitals where most practicing physicians are owners and others where
most practicing physicians are non-owners. Further, I observe many patients for each physician,
which allows me to assign each physician a behavioral "type." I then compare the distribution of
physician "types" across hospitals with a different ownership mix to separately identify the behavior
of owners and non-owners. Finally, I use the variation in average physician ownership shares to
examine whether physician-owner behavior varies with financial incentives.
The first set of results concerns the impact of treatment at a POH on patient mortality. Both
reduced form results assuming no unobservable patient selection across hospitals and IV results
using distance as an instrument indicate that POHs entail approximately a 1.1 percentage point
decrease in mortality risk for the average sample patient, an effect size of 18% relative to sample
mortality risk of 6.1%. The similarity between reduced form and IV results indicates that reduced
form quality improvements are not substantially driven by unobservable selection of patients across
hospitals; POHs do not appear to treat unobservably healthy patients. I also find that hospi-
tals which are not physician-owned but which are specialized in cardiac care provide a significant
improvement in mortality risk comparable to that of POHs.
I find some evidence that the mortality improvement provided by physician-owned hospitals is
attenuated for sicker patients. IV estimates of the effects of POH treatment on mortality for pa-
tients in different quintiles of overall sickness indicate that quality improvements pertain primarily
for moderate-severity patients. Thus, there is some limited evidence of an optimal matching ratio-
nale for treating sicker patients at community hospitals rather than at physician-owned hospitals.
However, the evidence does not suggest that POHs are detrimental to the highest severity patients.
The second set of results concerns physician choice behavior. After controlling for quality
differences across hospitals, I find limited evidence consistent with physician-investor cherry-picking
of healthier patients, with physician-owners being less likely to treat patients with greater non-
cardiac comorbid conditions at their owned facilities but more likely to treat otherwise sicker
patients at their owned facilities. Differences in selection between owners and non-owners are not
statistically significant. Even at the most extreme bound of the "cherry-picking" parameter's 95%
confidence interval, a standard deviation increase in non-cardiac comorbid conditions implies less
than a 4pp decrease in the likelihood of treatment at the physician-owned hospital for patients of
physician-investors. Physician-owners prefer to treat the majority of patients at the POH, so this
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effect is small relative to physicians' average preferences across facilities. Moreover, physician-owner
behavior appears to be driven by ownership per se rather than variation in per-physician financial
stake.
My findings favor the proponents' side of the debate over physician ownership. The strongest
evidence I find regards average effects and average preferences rather than interactions with patient
type. In my sample of physicians who ever treat at a physician-owned or cardiac specialty hospi-
tal, non-owners have a preference for not treating at the physician-owned hospital, while owners
have a home-base preference. Given the evidence of mortality improvements at physician-owned
hospitals for some patients, this preference cannot be interpreted as a negative distortion. On
balance, holding physician behavior and market structure otherwise fixed, my results suggest that
overall cardiac patient mortality would increase if physician-owned hospitals were eliminated from
their markets. This is particularly troubling given that controversy over cherry-picking resulted
in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 banning further physician in-
vestment in hospitals. The evidence of comparable quality improvements at non-physician-owned
cardiac specialty hospitals suggests that specialization rather than ownership may account for mea-
sured quality improvements, but the strong association between ownership and specialization in the
market for cardiac care implies that the specialized model may be difficult to implement without
physician investment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the origins of physician
ownership in hospitals and some industry background. In Section 1.3, I lay out my model of joint
hospital choice and patient outcome and provide intuition for identification. I then describe my
empirical approach to estimating the model and detail the assumptions needed for identification.
Section 1.4 describes the data used in this application. Section 1.5 discusses the model estimation
and Section 1.6 presents empirical results. Section 1.7 discusses some robustness checks. Section 1.8
concludes and discusses some directions for future research.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Physician-owned hospitals: origins and entry
Physician ownership is not a new model among U.S. hospitals. In the beginning of the 20th century,
most for-profit hospitals were small facilities owned by doctors in rural areas and small communities,
but their subsequent decline in popularity was such that by 1960 they accounted for only 15% of
the hospital care market (David, 2009). In the late 1980s, physician-hospital relationships became
the subject of intense regulatory scrutiny when the Office of the Inspector General, alarmed by
reports of suspicious behavior in physician-hospital joint ventures, issued a Special Fraud Alert.
Of particular concern was the potential for physician investors to refer patients to joint venture
entities providing clinical diagnostic laboratory services, durable medical equipment (DME), and
other diagnostic services in exchange for profit distributions. It was argued that such behavior would
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harm patients and hospitals through distorted facility choices, as well as potentially encouraging
unnecessary care (OIG, 1994). As an initial reaction, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1989 contained a provision (the "Stark I" provision) barring self-referrals for Medicare
clinical laboratory services. OBRA 1993's "Stark II" provision expanded the definition of self-referral
to include most institutional services, such as inpatient and outpatient hospital care. 5 The updated
law included a number of exceptions. Under the presumption that a physician's behavior would
not be significantly impacted by a small investment interest in an entire hospital, the ban included
a "whole hospital exception," which held that the ban does not apply if a physician is authorized to
perform services at the hospital and the investment interest is in the whole hospital. Subsequent
to the passage of OBRA 1993, the number of physician-owned specialty hospitals tripled by 2003,
not including the 20 facilities under development in 2003 (Kimbol, 2005). Most physician-owned
hospitals operating in recent decades are specialized in the fields of cardiac care, orthopedics, or
general surgery.
The regulatory loophole described above made ownership in a specialty facility a viable alter-
native for physicians seeking an investment share in a hospital, but expansion in hospital capacity
is regulated in many states. For this reason, it has been found that the requisites for physician-
owned specialty hospital entry are the presence of a large specialty group and lax regulation of
hospital capacity expansion (Casalino, et al., 2003). I focus my analysis on regions which have
experienced entry by specialty hospitals providing cardiac care, whether physician-owned or not.
Cardiac care is of particular interest because physician-owned cardiac hospitals are more similar to
general hospitals than are orthopedic hospitals or surgery centers, often having more beds than a
general hospital cardiac department and usually having staffed emergency departments. Further,
cardiac care generates a quality measure in the form of mortality outcomes.
1.2.2 Physician ownership and patient selection
As noted above, there are multiple explanations for physician-owned and community hospitals
treating different patient populations. The explanation favored by proponents of physician own-
ership is one in which some patients are better suited to treatment at physician-owned facilities
than others. As noted by Alan Pierrot, a member of the Board of Directors of the American Sur-
gical Hospital Association, "every hospital tries to do those things for which it is best suited and
whenever possible sends other cases to a better equipped facility. Such behavior is appropriate
and in the best interests of patients." (U.S. Cong., 2005) In the case of cardiac care, this "optimal
matching" story would apply if, for example, specialty heart hospitals are optimal for the treatment
5 See Kimbol (2005) for a description of the Stark laws. Under the Stark II law, physicians "may not make referrals
to an entity in which the physician or an immediate family member has a financial relationship, for the furnishing of
designated health services for which payment may be made by Medicare or Medicaid" (42 U.S.C. §1395nn). Physicians
violating the Stark laws faced non-payment for services rendered in addition to potential civil penalties and/or full
loss of Medicare/ Medicaid certification.
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of high-acuity cardiac patients, but not for patients with non-cardiac conditions like end stage renal
disease, which may require access to dialysis facilities.
The criticism that physician-owned hospitals (POHs) cherry-pick profitable patients is sup-
ported by several facts. As previously noted, specialty hospitals generally focus on profitable
services such as cardiac care and orthopedic surgery, and are less likely than general hospitals to
have emergency departments, which are required under the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) to serve all patients regardless of ability to pay. I will be focus-
ing on Medicare patients, for whom ability to pay is naturally not an issue, and only on cardiac
care facilities, which generally do have emergency departments. Thus, I focus my attention on
a physician's incentives to cherry-pick profitable patients into her own hospital given her average
patient population. In particular, I focus on patient selection as a function of patient sickness.
Medicare's reimbursement system encourages this type of selection directly. For Part B services
(physician services), reimbursements are tied to physician charges and additional care will entail a
greater reimbursement. However, for Part A services (hospital and nursing home care), Medicare's
prospective payment system (PPS) reimburses hospitals on a fixed-fee basis for each diagnosis-
related group (DRG), so that a physician with an ownership stake in his or her hospital will profit
from treating low-cost patients and lose money on treating high-cost patients. 6
To put this financial incentive into perspective, note that per-patient profit for cardiac cases
can be high. In FY 2002, the average marginal profit was $9,600 per patient for a coronary artery
bypass graft (CABG) with cardiac catheterization, a higher marginal profit surgery commonly used
to treat patients with angina and coronary artery disease. Further, some patients are much more
profitable than others within DRG. The lowest-severity CABG with catheterization patient is 1.86
times as profitable as the highest severity patient (MedPAC, 2005).7
A study performed by MedPAC in 2005 developed profitability measures for four severity classes
within each DRG by comparing reimbursements to national average Medicare cost reports. The
study found that, based on their DRG case mix alone, the twelve specialty heart hospitals studied
were expected to be 6 percent more profitable than competitor hospitals, and further that specialty
hospital patients were in lower severity classes, resulting in a further 3 percent increase in expected
profitability (MedPAC, 2005). There is also evidence that owners and non-owners exhibit different
preferences among POHs vs. competitor hospitals, with owners referring up to 34 percentage points
more patients to POHs than non-owners in three hospitals studied (CMS, 2005).8 My analysis
6 CMS altered the reimbursement grouping system in 2007, after the study period for this project, to include
richer measures of severity.
7 Reimbursements are not generally structured to provide zero profit on average; as implied by this example, some
treatments involve positive profit for even the most severe patients.
8 See also Mitchell (2005), which found that physicians that treated at least 10% of their cardiac patients at
the Tucson Heart Hospital or Arizona Heart Hospital treated a less severe case mix of both cardiac surgical and
medical DRGs than physicians only treating their cardiac patients in non-physician-owned competing facilities, and
Chollet, et al. (2006), which found that physician-owners in specialty facilities in Texas admitted significantly more
patients to their owned facilities than non-owners, though the difference in treatment patterns did not vary in patient
16
attempts to extend this literature by measuring differential behavior of owners and non-owners,
in terms of both "home base" preference as well as cherry-picking, in the full sample of markets
with physician-owned and/or cardiac hospitals. I separately identify selection based on optimal
matching vs. cherry-picking by estimating the choice and outcome processes jointly.
1.2.3 Physician ownership and facility quality
While the ability of physicians to selectively refer patients based on profitability is perhaps a funda-
mental problem with the physician-owned hospital model, proponents argue that specialty hospitals
are high-quality facilities, and that significant quality improvements may dominate concerns about
physician incentives. Quality improvements may occur at physician-owned hospitals for a number
of reasons. One possible explanation is that physicians "know best," so that physician input in
the design and mission of a facility will imply high quality, low cost treatment. Another poten-
tial explanation is a "name on the door" story, in which physician-owners take greater interest in
their own facility's reputation. The most common explanation focuses on the specialized nature of
POHs, characterizing them as similar to "focused factories," in which specialization implies dedi-
cated equipment and staff and tailored management, and that these characteristics in turn imply
high quality, low cost care.
Most available evidence on hospital quality points to POHs being better facilities. Greenwald,
et al. (2006) interviewed staff and collected financial data from specialty hospitals in six cities and
conducted focus group studies with patients in three cities, finding that patients thought that the
staff at specialty hospitals differed materially from that of community hospitals in terms of their
level of knowledge and specialized skills and that the nursing staff at POHs were particularly atten-
tive and confident. POH patients also commented on the private rooms, space, lower noise level,
and treatment of family members. Physicians at POHs cited improved scheduling and procedural
time; in a similar study by Casalino, et al. (2003) using site visit data from the Center for Studying
Health System Change's Community Tracking Study, physicians noted increased productivity, as
they chose their own surgical equipment, staff, and scheduling procedures, and thought that spe-
cialization reduced down time between procedures. These studies provide evidence that patients
and physicians like working and being treated at POHs.
Physicians also claim better patient outcomes as a motivation for specialty hospital affiliation.
The evidence for such effects is mixed. In one study of markets with four cardiac facilities, cardiac
specialty hospitals did perform better than a set of competitor hospitals on three of four cardiac
procedures studied as well as both of two cardiac conditions studied (CMS, 2005).9 Another study
characteristics.
9 See also Cram, et al. (2005) and Nallomothu, et al. (2007), which study mortality outcomes for specific
cardiac procedures and diagnoses, respectively. These studies use patient characteristics to generate risk-adjusted
quality measures and find evidence of quality improvements at specialized cardiac facilities relative to competitors.
However, Cram, et al. note that improvements are not statistically significant when specialty hospitals are compared
to competitors with similar procedural volumes, and Nallomothu, et al. find substantial variation in quality among
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(Barro, Huckman, and Kessler, 2006) focuses on Medicare cardiac patient outcomes before and
after specialty hospital entry using data from 1993, 1996, and 1999 and finds evidence of weakly
detrimental impacts of entry on patient outcomes as measured by survival and readmission rates
relative to control markets. In this study, I focus on entry markets only and estimate mortality
effects allowing for potential bias due to patient selection based on unobservable health status.
Finally, one argument made in favor of POHs is that they provide care at a lower cost. There
have been several studies of the effects of specialty hospital entry on health care expenditures using
longitudinal data. In the same study mentioned above, Barro, Huckman, and Kessler (2006) find
that specialty hospital entry markets experienced significantly slower growth in health expenditures,
on the order of $524-$763 per patient, relative to control markets. Schneider, et al. (2011) use a
two-stage least squares approach to analyze the effects of all types of POHs (including all types
of specialties and non-specialized facilities) on expenditures using Medicare data from 1998-2005
and find that, after accounting for endogeneity, POH entry markets had 1% lower expenditures per
enrollee, but the difference was not statistically significant. This project does not provide evidence
on expenditure effects of physician ownership, which will have important implications for welfare
effects of POHs; for now, this is left as a topic for future exploration.
1.3 Model
The goal of this project is to estimate the quality of treatment at a physician-owned hospital, and
the extent to which physician ownership influences hospital choice. I evaluate this question using a
model of hospital choice and patient outcome, in which hospital choice is based on expected outcome
as well as other financial and non-financial preferences. 10 Patient characteristics affect both the
potential for a good outcome as well as profitability across hospitals. Patient characteristics may
thus determine hospital choice through their effect on physician profits as in a model of physician
cherry-picking, or through their effect on expected outcome across hospitals (optimal matching).
In this section, I describe my approach to separating these effects in a full information setting. In
the following section, I describe my estimation approach, which separately identifies cherry-picking
and quality effects in the presence of unobservables.
I consider the following model:
1. Market m has Jm hospitals, each of which is either a community hospital or a physician-owned
hospital. Hospital k has characteristics Zk, including an indicator for physician ownership. For
the sake of brevity, the model simply includes dpo, a dummy for a hospital being physician-
owned, in place of Zk.
2. Cardiac specialist p, who may be a cardiologist or cardiac surgeon, has admitting privileges at
specialized facilities.
0 1n this section, I refer to patient "profitability" at a given hospital as convenient shorthand for all physician
preferences, both financial and otherwise, which are not related to patient outcome.
18
all Jm hospitals. Specialist p may be a physician investor in any one of the physician-owned
hospitals in the market and has characteristics (down, r where d;"" = 1 if physician p is a
physician investor and Tpk is physician p's ownership share in hospital k.
3. Patient i has characteristics Xi.
Although one may view hospital choice as a joint decision between the physician and the patient,
I find it useful to model hospital choice as the outcome of the physician's decision process, which
maximizes an additive function of patient and physician utility. I assume the timing is as follows:
1. Patient i experiences a cardiovascular illness and arrives in the care of cardiac specialist p.1 1
2. Specialist p evaluates the patient, observes patient characteristics, each hospital's character-
istics, and her own idiosyncratic preferences over hospitals: (Xi, (dPO, Tpk,Eipk)ki). This
allows the specialist to determine both expected outcome and patient profitability at each
hospital in the market.
3. Specialist p admits and treats patient i at hospital j. 12
4. Patient i's outcome (mortality) mipj is observed.
Denote the utility physician p derives from treating patient i at hospital j, as uipj, a function
of expected patient outcome, patient profitability, and an idiosyncratic shock. The physician will
choose to treat the patient at hospital j if uipj > Uipk for all k = 1,..., J m . In turn, patient i's
mortality outcome mipj is determined by his own and his physician's characteristics, the charac-
teristics of the chosen hospital, and an idiosyncratic shock. In a setting where both patient and
physician characteristics are perfectly observed (I refer to this as the "full-information benchmark"
in the following section), it is a simple exercise to estimate the choice and mortality processes. In
such a setting, observed mortality across physician and patient type show both average quality
and optimal matching (patient-specific quality) effects of treatment at a POH. After accounting for
quality, the association between physician ownership and hospital choice patterns provides evidence
of physician profit incentives.
"As illustrated in Figure 1-6 in Appendix B, there are a number of ways for a patient to arrive in the care of
a cardiac specialist. To the extent that the distribution of patient characteristics across physicians is not affected
by these pathways, they are irrelevant to the current model. I will return to this issue when I discuss econometric
identification in Section 1.3.5.3.
12In this project, I focus on a specific subset of cardiac patients, those who are severely ill enough to warrant hospital
admission but who are admitted on a non-emergency basis. The former restriction is imposed to decrease the amount
of unobservable variation in patient illness; without it, for example, the model would infer that hospital admission
is harmful to patients because admitted patients are much more likely to die than outpatients, when in fact this is
likely due to admitted patients being much sicker ex ante, conditional on all observable patient characteristics. The
latter restriction ensures that the decision-making specialist has the opportunity to choose the hospital of admission,
which may not be possible for emergency patients.
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1.3.1 Full information benchmark - graphical intuition
To illustrate the intuition of my model, suppose patient type (illness severity) is perfectly observed,
so that expected mortality for each patient can be estimated for each type of hospital, and that
physician ownership is perfectly observed, so that the probability of choosing a POH for treatment
can be estimated as a function of physician and patient type. It is useful to contrast two drastically
different scenarios which would yield similar aggregate associations between patient characteristics,
hospital choice patterns, and mortality outcomes. The following stylized figures each illustrate a
scenario in which healthier patients are more likely to be treated in a physician-owned hospital. In
the left panel of each figure, I display the relationship between patient illness severity (presented as
a unidimensional object) and the expected probability of survival, separately for patients treated
at a community hospital vs. a physician-owned hospital. In the right panel of each figure, I display
the relationship between illness severity and the probability of treatment at the physician-owned
hospital, separately for patients treated by staff physicians vs. physician-investors.13 In each set of
figures, the relationship between the expected mortality patterns in the left panel and the slope of
each physician's choice curve in the right panel illustrates physician sensitivity to patient outcome
in choosing a hospital; residual choice patterns may vary by ownership and provide evidence of
cherry-picking.
Figure 1-1 illustrates a scenario in which observed aggregate patterns are primarily due to
optimal matching. In the left panel, there is a marked difference between the survival curves for the
physician-owned hospital and the community hospital. The physician-owned hospital is preferable
for low-severity patients, but is much worse than the community hospital for high-severity patients,
implying that there is significant scope for optimal matching based on patient type. In the right
panel, the probability of treatment at the physician-owned hospital is shifted upward for patients
treated by physician investors, but the choice patterns for owners and non-owners vary similarly
in patient illness severity - physician-investors have a greater preference on average for admitting
at the physician-owned hospitals, but are equally as sensitive as non-owners to patient survival
probability. There does not appear to be an effect of patient-specific profitability on hospital
choice.
In contrast, Figure 1-2 illustrates a scenario in which observed aggregate patterns would be pri-
marily driven by physician-investor cherry-picking. Again, the left panel shows that the physician-
owned hospital has better mortality outcomes for low-severity patients, while the community hos-
pital is better for severe patients. However, in the right panel, there is a very slight negative
relationship between patient illness severity and the choice of a physician-owned hospital for non-
owning physicians - non-owner physicians have an overall preference for the community hospital,
and are slightly sensitive to the increase in optimality of the community hospital for more severe
patients. In contrast, the choice patterns of the physician-owners are strongly negative in illness
131 suppose that physicians have idiosyncratic preferences over hospital characteristics such as amenities, location,
etc., so that the choice probabilities are smooth in patient characteristics.
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Figure 1-1: Stylized figures: patient suitability and hospital choice patterns, optimal matching
scenario
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severity, far beyond what would be optimal based on survival probability - after accounting for the
effect of severity on survival probability across hospitals, physician investors are still quite sensitive
to the lower profitability of more severe patients if treated at the POH.
Figure 1-2: Stylized figures:
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The above examples provide a basic intuition for how we may identify optimal matching and
cherry-picking behavior by comparing choice patterns with patient outcomes and examining how
that relationship varies with physician ownership. In the following sections, I parameterize the
mortality and choice processes and describe how estimates of the model will characterize optimal
matching and cherry-picking.
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1.3.2 Full information benchmark - choice model
Suppose that the physician's profit from treating patient i at hospital j is gripj, that the expected
latent mortality outcome of patient i at hospital j is rnipj (which will be described in detail in the
following section), and that distij is the distance from patient i to hospital j. Then the physician's
utility for treating patient i at hospital j is
ipj =7ripj + p17ipj + P2distij + Eipj.
Here, p1 and P2 are the weights placed on expected patient mortality and the distance from the
patient's home to the hospital (as a proxy for patient convenience), respectively, relative to the
physician's profit. 14
I consider Medicare patients, for which the reimbursement structure is well-known, so it is
straightforward to model physician profit explicitly. For physician p with ownership stake Tpj in
hospital j, I assume that physician profit is
grip = Rpfy (Xi) - cp'j (Xi) + rpj (RH (Xi) - mcH (X))
Here, RP and cp are the revenue and cost of physician services for a patient with characteristics
Xi; the choice of hospital may affect the provision of physicians' services through, for example,
capacity constraints, so generally these terms may depend on j. Although I refer to this as "profit,"
these expressions capture both financial and non-financial preferences. For example, physicians may
prefer physician-owned hospitals because they may be more pleasant workplaces, and further may
prefer treating sicker patients at physician-owned hospitals because they require longer bed stays
and greater physician presence at the POH. Each of these effects could be interpreted as a lower
"cost" of physician services at the POH. RH is the Medicare reimbursement for hospital services
ordered by physician p, and mcH is the hospital's cost of treatment; a physician with ownership
share -rpj will receive that percentage of hospital profits RH - mcH.
The cost terms cp and cH are not known, so I impose a simple partially-separable functional
form for each profitability term:
Ry (Xi) - cop (Xi) = P + p2 Xi + P3 * + P4 * d p + P6 * do
+/17 * d own * dP0 +l'O d own * P i
+ pd d p j8*d 0i
RH (X)mcH (X) = A1 +A 2 *Xi.
Here, the profit on physician services depends on patient characteristics, both alone and interacted
14 Note that, since I will be focusing on Medicare patients exclusively in this project, there is no explicit price of
treatment in this model, as the price faced by the patient does not vary across hospitals. Reimbursements for hospital
care vary from region to region, but a given physician will have an ownership interest in at most a single hospital, so
"reimbursement"-based preferences will be based on the average reimbursement at physician-owned hospitals.
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with physician and hospital type. The quite simple form for RH - mcH is used because hospital
reimbursements will only be received when Tpj > 0, which implies df 0 - d"'" = 1. When I replace
the revenue less cost terms in 7ripj with these specifications, combine terms that enter multiple
times, and drop terms which are invariant to hospital and which thus may not impact choice, I
obtain the following simple specification:
ripj = djPOmi- + Xi * dPOw2 + diP * doswL0 3 + Xi * djP * d"own 4 + Tpj (A1 + XiA2 ).
Using the above functional form for physician profit, the choice model can be rewritten asi5
as- = dP)0wi + Xi * df002 + dPO * down 3 + Xi * djP * downL4 + rpj (Ai + XiA2) + pirnipj
+p 2distij + eipj.
To sum up, hospital choice is determined by non-owner physician preferences for POHs (wi), the ef-
fect of patient characteristics Xi on non-owner physician preferences for POHs (W2), the additional
preference of a physician-investor of treating a patient at a physician-owned facility, on average
(W3, A1)16 and varying with patient characteristics (4, A2), physician preferences over patient mor-
tality (pi), and physician preferences for patient travel distance (p2). Cherry-picking behavior is
captured by W4 and A2 .
1.3.3 Full information benchmark - mortality model
Next, consider a model of patient outcome, given hospital choice. I model mortality as a function
of patient, hospital, and physician characteristics plus an idiosyncratic shock which is unobserved
to the physician. 7 I assume a latent mortality model with Pr {mipj = 1} Pr {m - > 0 . The
baseline model for latent mortality is:
m -= a + XiO + d olv + (dfo * Xi)7 + dW"r, + (dfo * d"Wn)4 + vipj
mipj + vipj.
1 5 Note that, although I have modeled "patient concerns" in the physician's utility function as determined by
expected mortality and travel distance only, it is possible that other hospital characteristics (e.g., nurse staffing)
affect both physician and patient utility so that w is a sum of physician and patient coefficients. I consider a single
decision-maker, so I am unable to measure the extent to which each characteristic affects the physician vs. the patient
population and speak of them as "physician profit" only for the sake of exposition. This issue is less likely to pertain
for the patient profitability term rp (Al + XiA2 ) unless hospital choice is the outcome of a Nash bargaining process
where total surplus is split between the physician and patient; I ignore this issue now and return to it in the discussion
of welfare.
16The terms W3 and A, may also capture a "home base" preference for physician-investors to treat at their owned
hospital.
1 7Future analyses will include other outcomes, such as length of stay, readmission, and patient satisfaction, data
permitting.
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Here, mt- denotes latent mortality for patient i with physician p treated at hospital j. As above,
Xi is the full set of patient characteristics, d( 0 is a dummy for treatment at a physician-owned3
hospital, do" is a dummy for treatment by a physician investor, and (spj is an idiosyncratic shock.
The model allows flexibly for patient characteristics, hospital ownership, and physician investor
status to influence mortality directly and interacted with one another. The parameters of primary
interest are v, which describes the average effect of physician ownership on expected mortality, and
-y, which characterizes the relative suitability of physician-owned hospitals as patient health status
varies.
1.3.4 Full information benchmark - joint model
Taken together, the above model suggests the following specification for the joint probability of
observing a choice of hospital j and mortality outcome m:
Pr {cipj = 1, mipj = m|Xi, (d 0 , Tpk)k1, dow }
=-Pr = mcip 1,XI, d O, dow"; } *Pr {cip = 1Xi (d/jO,Tpk)5l , d"wf ;}
where 0 represents all model parameters. In the baseline specification, I assume type-I extreme
value error in the choice model and standard normal error in the mortality model. Given mipj and
logit error, the choice model yields the following closed-form probability of physician p treating
patient i at hospital j:
Pr Icipj = I exp Ui~J exp Uipk
Under the assumption of normal error in the mortality model, we also have a closed-form expression
for the probability of mortality for patient i if he is treated in hospital j:
Pr {mipj = 1 c lp =} = <b(nip).
The joint probability of observing mortality outcome m and choice cipj = 1 would be:
Pr {cip = 1 mp- = m} exp * (<D(Anpj)m(1 - <b(fnij))1-m)
k E Jm exp Uipk
Suppose there are N patients. Then, letting yipj denote the full set of characteristics and outcomes
of patient i treated at hospital j by physician p in market m, this specification implies that the
likelihood will be
N
lnI{O|yi,...,yN} = lnPr {yiJ} .
i=1
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It is quite straightforward to estimate 0 by maximizing this log-likelihood given observed Xi and
Tp.
Recall the baseline specification:
Uy = dfowi + Xi * df OLw2 + dPO * do"n w3 + Xi * dO * d"wn W4 + Tpj (A1 + XjA2 ) + Plnipj
+p 2distij + cpj
M. = ea + Xi/3+dj 0 v + (df7 * Xi)y +d "" + (dPD * d "")b+Vipj.
If iD > (<)0, then the average patient does worse (better) at physician-owned hospitals. The
estimates ', W4 and A2 characterize the potential for optimal matching and the extent of cherry-
picking, respectively. Suppose that 3 > 0 (high X implies sicker patients). Then if ' > 0, then
sick patients do relatively worse than healthy patients at POHs and it is optimal for physicians to
alter choice patterns away from POHs for such patients. If, on the other hand, ' < 0, then sick
patients do better at POHs and there is no optimal matching rationale for sicker patients ending
up more often at community hospitals. Either way, the estimates (&4, A2 ) will illustrate the effect
of patient sickness on hospital choice conditional on expected mortality. If W4 < 0, then physician-
owners are cherry-picking healthier patients into their owned hospitals; further, if A2 < 0, then
physician-investors' cherry-picking behavior is exacerbated by greater ownership shares.18
1.3.5 Accounting for unobservables
In practice, even with exceedingly rich data on patients, hospitals, and physicians, Xi and rp are
imperfectly known. It is thus necessary, following the literature on estimation of discrete outcome
models (Train, 2009), to impose some structure on the distributions of Xi and T and integrate over
those distributions to obtain an expected log-likelihood in lieu of the exact log-likelihood. That is,
the expected probability of observing (mi, cipj) will be
/ / exp ui pj  * (,p m(1 - <(nip))i-m)dFxdFrP.rP fxi Eke Jm exp Uipk
This approach is closely related to the random coefficients mixed-logit approach commonly used in
the discrete choice literature, but with the interpretation being focused on unobservable variables
rather than unobservable variation in preferences.
181n practice, pi will be normalized to equal -1 in the current analysis, as all hospital characteristics and inter-
actions therewith in the mortality specification also enter the choice model and physician preferences over hospital
characteristics in the choice model can only be interpreted relative to pi. In future analyses, I hope to obtain greater
data on hospital characteristics so that the choice model will include expected mortality rather than expected latent
mortality and p1 may be identified due to the nonlinearity of the CDF function; currently, most available hospital
characteristics are binary and insufficient for identification of pi using nonlinearity alone.
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1.3.5.1 Imperfectly observed ownership
In this application, individual physician ownership share rpj is not perfectly observed; rather, I
observe physician and hospital identifiers for each patient as well as aggregate statistics on physician
ownership. In particular, I observe how many physician-investors there are and the aggregate
physician ownership share in each physician-owned hospital. As described in greater detail in
Section 1.4, I also observe all physicians ever practicing at each POH in each year. This allows
me to assign each physician a probability that she is an owner based on the ratio of practicing
physicians (potential owners) to actual owners:
Pi
where Oj is the number of physician owners at hospital j and P is the number of physicians
practicing at hospital j.
Further, I observe all sample patients admitted by each physician. Each physician-investor will
always behave like a physician-investor and each non-owner physician will always behave like a
non-owner physician. Intuitively, observing many patients treated by a given physician allows me
to assign her a behavioral type. I could then compare the distribution of physician types to the
known physician mix (proportion of owners relative to non-owners) across hospitals to infer the
behavioral types of owners and non-owners. There is substantial variation across POHs in the
physician mix; for example, there are POHs where more than 80% of practicing physicians are
investors, and there are POHs where fewer than 25% of practicing physicians are investors. This
variation makes the probabilistic strategy more powerful; at hospitals where nearly all practicing
physicians are investors, I can identify the behavior of physician-investors relatively well; while at
hospitals primarily staffed by non-owners, I can identify the behavior of non-owners relatively well.
In practice, I incorporate the probability that each physician is an owner by using a Bernoulli
mixing distribution over the likelihood function for all patients treated by each potential owner
physician. As noted above, I also have data on the aggregate physician ownership share at each
POH. I do not have further information on the distribution of ownership shares across individual
physicians, so I simply assume that aggregate physician ownership is spread equally among all
physician-investors:
f with probability pg( 0 with probability 1 - pt
for each potential owner p treating patients at hospital j, where A3 is aggregate physician ownership
at hospital j. Given this assumption, for physician p treating patients lp, ..., N, in market m, the
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expected probability of observing outcomes ((mip, ci,), ... , (mNp, cNn)) then becomes
E (Pr {(mi, m,cip = 1),..., (mNp = m, cN, - 1)|(X)7 1 , (d ) -m })
Ny
=g, JPr {cip~j=1, mipy = mXi, (dP0 , ~r)J , 1;}
i=1p
N,
(1 - pj) 11 Pr {cip = 1, nipj = m Xi, (dPO,0)< ,0; .
i= 1p
1.3.5.2 Imperfectly observed sickness - structural approach with instrumental vari-
ables
Next consider Xi. Conditional on all patient characteristics which are observed to the econometri-
cian, it is possible that the physician observes that some patients are more severely ill than others.
For example, one patient may have difficulty climbing stairs, which may affect treatment and mor-
tality but not be reflected in observable data. In some specifications, I allow for the presence of an
unobservable component of patient characteristics, so that patient type is characterized by the set
of observable characteristics Xi and a unidimensional unobservable shock to patient illness severity,
si:
m* = a + Xi# + d' v + (df0 * Xi) + dp"', + (d 0 * down) + s,
Here, it is convenient to simply let si be the only unobservable shock in the mortality equation,
as one cannot econometrically distinguish unobservable sickness which is observable to the physi-
cian from unobservable sickness which is also unobservable to the physician. The unobservable
component si is allowed to affect both patient mortality and physician preferences; in a model
of cherry-picking, physician-investors may select unobservably healthy patients into their owned
hospitals:
Uipj df 0Oi + Xi * d ±OW2 + si * dpowu + dPO * downU3 + Xi * dPO * dwn W4
+sj * dPO * d"o4 + 7-pj (A1 + XiA2 + siA") + plnipj + p2distiJ + eipj
where the "u" superscripts denote preference parameters for unobserved sickness.
With this modification to the model, the average quality at physician-owned hospitals is not
separately identified from selection on unobservable health - intuitively, the same patterns in mor-
tality could be explained by higher quality (lower mortality) at physician-owned hospitals and no
selection on unobservables, or by no difference in quality at physician-owned hospitals and physician
cherry-picking on unobservable sickness. Thus, for this specification, it is necessary to first estimate
mortality parameters using instrumental variables to purge the effects of selection on unobserved
27
sickness, then to estimate the joint model holding quality parameters fixed, so that selection on
unobservables is identified by differences in mortality rates across hospital and physician types:
ipj 1dOw + Xi * dfO 2 + si * jdo +d *d w 3 + Xi * dPO * dowW 4
+si * dPO * d ""w + rpj (A\ + XiA2 + sihA) + p1&nipj + p2 distij + Eipj
m* = &+X + dOl+ (d' * Xj)' + down + (dfG * down) + s,
Snipj +si.
Having obtained consistent estimates of the parameters in the mortality equation, I will have
an estimate of latent mortality for each patient. For a physician-owner, if I observe that mortality
is systematically higher than expected given first stage estimates at the community hospital and
lower at the physician-owned hospital, I can infer that cherry-picking is taking place. 19
In practice, consistent instrumental variables estimates of the parameters in the mortality equa-
tion will be obtained in a preliminary step using patients' differential distance between the nearest
POH and the nearest non-physician-owned hospital as an instrument for treatment at the POH.
In the second step, I assume that si are i.i.d. standard normal2o and integrate the probability of
(mi, cipj), holding mortality parameters fixed, as a function of si, over the standard normal CDF,
for each i = 1, ... , N.
1.3.5.3 Identifying assumptions
The following assumptions provide conditions under which I am able to separately identify quality
and ownership incentive parameters using the above approach.
Assumptions
1. Conditional on all observable patient characteristics, the distribution of residual illness sever-
ity is not correlated with physician ownership. Above, I assume that si is i.i.d. standard
normal across all patients and physicians. Physician-owners may attract a different patient
population for a number of reasons. For example, they may be more experienced, or perhaps
primary care physicians send sicker patients to staff physicians because physician investors
would more likely treat them at the community hospital. This would lead me to underes-
timate profit incentive effects in my model because "cherry-picking" would not be observed
19 There could also be optimal matching based on si; e.g., unobservably sicker patients may be differentially
well-suited to treatment at a POH. In this specification, I am unable to associate selection on unobservables by
physicians with optimal matching behavior because optimal matching on unobservable sickness cannot be captured
in the mortality model. For this reason, selection on unobservable sickness by non-owners will be the sum of optimal
matching and other non-mortality-related preferences. Cherry-picking behavior will be captured by the difference in
selection on unobservables between owners and non-owners.
20 This normalization is imposed because the magnitude of mortality parameters can only be identified relative to
the magnitude of the error term.
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in subgame perfect equilibrium. It may also be the case that POHs enter with greater own-
ership shares in areas with unobservably healthy patients. In either case, the assumption
si ~ V(0, 1) would fail. I explore these issues in Section 1.7 using panel data for 2000-2004;
the results do not suggest evidence of substantial bias.
2. If treatment by owners implies different quality than treatment by non-owners, then this dif-
ferential quality is not varying in unobservable patient health. Letting A(m*,P) denote the
difference in latent mortality between POHs and community hospitals for physician type p,
I require that E[A(m*'owner) - Am*,nonoWner)|si] - E{A(m*,owner) _ *,non-owner) /]
for all si f s'. It may be the case that physician quality is hospital-specific. For example,
a " name on the door" effect could pertain due to owners caring more about perceived POH
quality; on the other hand, physician-owners may be more likely to skimp on materials at
the POH. If this quality differential of different types of physicians across physician-owned
and community hospitals also depends on unobservable patient severity si, for example, if
skimping on materials by physician investors harms severe patients more, then I cannot sep-
arate the physician's profit incentive from physician altruism at the margin of hospital choice
(the physician knows severe patients will receive worse care, so treating them at a community
hospital would be optimal). Such an effect would lead me to overestimate cherry-picking.
This assumption seems unlikely to be problematic, but I will return to it in my discussion of
the results.
3. The instrumental variable approach is valid. I use an instrumental variables approach in which
patients' differential distance between the nearest physician-owned and non-physician-owned
hospitals is used as an instrument for treatment at a POH. This approach requires that the
instrument not be correlated with the outcome variable (mortality) except through its effect
on the regressor of interest (treatment at the POH). I explore the validity of this assumption
using pre-entry data; as discussed in Section 1.7, the results do not suggest evidence of bias.
4. Each patient can treat their patients at any hospital in their market. It is important for my
analysis to correctly specify the choice set of each physician; otherwise, I may find that a
physician has a strong preference for her own hospital when in fact that is the only hospital
with which she has admitting privileges. I excluded one market from my sample because I
found evidence of economic credentialing, a practice in which physician privileges are based in
part on issues of competition. 2 1 A search of U.S. news articles for the period 1997 to present
uncovered evidence of no further suits for the physician-owned hospitals in my sample. I
also determined that only eight of the 151 non-physician-owned hospitals in my primary
sample (accounting for 2% of sample admissions) did not have patients treated by potential
2A group of cardiologists in Little Rock, Arkansas was denied admitting privileges at the Baptist Health hospital
system after the group obtained an ownership interest in the Arkansas Heart Hospital; the subsequent lawsuits
continued throughout my entire sample period (Sorrel 2007).
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owners of a hospital within a ten mile radius. I interpret this as evidence that tacit economic
credentialing does not occur in my sample. 22
I am able to examine the validity of all assumptions but Assumption 2, and do not find evidence
of substantial bias in my conclusions, as discussed in greater detail in Section 1.7. I now proceed
to describe my sample and estimation procedure.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Sample construction
This paper uses information from several datasets. Patient encounter data are taken from the
100% Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) inpatient admissions database from 2005.
In my main specifications, I analyze the population of non-emergency cardiac patients admitted
by a potential cardiac specialist in all hospital referral regions (HRRs23 ) containing at least one
physician-owned hospital. I also provide evidence on markets containing at least one cardiac single-
specialty hospital (SSH). I restrict my sample to non-emergency patients in order to focus on
cases where physicians were able to choose the location of treatment. For patients with multiple
admissions, the first admission in the year was analyzed.
The inpatient claims database includes patient demographics (age, sex, race), dates of admis-
sion and discharge, diagnosis-related group (DRG), ten diagnosis codes in addition to codes for
principal diagnosis and diagnosis at admission, six procedure codes, discharge status, length of
stay, unique hospital identifier, and unique identifiers for attending physician, operating physician,
and other physician.24 Cardiac patients were identified using DRG and principal diagnosis descrip-
tors. 25 Following the procedure used by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
22 Each such hospital operates in a relatively large market (10 or more hospitals) where each non-POH's share of
physician-owner admissions would be expected to be low without any credentialing.
23 HRRs were designed by the Dartmouth Atlas Working Group to explicitly account for regional health care
markets for tertiary medical care such as major cardiovascular surgical procedures and neurosurgery. Each HRR in
the U.S. has at least one city where both major cardiovascular surgical procedures and neurosurgery are performed.
See http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/. Each HRR in my sample contains at least 3 hospitals providing
high-acuity cardiac care.
24 For this project, it is necessary to identify a unique decision-making physician for each patient. Whenever
possible, each patient was assigned to the physician in the operating physician field, which was populated for 85.1%
of sample cases. In the absence of an operating physician identifier, the decision-making physician was assumed to
be the "other physician." In cases missing both "operating physician" and "other physician" identifiers, the decision-
making physician was assumed to be the attending physician on staff. For sample patients also appearing in the
CMS 20% carrier claims database, this procedure identified one of the physicians submitting a reimbursement claim
during the admission period in 93% of cases.
2 5 Cardiac DRGs were defined as those falling under the "circulatory system" major diagnostic category (MDC).
Diagnoses were identified as cardiac in nature via a search of the full set of ICD-9 codes for the key word components
of "cardio- ," "heart," "coronary," and "chest."
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in generating its report to Congress on specialty hospitals, I used the full 100% inpatient database
to determine each hospital's measure of cardiac specialization. 26 Cardiac single-specialty hospitals
were defined as those for which at least 45 percent of their Medicare cases were cardiac in nature
(MedPAC, 2005).27 I further refined my measure of specialization to require that cardiac specialty
hospitals be capable of admitting high-acuity patients; hospitals that admitted at least thirty pa-
tients in surgical cardiac DRGs (e.g., coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), percutaneous coronary
intervention (PCI), open heart surgery) in 2005 met this requirement.
The inpatient claims were also linked to CMS's 100% denominator database, which contains
information about enrollees' demographics, subsidy entitlement (i.e., employer subsidy, low-income
subsidy, etc.), participation in Medicare, and date of death. HMO patients were identified in this
file and eliminated from the sample in order to focus on patients without plan-based restrictions
on hospital choice. ZIP code-level demographics (e.g., median income, population, % of adult
population with Bachelor's degrees) were linked to each patient from the 2000 U.S. Census.
I merged the cardiac inpatient sample with the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual
surveys, which provide detailed data on hospital location, HRR, ownership type (e.g., non-profit,
for-profit, government), capacity, teaching status, system membership, scanning and surgical facili-
ties, and participation in physician-hospital affiliations. Each patient's hospital choice set is defined
as all hospitals capable of admitting high-acuity cardiac patients in the local HRR for their home
ZIP code. I used the Census TIGER database to find the latitude and longitude of the centroid
of each patient's home ZIP code and calculated the straight-line distance between home ZIP and
each choice set hospital using the Great Circle formula.
I also merged the Medicare data with a self-collected dataset containing characteristics of each
physician-owned hospital. Details regarding the construction of this dataset are available in Ap-
pendix A. The 20% carrier claims file was used to flag as potential owners those physicians present
on at least two inpatient admissions in 2005. This criterion was developed to identify potential
owners without assuming specific referral behavior for physician-investors. 2 8 In Section 1.7, I also
present estimates wherein physician investors were assumed to be the top admitting physicians at
2 6 The full inpatient database for 2005 includes 13.8 million claims submitted by 8,705 providers for 7.9 million
patients. 25% of all admissions were in cardiac DRGs.
2 7 The average provider had only 11% of admissions in cardiac DRGs, compared to 72% for cardiac POHs.
2 8 The carrier claims file was used in conjunction with the inpatient admission file because the carrier claims identify
all physicians present on each admission, while the inpatient file displays only up to three physician identifiers and
may therefore exclude many physicians present on each admission. In particular, the "operating physician" field in the
inpatient file naturally favors cardiac surgeons and interventional cardiologists (ICs) over other types of cardiologists,
as it identifies the performing physician if a procedure was performed during the admission. Over 84% of the
non-emergency patients in my sample had a procedure performed, 36% of which were for percutaneous transluminal
coronary angioplasty (PTCA), a procedure performed by ICs, and a further 17% of which were for CABG, a procedure
performed by surgeons. There are three major sub-specialties of cardiology: non-invasive cardiologists, invasive
cardiologists, and interventional cardiologists (,Johnson, 2009). POHs are owned by both cardiologists and surgeons
(see sources in Appendix A), so that using the inpatient file to identify potential owners might overstate the probability
that physicians in procedural specialties in my sample are owners.
31
each POH and results are largely unchanged. Two of the physician-owned hospitals in my dataset,
the Oklahoma Heart Hospital and the Aurora BayCare Medical Center, have made current lists of
their physician investors available on their websites. I examined these lists to aid in identification
of potential physician-investors based on referral patterns and specialization. 2 9
My sample of physician-owned hospitals includes both cardiac specialty hospitals and non-
specialized hospitals. Of the 20 physician-owned cardiac specialty hospitals in my sample, 12 were
privately-owned in 2005, either independently by physicians or joint with a private corporation.
These hospitals are identified in Table 1.1. Aggregate physician ownership shares range from 28%
to 100%, split among 12 to 69 physician-investors. There is substantial variation in the number of
actual owners relative to the number of potential owners flagged in the Medicare data; on average,
each potential owner has about a 50% chance of being an actual owner, but this measure varies
from 25% to 100%.
Table 1.1: Fully-private cardiac physician-owned hospitals
Agg. Phys. Actual Potential
Hospital Market Opened Stake Owners Owners
Arizona Heart Hospital AZ Jun-98 29.4 45 82
Bakersfield Heart Hospital CA Oct-99 46.7 20 51
Galichia Heart Hospital KS Dec-01 80 32 31
Kansas Heart Hospital KS 1999 40 20 62
Heart Hospital of Lafayette LA Mar-04 49 12 35
Louisiana Heart Hospital LA Feb-03 48.9 29 41
Nebraska Heart Institute NE May-03 100 19 59
Heart Hospital New Mexico NM Oct-99 28 35 84
Dayton Heart Hospital OH Sep-99 33.5 36 73
Heart Hospital of Austin TX Jan-99 29.1 51 77
Lubbock Heart Hospital TX Jan-04 49 13 52
TexSAn Heart Hospital TX Jan-04 49 69 91
Note: See Appendix A for description of dataset construction.
The remaining physician-owned cardiac specialty hospitals in my dataset are partnerships with
nonprofit hospital systems. Table 1.2 displays the characteristics of these hospitals in 2005. Hos-
pitals partnered with non-profit community hospitals have aggregate physician shares of 21.2% to
50% split among 21 to 73 doctors. Other than physicians having at most a 50% ownership share,
the overall distribution of ownership characteristics is similar for fully-private POHs and commu-
nity hospital partners. The ratio of actual owners to potential owners is also similarly distributed,
ranging from 0.31 to 1 with an average of 0.6.
Finally, my sample includes four physician-owned hospitals which provide generalized care in
29 See detail in Appendix A.
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Table
tems
1.2: Cardiac physician-owned hospitals partnered with non-profit hospitals or hospital sys-
Agg. Phys. Actual Potential
Hospital Market Opened Stake Owners Owners
Tucson Heart Hospital AZ Oct-97 21.2 45 58
Fresno Heart Hospital CA Oct-03 49 47 29
Indiana Heart Hospital IN Feb-03 30 35 77
St. Vincent Heart Center IN Dec-02 50 73 155
Oklahoma Heart Hospital OK Aug-02 49 34 82
St. Francis Heart Hospital OK Apr-04 40 34 55
Avera Heart Hospital SD Mar-01 33.3 21 67
Baylor Heart and Vascular TX 2002 49 43 52
Note: See Appendix A for description of dataset construction.
addition to cardiac services. 30 The characteristics of these hospitals are listed in Table 1.3. They are
quite different from physician-owned cardiac hospitals - although aggregate physician ownership
is similar to nonprofit partner POHs (20-49%), the ratio of actual to potential owners for non-
specialized POHs ranges from 43% to 55%.
Table 1.3: Non-specialized physician-owned hospitals
Agg. Phys. Actual Potential
Hospital Market Opened Stake Owners Owners
Crestwood Medical Center AL 1965 20 100 230
NEA Medical Center AR 1998 40 53 123
Harlingen Medical Center TX Oct-02 49 70 128
Aurora BayCare WI 2001 40 73 163
Medical Center
Note: See Appendix A for description of dataset construction.
Table 1.4 displays the characteristics of the 287 hospitals in the 29 HRRs I identified with at
least one physician-owned or cardiac specialty hospital. 3 132 13% of non-physician-owned general
3 0 These hospitals do not meet MedPAC's criteria for cardiac specialization, as described above.
3 1 Only characteristics of hospitals capable of treating high-acuity patients are included in all analyses.
3 2 In the full 100% sample of Medicare admissions, the 8,705 hospitals submitting claims treated an average of
1,277 patients in 1,582 inpatient encounters. Among the 5,573 hospitals treating non-emergency cardiac patients,
claims were submitted for an average of 194 patients in 217 encounters in that category. In contrast, hospitals in
my sample treated a far greater number of cardiac patients, submitting inpatient claims for 947 cardiac patients on
average in 2005; 876 of those patients were treated by decision-making physicians classified as cardiac specialists.
Further restrictions to non-disabled, non-HMO, non-emergency patients for whom the first facility of admission could
be identified and who were treated in a market with a physician-owned or cardiac specialty hospital in 2005 leaves
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Table 1.4: Hospital characteristics
N
HRRs
Note: All hospitals providing high-acuity cardiac care in 29 HRRs including either a physician-owned
hospital or cardiac specialty hospital. See Section 1.4 for definition of high-acuity cardiac care. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
hospitals are government-owned; 21-33% of non-physician-owned hospitals are for-profit. 11-12% of
non-physician-owned hospitals are teaching hospitals; no physician-owned hospitals are government-
owned, nonprofit, or teaching hospitals. Both specialization and physician ownership are associated
69,752 patients treated in 29 markets including 287 hospitals capable of treating high-acuity patients.
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Government
For-profit
Teaching
Cardiac catheterization
Cardiac ICU
Angioplasty
Adult cardiac surgery
Heart transplant
Ultrasound
CT scan
MRI
SPECT
PET
Emergency department
Beds
Cardiac ICU Beds
RNs/bed
Non-Phys-Owned
General Hospitals
0.130
(0.337)
0.209
(0.407)
0.118
(0.323)
0.864
(0.343)
0.624
(0.485)
0.733
(0.443)
0.584
(0.494)
0.068
(0.252)
0.986
(0.116)
0.982
(0.134)
0.923
(0.267)
0.629
(0.484)
0.235
(0.425)
0.982
(0.134)
311.559
(215.793)
7.439
(9.869)
1.417
(0.525)
254
29
Non-Phys-Owned
Cardiac Hospitals
0.000
(0.000)
0.333
(0.500)
0.111
(0.333)
0.857
(0.378)
0.857
(0.378)
0.857
(0.378)
1.000
(0.000)
0.143
(0.378)
1.000
(0.000)
0.857
(0.378)
0.857
(0.378)
0.714
(0.488)
0.143
(0.378)
0.857
(0.378)
179.889
(88.846)
17.857
(13.496)
1.771
(0.877)
9
8
Phys-Owned
General Hospitals
0.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.750
(0.500)
1.000
(0.000)
0.750
(0.500)
0.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.500
(0.577)
0.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
107.500
(20.551)
5.000
(7.572)
2.215
(0.832)
4
4
Phys-Owned
Cardiac Hospitals
0.000
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.941
(0.243)
0.765
(0.437)
0.882
(0.332)
0.882
(0.332)
0.000
(0.000)
0.941
(0.243)
0.824
(0.393)
0.118
(0.332)
0.176
(0.393)
0.000
(0.000)
0.765
(0.437)
57.650
(12.642)
15.765
(18.318)
1.809
(0.831)
20
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with a greater likelihood of adult cardiac surgery services, and with a lower likelihood of advanced
scanning capabilities (e.g., CT scan, MRI, etc.) and emergency departments. Physician-owned
and specialized hospitals are smaller, but tend to have more registered nurses per hospital bed and
more cardiac intensive care beds.
Table 1.5: Sample patient characteristics
All POH Markets All Cardiac POH Markets
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Demographic variables:
Age 75.198 7.060 75.168 7.042
Female 0.441 0.497 0.438 0.496
Black 0.035 0.184 0.037 0.188
Asian 0.004 0.062 0.004 0.064
Hispanic 0.027 0.162 0.023 0.151
% Bachelor's (ZIP) 0.136 0.082 0.138 0.083
Population (ZIP) 21,265 15,815 21,150 15,443
Median Income (ZIP) $39,363 $13,473 $39,824 $13,659
Primary diagnosis: 41401 0.372 0.483 0.380 0.485
Comorbid conditions:
End stage renal disease 0.017 0.127 0.017 0.127
Congestive heart failure 0.236 0.425 0.233 0.423
Peripheral vascular disease 0.057 0.231 0.056 0.230
Dementia 0.009 0.095 0.008 0.091
Chronic pulmonary disease 0.216 0.412 0.216 0.411
Rheumatic disease 0.016 0.125 0.015 0.123
Mild liver disease 0.006 0.078 0.006 0.077
Diabetes with chronic complication 0.020 0.139 0.019 0.135
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 0.002 0.043 0.002 0.041
Renal disease 0.056 0.230 0.054 0.227
Malignancy 0.023 0.150 0.023 0.150
Moderate or severe liver disease 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.024
Metastatic solid tumor 0.004 0.062 0.004 0.062
Treatment/outcome characteristics:
Treated at POH 0.305 0.460 0.314 0.464
90-day mortality 0.062 0.241 0.061 0.240
# Hosps 11.391 7.253 12.071 7.214
Distance 26.175 29.098 26.936 29.874
N 46,597 42,579
Note: Non-emergency cardiac patients in HRRs with physician-owned
hospitals. Distance
ZIP code to hospital.
appserv.cpe.umanitoba.ca/
is Great Circle distance from centroid o
ICD-9 codes for comorbidities from h
viewConcept.php?conceptID =1098#a_ references.
f patient's
ttp://mchp-
Characteristics of my sample of 46,597 cardiac patients in POH market hospitals and 42,579
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patients in specialized POH market hospitals are displayed in Table 1.5. The average patient in
my sample is a white man aged 75 years and comes from a relatively large, affluent, educated
ZIP code. About 38% of patients have a primary diagnosis of coronary atherosclerosis. The most
common included comorbidities are congestive heart failure and chronic pulmonary disease. 31% of
sample patients are treated at a physician-owned hospital. Overall 90-day mortality in this sample
of non-emergency patients is 6.1%, which is significantly lower than the 8.7% mortality rate among
emergency cardiac Medicare admissions. The average distance between a patient's home and the
hospital of treatment is 27 miles.
Table 1.6: Sample physician characteristics
Non-POH Physicians POH, Non-Owners Potential Owners
Mean SD Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Inpatient Admissions 160.005 159.597 192.613 202.388 233.747 186.776
Sample Admissions 8.705 16.315 13.503 23.983 26.179- 30.355
N 2,243 292 730
Note: Sample physicians classified based on being non-owners never treating at POH, non-owners
who treat at POHs, and potential owners. Inpatient admissions counts include all admissions
for which physician was listed in any physician identifier field. Sample admissions counts based
on identifier of decision-making physician as described in Section 1.4.
Table 1.6 displays some statistics for sample physician treatment patterns. The average non-
owner physician who did not admit patients at a local POH in my data was present on 160 inpatient
admissions in 2005, compared to 192 inpatient admissions for non-owners who did admit at a local
POH. In contrast, the average potential owner was present on 234 inpatient admissions - this
pattern is in part mechanical because potential owners are flagged as having a certain number
of admissions at the local POH. Among the non-emergency cardiac patients in my sample, non-
owners were classified as the decision-making physician for 8-13 patients on average, the higher
figure applying to non-owners treating patients at the local POH, while the average potential owner
physician was the decision-making physician for 26 admitted patients. It is common for physicians
to treat patients at more than one hospital in their market; Figure 1-3 is a histogram of the number
of hospitals in which sample physicians treated admitted patients, focusing on physicians who ever
treated patients at the local POH. Both non-owners and potential owners are more likely to see
patients at multiple hospitals rather than at a single hospital, though the distribution is somewhat
more skewed right for potential owners of POHs. This is consistent with my model of physicians
choosing among multiple hospitals in their local market.
36
Patterns in physician treatment across multiple hospitals: potential owners vs. non-
O Non-Owners [N=292]
M Potential Owners [N=730]
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Note: Hospital counts from all physician identifiers in 100% inpatient admissions file. Included physicians are those ever treating at a physician-
owned hospital in 2005 based on link of 20% carrier file with 100% inpatient admissions file using patient identifier and date. Only specialized
physician-owned hospital markets included.
1.4.2 Mortality and choice patterns: descriptive evidence
In this section, I provide some descriptive evidence regarding mortality and choice patterns in my
sample of markets with physician-owned or specialty cardiac hospitals. Reduced form analysis of the
data indicates the presence of optimal matching effects, in that some patients are relatively better-
suited to treatment at physician-owned hospitals than others, and that cherry-picking behavior
appears small at most.
Table 1.7 displays the results of a probit regression of 90-day mortality on a dummy for treatment
at a physician-owned hospital and several other hospital characteristics (dummies for government
ownership, for-profit ownership, teaching status, and de-meaned registered nurses per bed), sepa-
rately for different sets of controls for patient characteristics. In the first pair of columns, included
patient characteristics are demographics only: age, gender, race, and ZIP code demographics such
as income, population, and the percentage of adults with a Bachelor's degree. In the second pair of
columns, fixed effects for principal diagnosis and 12 dummies for comorbidities which are commonly
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Table 1.7: Reduced form mortality effects of hospital characteristics
Demog Controls Demog Controls Demog Controls
Comorb Controls Comorb Controls
Primary Diag FEs DRG FEs
HRR FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
All POH/SSH Markets
Government 0.091*** 0.101*** 0.075** 0.075* 0.059* 0.058
(0.030) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.036)
For Profit 0.036 0.053*** 0.068*** 0.084*** 0.057** 0.071**
(0.023) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.030)
Teaching -0.120*** -0.067 -0.066** -0.029 -0.015 0.026
(0.026) (0.049) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.036)
RNs/Bed 0.020 -0.002 0.009 0.002 0.002 -0.004
(0.015) (0.030) (0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022)
Non-Phys. Owned SSH -0.136*** -0.080** -0.089*** -0.051 -0.033 0.020
(0.031) (0.040) (0.033) (0.047) (0.033) (0.064)
Phys. Owned -0.145*** -0.153*** -0.101*** -0.120*** -0.072*** -0.092***
(0.024) (0.043) (0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.034)
Pseudo R 2 (N = 69, 752) 0.055 0.059 0.170 0.174 0.157 0.160
All POH Markets
Government 0.110*** 0.100* 0.078** 0.066 0.069* 0.047
(0.035) (0.052) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.043)
For Profit 0.098*** 0.059** 0.121*** 0.077** 0.093*** 0.050
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Teaching -0.025 0.015 0.017 0.032 0.007 0.037
(0.037) (0.047) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.061)
RNs/Bed -0.003 -0.021 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.004
(0.017) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.025)
Phys. Owned -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.103*** -0.111*** -0.091*** -0.102***
(0.025) (0.041) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.038)
Pseudo R 2 (N 46,597) 0.055 0.058 0.168 0.171 0.151 0.155
All Cardiac POH Markets
Government 0.116*** 0.117** 0.091** 0.082* 0.067 0.049
(0.041) (0.047) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
For Profit 0.103*** 0.063** 0.121*** 0.081** 0.095*** 0.058
(0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035)
Teaching -0.029 0.010 0.007 0.028 0.000 0.036
(0.038) (0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.063)
RNs/Bed 0.000 -0.020 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.003
(0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025)
Phys. Owned -0.155*** -0.151*** -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.105*** -0.110***
(0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.041)
Pseudo R 2 (N =42,579) 0.055 0.058 0.166 0.169 0.152 0.155
Note: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses for specifications without HRR FEs. Specifications
with HRR FEs have HRR-clustered standard errors.
used in the health literature, such as congestive heart failure, diabetes, and dementia are included
as well.33 In the third pair of columns, DRG fixed effects and comorbidities are included. 34 For each
3 3 Included comorbidities are the unweighted comorbidity illness components of the Charlson Index, an index
shown to be strongly associated with mortality (Quan, et al., 2005). ICD-9 codes for Charlson index components
from http://mchp-appserv.cpe.umanitoba.ca/viewConcept.php?conceptlD= 1 098#a references.
3 4 DRG and procedure codes are in part based on the intensity of treatment chosen by the patient's physician and
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set of controls, estimates with and without HRR fixed effects are shown. The most striking feature
of this table is the significant reduced-form mortality improvement observed at physician-owned
hospitals. The magnitude of the improvement decreases as richer controls are included, consistent
with the observation that POHs treat an observably healthier patient population on average, but
remains large and significant across all specifications. Notably, we see in the specifications includ-
ing markets with non-physician-owned cardiac specialty hospitals that a mortality improvement
is available at those facilities as well, which is generally not statistically different from the POH
mortality effect. This fact indicates that the mortality improvement at POHs may be due to spe-
cialization rather than physician ownership itself - indeed, the reduced form mortality improvement
at cardiac POHs is larger than across all POs, but the difference is not statistically significant. In
markets containing only cardiac POHs and controlling for primary diagnoses, demographics, and
comorbidities (the main specification used in this paper), expected mortality is 1.3pp lower for the
average patient, which is large relative to sample mortality of 6.1%.
The table also indicates that treatment at a government-owned or (non-physician-owned) for-
profit institution appears to increase mortality risk (implying about a 1.3pp increase in mortality
for the average patient), though the magnitude and significance of those estimates vary by included
markets and controls. The effects of other hospital characteristics on mortality are small and noisy.
Table 1.8 displays the results of a probit regression of 90-day mortality on primary diagnoses,
demographics, and comorbidities alone and interacted with a dummy for treatment at POH and
other hospital characteristics as well as the distance from the patient's home to the nearest hospital.
In the first two columns, the estimates and standard errors for all level terms in this regression are
displayed. In the second two columns, estimates and standard errors for the patient characteristic-
POH interactions are displayed. We observe in the table that age, diagnoses, and patient comor-
bidities are strong predictors of patient mortality regardless of hospital choice. Consider the effects
of these factors on the baseline white, male, mean age patient with zero comorbidities and a pri-
mary diagnosis of coronary atherosclerosis (the excluded category in this regression and the modal
primary diagnosis). Predicted mortality risk for this patient is 1.7%. A one standard deviation
increase in patient age (approximately seven years) implies a 1.3pp increase in expected mortality
risk, nearly doubling the mortality risk for that patient. Among the more common patient comor-
bidities observed in the data, such as congestive heart failure and chronic pulmonary disease, the
presence of such comorbidities increases the Z-score of mortality by 0.23-0.34, implying an increase
in mortality risk for the baseline patient of 70-120%. There are also a number of primary diagnoses
for which mortality rates are drastically different than for the baseline patient. For example, acute
myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attack) patients admitted on a non-emergency basis have
much higher predicted 90-day mortality, up to a factor of 11, than the baseline non-emergency
are thus directly endogenous. Diagnoses and comorbidities are assigned by physician and may be subject to bias as
well as they are a subset of the inputs into the algorithm that determines DRG and thus reimbursement. E.g., if
physician-owners "up-code" patient diagnoses/comorbidities in order to target a particular DRG and non-owners do
not, mortality estimates could be biased.
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Table 1.8: Reduced form mortality model results for cardiac POH markets
N
Pseudo R
2
Note: All patient characteristics included alone and interacted with dummy for treatment at POH. Huber-
White robust standard errors in parentheses.
patient. The coefficients on these and other patient characteristics can account for a substantial
amount of the variation in mortality risk, resulting in a mean sample mortality of 6.1%, which is
much higher than for the baseline patient.
The coefficient of primary interest in Table 1.8 is the estimated mortality impact of being treated
at a physician-owned hospital. The reduced form evidence shows that treatment at a physician-
owned hospital implies a decrease in mortality risk of about 0.5pp for the baseline (relatively
healthy) patient, an effect size of 31% which is significant at the 5% level. The results in the second
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Treated at POH
Age
ESRD
Female
Black
Asian
Hispanic
% Bachelor's (ZIP)
Population (ZIP)
Median Income (ZIP)
Congestive heart failure
Peripheral vascular disease
Dementia
Chronic pulmonary disease
Rheumatic disease
Mild liver disease
Diabetes with chronic complication
Hemiplegia or paraplegia
Renal disease
Malignancy
Moderate/severe liver disease
Metastatic solid tumor
Rheumatic mitral insufficiency
Mitral valve insufficiency and aortic valve stenosis
Multiple involvement of mitral and aortic valves
Rheumatic heart failure (congestive)
Hypertensive heart and chronic kidney disease
AMI of anterolateral wall, initial
AMI of other anterior wall, initial
AMI of inferolateral wall, initial
AMI of inferoposterior wall, initial
AMI of other inferior wall, initial
AMI of other lateral wall, initial
Subendocardial infarction, initial
AMI of other specified sites, initial
AMI of unspecified site, initial
Acute and subacute bacterial endocarditis
Mitral valve disorders
Aortic valve disorders
Atrial fibrillation
Ventricular fibrillation
Cardiac arrest
Congestive heart failure, unspecified
Acute on chronic systolic heart failure
Acute on chronic diastolic heart failure
Dissection of aorta, thoracic
Thoracic aneurysm without mention of rupture
Abdominal aneurysm, ruptured
Other chest pain
Mechanical complication due to heart valve prosthesis
Infection, reaction to cardiac device, implant, graft
Other primary diagnosis
Min. Dist.
Government
For-Profit
Teaching
RNs/Bed
Constant
Level Term
Coef. SE
-0.148* (0.060)
0.034*** (0.002)
0.214*** (0.079)
-0.007 (0.025)
-0.102 (0.065)
0.056 (0.189)
-0.124 (0.076)
-0.326 (0.229)
0.022* (0.012)
-0.023 (0.061)
0.342*** (0.027)
0.301*** (0.051)
0.249** (0.100)
0.228*** (0.028)
0.145 (0.090)
0.863*** (0.108)
0.154* (0.081)
0.384* (0.209)
0.354*** (0.046)
0.372*** (0.066)
0.818** (0.322)
1.037*** (0.129)
1.109** (0.466)
0.600*** (0.211)
0.793** (0.360)
0.770*** (0.135)
0.622*** (0.205)
1.278*** (0.171)
0.805*** (0.096)
0.966*** (0.224)
0.706*** (0.236)
0.644*** (0.098)
0.881*** (0.215)
0.605*** (0.048)
0.755*** (0.193)
1.299*** (0.107)
0.998*** (0.261)
0.443*** (0.118)
0.487*** (0.075)
0.174*** (0.054)
1.108*** (0.241)
2.751* (0.376)
0.622* (0.039)
0.611** (0.249)
0.798*** (0.309)
1.135* (0.627)
0.892*** (0.323)
1.778*** (0.227)
-0.384*** (0.126)
1.414*** (0.367)
0.435* (0.228)0.060 (0.037)
0.000 (0.001)
0.093* (0.044)
0.121** (0.033)
-0.002 (0.040)
-0.009 (0.019)
-2.118*** (0.033)
42,579
0.1682
POH Interaction
Coef. SE
-0.001 (0.004)
0.065 (0.183)
0.038 (0.050)
0.132 (0.146)
0.209 (0.373)
0.256* (0.150)
0.631 (0.429)
-0.031 (0.022)
-0.199* (0.117)
0.002 (0.053)
-0.003 (0.087)
-0.279 (0.267)
0.014 (0.055)
-0.042 (0.207)
0.028 (0.215)
-0.276 (0.186)
0.862** (0.384)
0.085 (0.093)
0.158 (0.145)
0.635 (0.731)
-0.392 (0.317)
0.030 (0.669)
-0.198 (0.323)
-0.227 (0.484)
-0.292 (0.225)
0.325 (0.713)
-0.182 (0.278)
-0.005 (0.163)
-0.952* (0.518)
0.531 (0.373)
0.276* (0.146)
-0.044 (0.381)
-0.139 (0.087)
-0.048 (0.351)
-0.255 (0.225)
0.151 (0.529)
-0.048 (0.211)
-0.219 (0.153)
-0.116 (0.114)
-0.333 (0.401)
-0.558 (0.667)
-0.008 (0.080)
0.346 (0.353)
0.214 (0.583)
0.617 (0.757)
-0.169 (0.474)
-0.531 (0.648)
-0.352 (0.383)
-0.683 (0.682)
0.253 (0.412)
-0.045 (0.072)
two columns further indicate some potential for optimal matching in that there are some patient
characteristics which alter the potential mortality effect of treatment at a POH. For example,
patients with hemiplegia/paraplegia have marginally significantly higher predicted mortality at
physician-owned hospitals than at community hospitals. There are also some characteristics for
which treatment at a POH is more beneficial than for the baseline patient. For example, most
patients with a primary diagnosis of AMI have a more acute (higher mortality risk) cardiac condition
than the baseline patient and benefit more from treatment at the POH than the baseline patient.
Most of these "optimal matching" coefficients are insignificant at this level of detail.
Figure 1-4: Patterns in potential owner physician referral
80
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
% of Patients Admitted at Physician-Owned Hospital
E Potential Owner
Physicians [N=432]
0.8 0.9 1
Note: Patterns in potential owner physician referral of sample patients to physician-owned hospitals, 2005.
sample patients excluded. Only specialized physician-owned hospital markets included.
Physicians treating fewer than 10
The above reduced form evidence indicates there may be scope for optimal matching of patients
to physician-owned hospitals based on underlying health characteristics. There is also evidence of
substantial variation across physicians in hospital choice patterns, which may provide evidence of
the potential scope for cherry-picking or other differential physician-owner behavior. Figure 1-
4 displays a histogram of the percentage of patients treated at a POH by physicians flagged as
potential owners. 3 5 There is a large mass of physicians treating 70% or more of their patients at
3 5Potential owner physicians treating 10 or more sample patients are included.
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Figure 1-5: Predicted probability of treatment at a POH: likely owners vs. likely non-owners
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Note: Estimates from logistic regression of POH treatment dummy on age and index of patient sickness excluding age, alone and interacted with
dummy for high likelihood of ownership. Index of patient sickness generated using coefficient estimates from probit of 90-day mortality on
patient demographics, comorbidities, and primary diagnosis fixed effects in full sample of non-emergency cardiac patients in 22 HRRs including
cardiac POHs. Physicians treating fewer than 10 sample patients excluded. Pr{own} defined as ratio of actual owners to potential owners;
Pr{own}=0 for non-potential owners. See Appendix for description of actual and potential ownership.
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the local POH and another mass of physicians treating zero sample patients at the POH. This
histogram implies that the majority of physicians either treat the majority of their patients at the
POH or few patients at the POH. Neither behavior allows for a large degree of cherry-picking.
To examine how treatment behavior varies in patient characteristics, Figure 1-5 provides a
coarse characterization of the graphical intuition in Section 1.3, based on a logit regression of
the choice of physician-owned hospital on a sample of physicians who were either very likely (at
least 67% probability based on the ratio of actual owners to potential owners) or very unlikely
(33% probability or less) to be physician investors. I included in the regression both age and a
(de-meaned) index of patient sickness 36 alone and interacted with a dummy for likely ownership.
As can be seen in the Figure, sample physicians who are not very likely to be owners refer only
about 30-40% of their patients to the local POH, and this probability is decreasing in both age
and other patient sickness. In contrast, physicians who are very likely to be owners send about
65-70% of their patients to the POH on average, and there is a mixed relationship between referral
patterns and patient type - likely owners' referrals to the POH are increasing in patient age and
decreasing in other patient sickness. These estimates do not account for differences in market size
and composition across physician probability type (each of which will be factored into the joint
model described in Section 1.3), but are suggestive that physician-owner cherry-picking is small at
most.
1.5 Joint Model Estimation
In the following section, I estimate the full joint choice-outcome model using maximum likelihood,
first on the sample of markets including specialized POHs, which are the primary focus of my
analysis. This sample includes 42,579 patients in 18 markets. I also show results including four
additional markets with non-specialized physician-owned hospitals; this sample covers 46,597 pa-
tients in 22 markets. Each physician's choice set contains between 3 and 26 hospitals in the local
market, as defined by HRR. In addition to all ownership variables, I include the same hospital
controls used in the reduced form mortality analysis: government-owned, for-profit, teaching, and
registered nurses per bed.37
As noted in Section 1.3, the joint model results may be inconsistent due to unobservable pa-
tient sickness across hospital type. To account for this potential issue, I also perform a two-step
estimation procedure using instrumental variables. In the first step, I use patients' differential
distance between the nearest physician-owned and non-physician-owned hospitals to instrument for
treatment at a POH. The equation of interest, 90-day mortality as a function of patient, hospital,
36 The index is generated by running a probit of 90-day mortality on all patient demographics, primary diagnosis
fixed effects, and comorbidities.
3 7 Other hospital characteristics, such as surgical programs and imaging facilities, are often missing in the AHA
data, and are thus omitted from my analysis. Non-physician-owned SSH markets are almost mutually exclusive of
cardiac POH markets, so a separate control for cardiac specialization is not included.
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and physician characteristics, is by necessity a latent variable model, and the endogenous regressor
is binary, so the appropriate instrumental variables approach is maximum likelihood estimation of
a multivariate probit model, where treatment at a POH is assumed to be a function of all included
patient characteristics and differential distance to the nearest POH, the latter of which is excluded
from the main equation. For example, if treatment at a POH is the only endogenous variable in
the mortality model:
mip = 1 [ai + Xi#1 + dp0 v + si > 0]
dP0 = 1 [a2 + Xi/32 + (disti,po - disti,non o PO2 + ui > 0]
where disti,t is the distance from patient i to the nearest hospital of type t. Another distance
measure, disti,ho0 p, the minimum distance from patient i to any hospital, is included in Xi in both
equations (i.e., patients located far away from any hospital may be likely to die due to limited
availability of care in an emergency situation).
See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for a discussion of this approach. Linearity of the latent vari-
able models and joint normality of the errors si and ui are sufficient for identification. However,
as noted by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), the appropriate choice of instrument can contribute
substantially to identification. An appropriate instrumental variable will satisfy two requirements:
(1) it will be correlated with the endogenous regressor dPO; and (2) it will be uncorrelated with the
error in the main equation si. Here, I require that the instrument, patients' differential distance be-
tween the nearest POH and the nearest non-physician-owned hospital, is correlated with treatment
at a POH, but uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of mortality. Regarding requirement
(1), the first stage estimates indicate that differential distance is a strong negative predictor of
treatment at a POH, in both linear probability and probit models with and without patient char-
acteristics - in each specification, the null of no effect of differential distance on POH choice is
rejected at the 0.1% level, indicating that this approach is not subject to weak instruments bias.
As expected, patients located relatively far from POHs are significantly less likely to be treated
at POHs. Regarding (2), the necessary exclusion restriction for this approach is that, conditional
on all patient characteristics, unobserved patient health is not correlated with differential distance,
as might be expected if POHs locate in areas with unobservably healthy patients. Differential
distance to hospitals of different types is a commonly-used instrument in the literature on health
care quality, and this restriction seems plausible given that the IV estimation includes a rich set of
sickness characteristics including demographic variables that a hospital planning board would take
into consideration in choosing a site; Section 1.7 explores this assumption using pre-entry data and
finds no evidence suggestive of bias.
The first-step IV estimation of the above specification provides me with consistent estimates
of the average quality of treatment at POHs in the mortality equation. I am also interested in
how quality varies with patient characteristics (optimal matching). Multivariate probit models can
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only handle binary endogenous regressors because they model a system of several latent variable
models simultaneously. Thus, my IV specifications with patient characteristics interactions in the
following section include only binary patient characteristics - I present results in which patient
characteristics are used to generate quintiles of patient sickness. 3 8
In the second step, I fix the mortality parameters in the joint choice-mortality model to equal
the consistent IV estimates obtained in the first step and allow for an unobservable shock to illness
severity to impact both choice and mortality. I integrate the likelihood of the joint choice-outcome
probability over the assumed distribution of unobserved illness severity to obtain the expected
likelihood of each observation; given the assumption of a unidimensional normal for unobserved
illness severity, I improve the speed of the integration by using Gauss-Hermite numerical quadrature
rather than straightforward simulation.
Estimation of the joint models becomes computationally difficult with the full set of patient
characteristics, so I estimate several different specifications in which I collapse subsets of the patient
characteristics into indices of patient sickness using the mortality parameters from the IV estimation
results. This approach restricts the pattern of interaction effects in the joint estimation across the
patient characteristics included in each index, but allows me to illustrate how different types of
patient characteristics influence hospital choice behavior both on average and varying with multiple
ownership variables.
1.6 Empirical Results
In this section, I discuss the results of estimation of my joint models. First, I show mortality and
choice results for cardiac POH markets using two baseline characterizations of patient type, one
continuous and one using quintiles of patient sickness. I then briefly discuss results of two alternative
specifications, one including DRG fixed effects and DRG weight (which determines reimbursement)
in order to examine potential cherry-picking based on more direct measures of profitability, and
another including additional markets with non-specialized facilities. The results are overall similar
across baseline and alternative specification results, indicating there are quality improvements at
physician-owned hospitals and no strong evidence of physician-owner cherry-picking.
1.6.1 Mortality results - base specifications
In this section, I describe the mortality results of the two estimation approaches - with and without
unobservable patient sickness - for the sample of patients treated in markets with cardiac POHs.
38In some specifications, I include the effect of being treated by an owner in the mortality equation. In order
to obtain first-step IV estimates of the effect of a physician being an investor in a POH, I run the estimation 100
times, drawing at each iteration a set of owners based on the probability that each physician is an investor, and
instrumenting for the interaction between the POH dummy and the investor dummy using the interaction between
the simulated owner dummies and differential distance.
45
I first show results for a specification using continuous measures of patient sickness, de-meaned
patient age and sickness indexes for other demographic variables, cardiac comorbidities, non-cardiac
comorbidities (e.g., end-stage renal disease), and primary diagnoses. These results do not reject the
null hypothesis that reduced form estimates of hospital quality are not subject to omitted variables
bias, and both reduced form and IV estimates provide evidence of a significant improvement in
mortality risk for patients treated at a POH, which may be attenuated for some sicker patients. I
then show results where patient type is characterized by a set of dummy variables for each quintile of
patient sickness, which allows for consistent IV estimation of optimal matching parameters. These
results suggest that POH quality is nonlinear in patient sickness, so that quality improvements are
strongest for moderate severity patients.
The first column of Table 1.9 displays the mortality coefficient estimates from the joint model
estimation assuming no unobservables, with patient age and sickness indexes entering the model
alone and interacted with a dummy for treatment at a POH to allow for optimal matching on
observables. 39 The second column displays the results of the instrumental variables estimation
of the mortality model as a function of patient, hospital, and physician characteristics. 40 A Chi-
squared test of the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of hospital choice with respect to mortality
(i.e., in the multivariate probit model, that the error terms in the first stage - POH choice as a
function of patient characteristics and differential distance - and second stage - mortality - are
uncorrelated) is not rejected at the 10% level of significance.
The results of the mortality model are quite consistent across the two estimation approaches,
implying similar effects for patient and non-ownership-related hospital characteristics to those de-
scribed in the reduced form results in Section 1.4. As before, patient age and sickness are strong
positive predictors of mortality (the latter by construction), and government and for-profit owner-
ship are associated with an increase in patient mortality.
The estimated mortality impact of treatment at a physician-owned hospital is slightly larger
in the joint model without IV than in the model which allows for unobservable patient selection
- the difference is not significant. The estimates of the joint model without instruments in the
first column of Table 1.9 indicate that treatment in a physician-owned facility entails a 0.6pp
reduction in mortality for the baseline patient with mean age and minimum sickness indexes,41
an effect which is large in relative terms (34% of the baseline patient's mortality rate of only
1.1%). The estimated mortality improvement is greater for patients with less favorable demographic
characteristics, cardiac comorbidities, and more severe cardiac diagnoses - for a patient with mean
39 Each sickness index was generated by applying the level coefficient estimates from the IV estimation to each pa-
tient characteristic included in the index. Coefficients on patient characteristics from the IV estimation are essentially
identical to reduced form estimates.
40 In this specification, continuous patient characteristics are used, so no interactions with the POH dummy are
estimated as the multivariate probit method allows only for binary endogenous regressors. IV results with interactions
are discussed below for the sickness quintiles model.
4
'The sickness indexes are not de-meaned, so that the baseline patient has the modal primary diagnosis and no
comorbidities, as in the reduced form results in Section 1.4.
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Table 1.9: Mortality results - multiple
Joint Model Joint Model
No IV IV - Distance
No Unobs. Sickness Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Age 0.034*** (0.002) 0.034*** (0.002)
Demographic Index 1.057*** (0.368) 1.000 -
Card. Comorbidity Index 1.001*** (0.053) 1.000 -
Non-Card. Comorbidity Index 0.983*** (0.050) 1.000 -
Diagnosis Index 1.008*** (0.037) 1.000 -
Government 0.090** (0.046) 0.093** (0.044)
For-Profit 0.117*** (0.033) 0.117*** (0.033)
Teaching 0.000 (0.049) -0.002 (0.040)
RNs/bed -0.010 (0.019) -0.010 (0.019)
Distance to Hosp. 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)
POH -0.163* (0.091) -0.152*** (0.042)
POH*Age -0.001 (0.063)
POH*Demographic Index -0.244 (0.611)
POH*Card. Comorbidity Index -0.003 (0.099)
POH*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index 0.087 (0.128)
POH*Diagnosis Index -0.026 (0.107)
Owner -0.043 (0.050) -0.025 (0.040)
POH*Owner 0.081 (0.482) 0.046 (0.068)
Constant -2.117*** (0.026) -2.114*** (0.031)
N 42,579
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobservables and IV estimates for
joint choice-outcome model with unobservables. Instrument for treatment at POH was dis-
tance between nearest POH and nearest non-physician-owned hospital. Sickness indexes
generated using coefficients on patient characteristics from IV estimation, separating de-
mographic characteristics, cardiac comorbidities, non-cardiac comorbidities, and primary
diagnoses. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors from joint model with no
unobserved sickness from nonparametric bootstrap with 100 repetitions. Standard errors
from IV model are Huber-White robust standard errors.
age, demographics, cardiac comorbidities, and primary diagnosis severity but zero non-cardiac
comorbidities, treatment at a POH implies an estimated reduction in mortality of 1.1pp. In contrast,
the estimated mortality improvement is smaller for patients with higher non-cardiac comorbidities.
In relative terms, there is a 30% mortality improvement for the mean patient but only a 26%
mortality improvement for a patient with non-cardiac comorbidities one standard deviation above
the mean. These estimates imply some potential for optimal matching which is consistent with
the intuition that cardiac POHs may be well suited to treating very sick cardiac patients but not
patients who are very sick along non-cardiac dimensions; however, the estimated interactions are
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quite noisy, with standard errors exceeding their point estimates.
The IV mortality results in the second column of Table 1.9 imply a slightly smaller quality
effect of being treated at a physician-owned hospital - for the average patient, treatment at a
POH is estimated to entail a 1.1pp lower mortality risk than treatment at a non-profit community
hospital, the excluded hospital category in the mortality model. This effect is slightly smaller than
the 1.2pp estimated quality effect for the average patient from the non-IV results, which echoes
the finding that the null of no endogeneity of POH treatment was not rejected. Thus, correction
for omitted variables bias does not strongly impact the finding of higher-quality care at physician-
owned hospitals.
In this base specification, I also allow for treatment by a physician-investor to have an effect
on mortality, and further allow for that effect to vary by hospital type in order to capture any
potential firm specificity of physician performance. 4 2 The results of each estimation shown in
Table 1.9 imply a slight decrease in mortality for patients treated by physician investors, which is
undone for patients treated at POHs. These effects could be consistent with a number of stories.
For example, survey studies discussed in Section 1.2 indicated that POHs have higher amenities - if
physician-owners divert attention to providing amenities at the POH when treating patients at the
owned hospital, then this could diminish other dimensions of quality. However, these estimates are
small and imprecise, so no strong conclusions may be drawn. I omit the owner effects in alternative
specifications to focus on the POH quality.
The continuous mortality specification considered above is illuminating as to the effect of physi-
cian ownership on quality of care for the average patient, but the IV approach had limited ability to
characterize optimal matching to physician-owned hospitals due to its focus on binary endogenous
regressors. To provide further evidence on the potential for optimal patient-hospital matching,
I also estimated a specification in which patient characteristics were limited to sickness quintiles
obtained from a probit of 90-day mortality on all available patient characteristics. This provides a
set of binary regressors that can be interacted with treatment at the POH to provide evidence of
optimal matching while accounting for endogenous hospital choice. To fix ideas, note that the coef-
ficients driving quintile assignment are similar to those found in Table 1.8, with primary diagnoses
and comorbidities accounting for much of the variation in mortality risk.43 The distribution of
predicted latent mortality is heavy-tailed and skewed right; the standard deviation of the index of
expected mortality among patients in the highest quintile is more than four times that of patients
in the middle quintile.
4 2Huckman and Pisano (2006) found evidence that cardiac surgeon performance at a particular hospital was
correlated with prior procedural volume at that hospital but not correlated with volume at other hospitals, suggesting
that surgeon performance is not fully portable.
4 3The majority of patients in the lowest quintile have the modal primary diagnosis of coronary atherosclerosis
(the excluded category in Table 1.8), while nearly half of patients in the highest quintile have a primary diagnosis
of subendocardial infarction or congestive heart failure, unspecified, two severe diagnoses which are common in my
sample.
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Table 1.10 displays the mortality coefficient estimates from both joint model estimations (with
and without IV), where quintiles of sickness enter the model alone and interacted with a dummy
for treatment at the POH. The baseline patient in this model has low predicted mortality risk of
approximately 0.9% in non-profit community hospitals. The coefficients on the dummies for other
quintiles are sensible - patients in the higher quintiles have increasingly greater mortality risk. The
highest quintile patients have an expected mortality rate of 19%, which is more than three times
the average sample mortality rate. Results for hospital characteristics are similar to both previous
specifications and are not discussed here for the sake of brevity.
Table 1.10: Mortality results
Sickness Quintile 2
Sickness Quintile 3
Sickness Quintile 4
Sickness Quintile 5
Government
For-Profit
Teaching
RNs/bed
Distance to Hosp.
POH*Sickness Quintile
POH*Sickness Quintile
POH*Sickness Quintile
POH*Sickness Quintile
POH*Sickness Quintile
Constant
N
1
2
3
4
5
- quintiles specification,
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
0.227*** (0.061)
0.543*** (0.059)
0.868*** (0.054)
1.491*** (0.053)
0.098** (0.049)
0.110*** (0.032)
-0.024 (0.054)
-0.006 (0.022)
0.001 (0.001)
-0.063 (0.105)
-0.122 (0.080)
-0.172*** (0.059)
-0.138*** (0.053)
-0.174*** (0.051)
-2.362*** (0.054)
42,579
cardiac POH markets only
Joint Model
IV - Distance
Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
0.227*** (0.063)
0.544*** (0.058)
0.866*** (0.055)
1.492*** (0.053)
0.001 (0.001)
0.099** (0.043)
0.109*** (0.032)
-0.024 (0.040)
-0.006 (0.018)
-0.060 (0.103)
-0.119 (0.086)
-0.195** (0.079)
-0.105 (0.073)
-0.201*** (0.073)
-2.362*** (0.051)
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobservables and IV
estimates for joint choice-outcome model with unobservables. Instrument
for treatment at POH was distance between nearest POH and nearest non-
physician-owned hospital. Sickness quintiles generated using coefficients on all
patient characteristics from probit estimation of mortality on full sample of
non-emergency cardiac patients in 26 sample POH markets. Standard errors
in parentheses. Standard errors from joint model with no unobserved sickness
from nonparametric bootstrap with 100 repetitions. Standard errors from IV
model are Huber-White robust standard errors.
As can be seen by comparing the two pairs of columns of Table 1.10, the results of the speci-
fications with and without instrumental variables both predict a large mortality improvement for
patients with moderate illness severity. The estimated effects of treatment at a POH for differ-
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ent sickness quintiles are similar in magnitude in the non-IV and IV specifications, though the IV
estimates are somewhat noisier; non-IV estimates again appear to be largely unaffected by unob-
served patient selection across hospital types. As in the previous specification, for moderate-severity
patients in the third quintile, treatment at a POH rather than a non-profit community hospital
implies a decrease in mortality risk of 1.1pp, which is statistically significant and large relative to
the mortality risk of 3.3% for that patient category.
The mortality effect of treatment at a POH appears to be nonlinear in patient sickness in
both IV and non-IV specifications; the point estimates indicate that patients in the first, second,
and fourth quintiles of sickness benefit relatively less from treatment at the POH. These effects
are sensible given that patients who are very healthy or very ill may be less affected by higher
quality treatment. The effect for patients in the highest quintile is also strongly negative even in
IV estimates, which may be related to an optimal matching effect as the high average mortality
rate for fifth-quintile patients is driven in large part by patients in high-severity primary diagnoses.
However, the high degree of variation in characteristics among the sickest patients implies that
this effect is small in relative terms, on the order of 23% of average mortality in that category
rather than 33% for the third quintile of sickness. Taken together, these results suggest that the
average mortality result in the previous joint model specifications were primarily driven by quality
improvements for moderate-severity cardiac patients.
1.6.2 Choice results - base specifications
Next, I turn to the choice results from the base specifications with and without unobservables.
The results indicate that owner physicians prefer to treat the majority of their patients at the
physician-owned hospital, and that physician-owner preferences over measures of patient sickness
do not diverge from those of non-owners. This is not suggestive of a model of physician-owner
cherry-picking of healthier patients. Moreover, estimates on the measure of per-physician ownership
share do not suggest that a greater financial stake leads to greater cherry-picking behavior. Finally,
the estimated coefficients on unobserved sickness indicate that non-owners, rather than owners,
are sending patients with greater unobserved sickness away from POHs, while physician-owners
appear to exhibit countervailing behavior, so that on balance there is no substantial selection on
unobservables biasing reduced form mortality coefficients.
Table 1.11 displays the choice coefficient estimates from the joint model estimation using age
and indexes of patient sickness characteristics. The first pair of columns displays the results of the
joint model without unobservables; the second pair of columns displays the results fixing mortality
parameters at their IV estimates and estimating the choice model allowing for selection on unob-
servable patient sickness. In each column, we see average preferences over general hospital charac-
teristics, non-owner physician preferences for treating at the physician-owned hospital, differential
preferences of owners for treating at the physician-owned hospital, and the effect of ownership share
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on preferences for treating at one's own hospital.44 Note that average preferences of non-owners for
treating patients at the POH are separated by whether physicians were flagged as potential owners
to account for the mechanical effect of potential owner status on average preferences.
Table 1.11: Choice results multiple sickness indexes specification,
Distance
Government
For-Profit
Teaching
RNs/bed
POH
POH*Potential Owner
POH*Age
POH*Demographic Index
POH*Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Diagnosis Index
POH*Unobs. Sickness
POH*Owner
POH*Owner*Age
POH*Owner*Demographic Index
POH*Owner*Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Owner*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Owner*Diagnosis Index
POH*Owner*Unobs. Sickness
Share
Share*Age
Share*Demographic Index
Share*Card. Comorbidity Index
Share*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index
Share*Diagnosis Index
Share*Unobs. Sickness
N
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
-1.265*** (0.034)
-1.323*** (0.129)
-0.539*** (0.079)
0.402*** (0.124)
0.188** (0.085)
-2.432*** (0.299)
2.239*** (0.375)
-0.019*** (0.007)
5.043*** (1.737)
-0.021 (0.276)
-0.851*** (0.304)
0.026 (0.177)
4.196***
0.012
-0.781
0.195
-0.298
0.115
-0.011
0.002
2.664
-0.044
0.229
-0.185
(0.353)
(0.010)
(4.169)
(0.412)
(0.427)
(0.312)
(0.147)
(0.004)
(2.922)
(0.166)
(0.161)
(0.164)
cardiac POH markets only
Joint Model
IV - Distance
Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
-1.311*** (0.037)
-1.348*** (0.116)
-0.545*** (0.086)
0.422*** (0.102)
0.176** (0.080)
-2.852*** (0.495)
2.484*** (0.420)
-0.018** (0.008)
4.679** (1.875)
-0.041 (0.236)
-1.073*** (0.368)
0.008 (0.195)
-1.037* (0.619)
4.513*** (0.505)
0.020 (0.014)
-0.075 (3.710)
0.403 (0.533)
-0.040 (0.625)
0.061 (0.362)
0.546 (0.804)
0.058 (0.172)
-0.002 (0.008)
2.226 (1.991)
-0.135 (0.251)
0.179 (0.314)
-0.100 (0.194)
-0.407 (0.273)
42,579
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobservables and joint choice-outcome
model with mortality parameters on observables fixed at their IV estimates. Instrument for treat-
ment at POH was distance between nearest POH and nearest non-physician-owned hospital. Sick-
ness indexes generated using coefficients on patient characteristics from IV estimation, separating
demographic characteristics, cardiac comorbidities, non-cardiac comorbidities, and primary diag-
noses. Standard errors from nonparametric bootstrap with 100 repetitions in parentheses.
Consider the results in the first column, the results of the joint choice-mortality model estimation
4 4 The coefficient on expected latent mortality in the choice equation has been normalized to equal -1, as all terms
in the mortality equation also enter linearly into the choice equation and this allows us to interpret the magnitudes
of the choice parameters.
51
allowing for optimal matching on continuous patient characteristics (age and sickness indexes)
and differential selection by ownership status, but assuming no selection on unobserved patient
health. The coefficient on a dummy for a hospital being physician-owned (denoted POH and
POH * PotentialOwner for non-potentials and potentials, respectively, in the table), alone and
interacted with patient characteristics, represents the preferences of non-owners for treating patients
at the local POH, after accounting for the effect of POH treatment on predicted mortality. First,
there is a significant negative preference among non-owners for treating patients at the local POH.
To put these numbers in perspective, looking across all sample markets and assuming all patients
have mean age and sickness indexes, the average predicted probability of being sent to a particular
physician-owned hospital by a non-owning physician flagged as a potential owner (and who does,
by definition, consider the POH as part of his or her choice set) is only 15.2%. The coefficients on
POH interacted with patient characteristics indicate that non-owners are more likely to treat older
patients and patients with greater comorbidities at a community hospital and to treat patients
with less favorable demographics at the local POH. For example, a standard deviation increase in
age or non-cardiac comorbidities implies a 1.4-1.6pp decrease in the likelihood of treatment at a
POH among non-owners, while a standard deviation increase in demographic index entails a 2.2pp
increase in the likelihood of treatment at a POH for a non-owner's patient. Demographic variables
are less strongly predictive of patient mortality than age and comorbidities, so that on balance
these estimates indicate an overall preference, after controlling for optimal matching, among non-
owners for treating sicker patients at community hospitals rather than physician-owned hospitals.
These preferences may capture the sum of non-owner physician preferences and average patient
preferences - e.g., older patients and patients with non-cardiac comorbidities may seek out the
general-service environment at a community hospital even beyond what can be accounted for by
expected mortality differences across hospitals. However, these differences do not indicate a large
alteration in the distribution of patients across hospitals.
The next six rows of the table tell a somewhat different story. Physician-owners have a strong
preference for treating patients at their owned facility. There is a statistically significant coefficient
of 4.2 on a dummy for physician owner interacted with a dummy for POH, which represents the
differential preference of owners relative to non-owners. Adding in the coefficients that capture
baseline preferences for POHs, this estimate indicates that the average predicted probability of a
physician-owner sending a patient of average health to their owned hospital is 83%. Patient age,
cardiac comorbidity index, and primary diagnosis index each have a positive, noisy effect on owner
preferences over hospitals, while non-cardiac comorbidities have a negative, noisy effect on owner
preferences for the POH. Each of these effects would be consistent with a story in which physician-
investors have a stronger preference than non-owners to treat the patients who do relatively well
at POHs at their owned hospital, but they are not statistically significant. Moreover, the standard
errors on the estimates are sufficiently small that the finding of no strong effect is meaningful
even at the top ends of the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated effects of age, cardiac
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comorbidities, and primary diagnoses on owner preferences, a standard deviation increase in any of
those characteristics implies only about a 2pp increase in referral probability, while the parameter
at the bottom end of the 95% CI for the estimated effect of non-cardiac comorbidities on owner
preferences indicates only a 3.8pp decrease in referral probability for a standard deviation increase in
the non-cardiac comorbidity index. These "most extreme" effect sizes are all still fairly small in both
absolute and relative terms, and do not suggest strong evidence of physician-owner cherry-picking.
There is a small negative point estimate of the effect of patient demographics on physician-owner
preferences, but the standard error is extremely large, so that this finding is not informative.
Per-physician ownership share directly affects the reimbursement a physician can expect for
a given patient, so the final six estimates in the first column examine the effect of increasing
estimated per-physician ownership share on average preferences as well as cherry-picking behavior.
Individual data on ownership were not available, as noted above, so these coefficients are identified
by variation in the ratio of aggregate ownership to total number of investors across hospitals. The
point estimate on per-physician ownership share, which ranges from 0.2 - 5.3%, is essentially zero
in this specification, indicating that physician-owners with greater ownership shares do not have
more or less of a home-base preference than owners with lower than average ownership shares.
This estimate may provide evidence that ownership per se drives physician choice patterns much
more than a physician's actual financial stake in the hospital. There is no significant evidence in
this model of physician stake driving cherry-picking behavior, either. The interactions between
ownership share and patient characteristics are all extremely noisy and exhibit no clear pattern
with regard to greater physician share and patient sickness altering preferences.
The second pair of columns of Table 1.11 displays the estimates of the choice model hold-
ing mortality parameters fixed at their IV estimates and allowing for selection across POHs and
community hospitals based on unobservable patient sickness. The estimated choice coefficients re-
garding preferences of owners and non-owners for the POH on average and varying with observable
characteristics are not statistically different from the estimates in the first column.
The specification in the second column of Table 1.11 also includes estimates of how owner and
non-owner preferences across hospitals vary with unobserved patient sickness. The coefficient on the
POH indicator interacted with unobserved patient sickness is negative for non-owners and positive
for owners. The former effect is significant, which is consistent with the pattern described above of
non-owners generally sending sicker patients to the community hospital, though the countervailing
effect of physician-owner preferences is consistent with a story in which there is no substantial
selection of unobservably healthy patients into POHs on balance - recall that I did not reject the
null hypothesis of no endogeneity of treatment at a POH. In any case, these estimates do not
provide strong evidence regarding cherry-picking behavior by owners. The interaction between
per-physician ownership share and unobservable sickness is negative, which could be consistent
with greater share implying greater cherry-picking behavior, but the effect is small and again
insignificant.
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Looking across the remaining rows in the table, it appears that physicians have strong prefer-
ences over general hospital characteristics aside from their effects on mortality. The coefficient on
(log) distance is negative and strongly significant. In a market with three hospitals (the smallest
market in my sample), a one standard deviation increase in distance (about 30 miles) above the
mean decreases the choice probability by 17pp for that hospital, all else equal. In my sample of
patients in cardiac POH markets, there is a significantly negative preference for government and
non-physician-owned for-profits, and a significant positive preference for teaching hospitals and
greater RNs per bed, above and beyond the effects of those preferences on mortality. In a market
of the average size for my sample (twelve hospitals) with one government hospital, the government
hospital is expected to have only a 3% market share of sample patients, all else equal. The lesser
preference for for-profits is not quite as pronounced on its own - in an average market with three
for-profit hospitals (the average across patients), the non-physician-owned for-profit hospitals are
expected to have only a 22% market share combined rather than the 25% that would apply if
preferences were entirely random. In contrast, a single teaching hospital in a market of average
size (the average patient has 1.3 teaching hospitals in their market) is expected to have a market
share of over 13%, which is more than 50% above the share that would be expected under random
preferences. The number of registered nurses per bed has a small but significant positive effect on
hospital choice - in a small market with three hospitals, a one standard deviation increase in RNs
per bed increases that hospital's choice probability by 3pp, all else equal.
Table 1.12 displays the choice coefficient estimates from the joint model estimations using
sickness quintiles as a stand-in for patient characteristics. Consider first the estimates in the first
pair of columns. Overall, the results for non-owner preferences exhibit a similar pattern to those
in the previous specification - non-owners overall prefer not to treat at the POH, and greater
observable patient sickness decreases their preference for the owned facility. The latter preferences
are only significant for the highest quintile of sickness and entail small changes overall - a patient
in the highest quintile of sickness is about 2.2pp less likely to be treated by a non-owner at a POH
than a patient in the lowest quintile, all else equal.
The table also shows a similar pattern to the previous specification in the preferences of owners
relative to non-owners regarding average preferences and selection of patients across hospitals based
on sickness. Owners are very likely to send all patients to the owned hospital, and there is not
a strong pattern of owner preferences varying in patient sickness characteristics that would be
expected in a model of cherry-picking. Further, the results for imputed per-physician ownership
alone and interacted with patient sickness are again essentially zero.
Comparing the two sets of columns, the joint specifications with and without unobservables
exhibit similar patterns, particularly for the baseline preferences over patient and hospital charac-
teristics. Comparing selection on unobservables to the results in Table 1.11, we again observe that
unobservably sick patients are selected by non-owners away from the POH and that there is a coun-
tervailing effect for patients of owner physicians. In this specification, however, there is a significant
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Table 1.12: Choice results - quintiles specification, cardiac POH markets only
Distance
Government
For-Profit
Teaching
RNs/bed
POH
POH*Potential Owner
POH*Sickness Quintile 2
POH*Sickness Quintile 3
POH*Sickness Quintile 4
POH*Sickness Quintile 5
POH*Unobs. Sickness
POH*Owner
POH*Owner*Sickness Quintile
POH*Owner*Sickness Quintile
POH*Owner*Sickness Quintile
POH*Owner*Sickness Quintile
POH*Owner*Unobs. Sickness
Share
Share*Sickness Quintile 2
Share*Sickness Quintile 3
Share*Sickness Quintile 4
Share*Sickness Quintile 5
Share*Unobs. Sickness
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
-1.253*** (0.033)
-1.315*** (0.117)
-0.541*** (0.093)
0.383*** (0.113)
0.185** (0.089)
-2.291*** (0.272)
2.191*** (0.351)
-0.181 (0.173)
-0.187 (0.165)
-0.151 (0.186)
-0.454*** (0.174)
2
3
4
5
4.249***
-0.001
-0.184
-0.030
0.244
-0.141
0.044
0.105
0.040
-0.034
(0.273)
(0.192)
(0.201)
(0.237)
(0.295)
(0.096)
(0.094)
(0.071)
(0.084)
(0.137)
Joint Model
IV - Distance
Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
-1.316*** (0.033)
-1.348*** (0.120)
-0.552*** (0.092)
0.408*** (0.103)
0.175** (0.075)
-3.047*** (0.555)
2.647*** (0.438)
-0.191 (0.138)
-0.162 (0.142)
-0.099 (0.186)
-0.485** (0.197)
-1.365*** (0.417)
4.740*** (0.410)
0.088 (0.219)
-0.164 (0.246)
0.287 (0.315)
0.313 (0.351)
0.639 (0.447)
-0.037 (0.158)
0.003 (0.107)
0.132 (0.102)
-0.005 (0.120)
-0.012 (0.147)
-0.396*** (0.132)
N 42,579
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobservables and joint
choice-outcome model with mortality parameters on observables fixed at their IV
estimates. Results for general hospital characteristics suppressed for brevity. In-
strument for treatment at POH was distance between nearest POH and nearest
non-physician-owned hospital. Sickness quintiles generated using coefficients on all
patient characteristics from probit estimation of mortality on full sample of non-
emergency cardiac patients in 30 POH/SSH markets. Standard errors from non-
parametric bootstrap with 100 repetitions in parentheses.
estimate of some cherry-picking on unobservable health as per-physician ownership increases. This
would provide some evidence of physician-investor cherry-picking; however, as discussed above,
sickness quintiles are a coarse measure of patient health and there is substantial variation within
the higher quintiles particularly, so that covariation in observable measures of patient sickness and
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per-physician ownership shares could yield this result. Indeed, a regression of an overall index of
mortality on per-physician ownership, controlling for quintiles of sickness, suggests this negative
relationship does exist. Taken together with the results in Table 1.11, this does not provide strong
evidence of physician-owner cherry-picking.
Taken together, the results of the two approaches to estimating the baseline specification indi-
cate that, for markets with specialized physician-owned hospitals, physician-owners have a strong
preference for treating at their owned facility and that owner preferences over hospitals do not dif-
fer substantially from those of non-owners in how they vary with patient characteristics. Further,
the estimates on physician type interacted with unobservable patient sickness do not suggest that
physician-owners cherry-pick unobservably healthier patients, and the results on physician share
do not suggest that financial stake impacts cherry-picking behavior.
1.6.3 Alternative specifications
In this section, I estimate two alternative specifications in order to further explore the patterns found
in the baseline estimation results. First, the mortality results above indicated that the specialized
POHs which are the primary focus of this project provide a significant mortality improvement, but
I found in Section 1.4 that comparable effects are found at non-physician-owned cardiac hospitals. I
also have a small sample of data for four markets including non-specialized POHs; in the following,
I include those markets in my sample to investigate whether quality effects are altered substantially.
Second, the choice results demonstrated that physician-owners' preference for treating at POHs is
not substantially affected by greater patient sickness, but did not consider how preferences vary
with reimbursement, which also affects patient profitability; in order to explore the determinants of
cherry-picking behavior more closely, I also estimate a specification including an index of sickness
based on DRG fixed effects as well as the DRG weight that determines reimbursement.
The results of the alternative specifications are largely similar to the baseline results discussed
above. Analysis of non-specialized POHs as well as specialized facilities does not significantly
alter results; the sample of patients treated at non-specialized POHs is small, but the results
do not suggest that quality improvements pertain only for specialized facilities. Results for the
specification including DRG weight do not suggest that physician-owners cherry-pick patients with
greater reimbursements, reinforcing the previous finding of no physician-owner cherry-picking on
patient characteristics.
1.6.3.1 Results for all POHs
As noted above, the majority of physician-owned hospitals providing cardiac care in my sample are
specialized; results presented thus far have focused on these facilities. In this section, I describe
the mortality results for all sample markets. The first column of Table 1.13 displays the mortality
coefficient estimates from the joint model estimation assuming no unobservables, and patient age
and sickness indexes enter the model alone and interacted with a dummy for treatment at a POH
56
to allow for optimal matching on observables. The second column displays standard errors. The
mortality results on patient and non-ownership hospital characteristics are nearly identical to the
results from the restricted sample. Again, there is a large and significant mortality improvement
at POHs, which may be enhanced for patients with greater demographic and cardiac measures of
sickness and attenuated for patients with greater non-cardiac sickness, but the interactions are not
statistically significant. The additional sample size in the four non-specialized POH markets is small
(4,018 patients), but the results do not suggest that results for POHs generally are significantly
different than results for specialized POHs.
Table 1.13: Mortality results - multiple sickness indexes specification, all POH markets
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
Age 0.034*** (0.002)
Demographic Index 1.125*** (0.302)
Card. Comorbidity Index 1.006*** (0.061)
Non-Card. Comorbidity Index 0.980*** (0.050)
Diagnosis Index 1.004*** (0.036)
Government 0.076** (0.039)
For-Profit 0.121*** (0.032)
Teaching 0.011 (0.048)
RNs/bed -0.011 (0.018)
Distance to Hosp. 0.001 (0.001)
POH -0.111*** (0.043)
POH*Age 0.000 (0.004)
POH*Demographic Index -0.519 (0.597)
POH*Card. Comorbidity Index -0.022 (0.100)
POH*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index 0.095 (0.123)
POH*Diagnosis Index -0.013 (0.065)
Constant -2.136*** (0.025)
N 46,597
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobserv-
ables. Sickness indexes generated using coefficients on patient
characteristics from IV estimation, separating demographic char-
acteristics, cardiac comorbidities, non-cardiac comorbidities, and
primary diagnoses. Standard errors from nonparametric bootstrap
with 100 repetitions in parentheses.
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1.6.3.2 Results using DRG index and DRG weight
The above baseline specifications analyzed choice and mortality with respect to measures of patient
sickness; in this section, I describe mortality and choice results using DRG weight, which determines
reimbursement for each diagnosis-related group, and an index based on DRG fixed effects rather
than primary diagnosis fixed effects. The latter modification allows me to explore the effect of
patient reimbursement category on hospital choice, holding fixed expected sickness for that category.
Continuous patient characteristics are used here and previous results indicated no omitted variables
bias with a coarser set of controls, so IV results allowing for unobservables are suppressed.
Table 1.14 displays the mortality coefficient estimates from the joint model estimation assuming
no unobservables. Patient age,'demographic index, comorbidity indexes, and DRG index and weight
enter the model alone and interacted with a dummy for treatment at a POH in the mortality model
to allow for optimal matching. Results for general hospital characteristics, as well as the level
coefficient estimates on patient characteristics, are quite similar to the base specification. In this
specification, the baseline patient is in DRG 527 (percutaneous cardiovascular procedure with drug-
eluting stent) and has expected mortality risk of 1% in a nonprofit hospital vs. 0.6% in a POH. In
this specification, we see that the POH mortality improvement is significantly smaller for patients
in more severe DRGs, so that the mortality improvement for the mean patient is slightly smaller
(lpp) than in the specification with primary diagnosis fixed effects; this may be due to POHs being
particularly well-suited to providing percutaneous interventions, and procedures were not accounted
for in the previous specifications. Other "optimal matching" estimates are not statistically different
from previous results.
Table 1.15 displays the choice coefficient estimates from the joint model estimation using DRG
controls. The results on general hospital characteristics and distance are similar to the base model
and are not discussed here. As in the base model, non-owners have a negative preference for treating
patients at the POH and owners have a strong positive preference for treating at the owned facility.
The results of the joint model without unobservables indicate again that non-owners tend to
send sicker patients away from POHs, and the magnitudes of the effects are similar to the base
model. Interestingly, non-owners are more likely to send patients with higher DRG weights (and
thus higher reimbursement) to the POH. This estimate is statistically significant but not large -
a standard deviation increase in DRG weight (about 1.8, which is quite large) involves only a 3%
increase in the probability of a non-owner treating the patient at a POH.
The differential preferences of owner physicians exhibit a similar pattern of cherry-picking to
that seen in previous specifications with respect to age, demographics and comorbidities. However,
in this specification, we observe that owners are significantly more likely than non-owners to treat
patients in more severe DRGs and with lower DRG weights. These effects are quite small (the
standard deviations of the DRG index and DRG weight, respectively, are 0.29 and 1.8) and alter
owners' expected referral patterns by only 1-2pp for a standard deviation change in characteristics.
The estimates of how physician preferences vary in ownership share are again for the most part
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Table 1.14: Mortality results - multiple sickness indexes specification with DRG dummies and DRG
weight, cardiac POH markets only
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
Age 0.034*** (0.002)
Demographic Index 0.994*** (0.248)
Card. Comorbidity Index 1.012*** (0.065)
Non-Card. Comorbidity Index 1.002*** (0.057)
Diagnosis Index 0.945*** (0.046)
DRG Weight -0.013** (0.006)
Government 0.068 (0.049)
For-Profit 0.092*** (0.034)
Teaching -0.004 (0.046)
RNs/bed -0.004 (0.021)
Distance to Hosp. 0.002*** (0.000)
POH -0.201*** (0.072)
POH*Age -0.002 (0.004)
POH*Demographic Index 0.006 (0.581)
POH*Card. Comorbidity Index -0.010 (0.132)
POH*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index -0.019 (0.115)
POH*Diagnosis Index 0.240** (0.104)
POH*DRG Weight -0.010 (0.014)
Constant -2.300*** (0.037)
N 42,579
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobserv-
ables. Sickness indexes generated using coefficients on patient
characteristics from IV estimation, separating demographic char-
acteristics, cardiac comorbidities, non-cardiac comorbidities, and
DRG dummies. Standard errors from nonparametric bootstrap
with 100 repetitions in parentheses.
zeros or sufficiently noisy to be uninformative; however, there is a significant estimate of greater
ownership share involving a lower preference for treating more severe DRGs at the POH. This
simply attenuates the average owner preference for treating more severe DRGs at the POH, and so
is not indicative of differential physician-owner cherry-picking on average.
This alternative specification was intended to examine whether including DRG weight (a proxy
for patient reimbursement) and controlling for DRG sickness would provide evidence of cherry-
picking not seen in the previous specifications, which just controlled for sickness. There is no
evidence of such behavior using these controls. On the contrary, the effects tend to go in the
opposite direction. DRG assignment is likely to be endogenous to physician treatment behavior
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Table 1.15: Choice results - multiple sickness indexes specification with DRG dummies and DRG
weight, cardiac POH markets only
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
Distance -1.263*** (0.032)
Government 
-- 1.346*** (0.127)
For-Profit -0.565*** (0.094)
Teaching 0.398*** (0.107)
RNs/bed 0.196*** (0.073)
POH -2.729*** (0.370)
POH*Potential Owner 2.135*** (0.325)
POH*Age -0.013 (0.008)
POH*Demographic Index 4.786*** (1.456)
POH*Card. Comorbidity Index -0.113 (0.238)
POH*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index -0.947*** (0.344)
POH*Diagnosis Index -0.161 (0.259)
POH*DRG Weight 0.157*** (0.044)
POH*Owner 4.330*** (0.428)
POH*Owner*Age -0.001 (0.012)
POH*Owner*Demographic Index -2.152 (3.337)
POH*Owner*Card. Comorbidity Index 0.033 (0.464)
POH*Owner*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index -0.502 (0.468)
POH*Owner*Diagnosis Index 1.158** (0.453)
POH*Owner*DRG Weight -0.201** (0.087)
Share 0.039 (0.218)
Share*Age 0.007 (0.006)
Share*Demographic Index 2.600 (1.842)
Share*Card. Comorbidity Index 0.089 (0.194)
Share*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index 0.268 (0.171)
Share*Diagnosis Index 
-0.534** (0.235)
Share*DRG Weight 0.040 (0.062)
N 42,579
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobservables.
Sickness indexes generated using coefficients on patient characteristics
from IV estimation, separating demographic characteristics, cardiac co-
morbidities, non-cardiac comorbidities, and DRG dummies. Standard
errors from nonparametric bootstrap with 100 repetitions in parenthe-
ses.
(moreso than simple diagnosis) and DRG weights are not direct measures of profitability, so I
will not interpret these effects as evidence of physician-owner altruism. However, they do provide
further evidence that physician-owners are not cherry-picking based on patient characteristics.
60
1.7 Robustness
My approach relies on several assumptions regarding the distribution of illness severity in the
patient population as well as the nature of POH entry. Further, I use a probabilistic method to
distinguish the behavior of owners from non-owners. I now turn to evidence on whether the extent
of any failures of the identifying assumptions is likely to lead to any substantial bias.
1.7.1 Distribution of unobservable patient sickness across physicians
First, because patient characteristics may not be perfectly observed, this analysis takes a structural
approach to dealing with unobserved illness severity. Specifically, I assume that unobserved patient
sickness is normally distributed and independent of patient observable characteristics and physician
type. One may be concerned that physician owners attract an unobservably different patient
population even prior to POH entry, and further that POH entry causes referral patterns to differ
across physician owners and non-owners. In order to explore these issues, I estimated reduced-form
models of the association between physician characteristics and both observable patient health and
residual mortality risk using a panel of inpatient cardiac admissions for 2000-2005, constructed
in exactly the same manner as described in Section 1.4, but selecting only the admissions for
physicians appearing in my 2005 sample. The full panel in markets with pre-entry data include
156,021 patients treated by 2,139 physicians at 107 hospitals.
To examine the distribution of unobserved patient sickness severity across physicians, I first
focus on the period prior to POH entry so that I may determine the difference in patient type
across physicians rather than picking up any quality effects of treatment at the POH. As in my
mortality specification, I ran a regression for the pre-entry period (N = 73,544) of 90-day mortality
on patient principal diagnoses, comorbidities, demographics, the distance from the patient to the
nearest hospital, characteristics of the treatment hospital, and some proxy variables for physician
ownership:
mipt = a + Xjt/ + Zjo + pOwnerVarp + eipt
I used three different proxy variables: the probability that the physician is an owner (the ratio of
the number of actual owners to the number of potential owners), an index of ownership equalling
the probability of ownership multiplied by the aggregate physician ownership share, and a dummy
variable for potential owners; to the extent that the coefficients on these variables capture differences
in unobserved patient sickness rather than quality effects of treatment by physician-owners, they
provide evidence on the association between physician type and sickness of the treated patient
population. The first row of Table 1.16 shows the results for the coefficients of interest. For
each proxy variable, there is a small negative relationship between ownership and unaccounted-for
mortality risk: (APrown = -0.00007, pIndex = -0.00001 and APotential = -0.001, respectively). 4 5
4 5 Results displayed are for linear regression of mortality on included characteristics; probit regression results were
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All of these results are quite noisy, having standard errors of greater size than the point estimates,
and they show no evidence that physician-owners treated unobservably healthier patients in the
pre-entry period.4 6
Table 1.16: Results of robustness check for association between patient sickness and physician
ownership
Pre-Entry DD Interaction
LHS Variable Pr{own} Own Index Pot. Owner Pr{own} Own Index Pot. Owner
90-Day Mortality 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Mortality Index -0.102*** -0.002*** -0.069*** -0.013 0.000 0.003
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008)
Age -0.752*** -0.010*** -0.537*** -0.282*** -0.006*** -0.054
(0.099) (0.002) (0.057) (0.116) (0.002) (0.052)
ESRD -0.008*** 0.000** -0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Female -0.072*** -0.001*** -0.048*** -0.005 0.000 -0.002
(0.010) (0.000) (0.008) (0.013) (0.000) (0.009)
Black -0.026*** -0.001*** -0.017*** 0.009 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.003)
Asian 0.002*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Hispanic 0.000 0.000 -0.015*** 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004)
% Bachelor's 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
ln(Population) 0.076 -0.002*** -0.176*** 0.076 0.004*** -0.010
(0.053) (0.001) (0.051) (0.130) (0.002) (0.108)
ln(Income) 0.019 0.000 -0.009 -0.023 0.000 -0.022
(0.019) (0.000) (0.011) (0.023) (0.000) (0.019)
Congestive heart failure -0.019*** -0.001*** -0.016*** -0.006 0.000 -0.007
(0.009) (0.000) (0.007) (0.013) (0.000) (0.011)
Peripheral vascular disease -0.009 0.000*** 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004)
Dementia -0.006*** 0.000*** -0.004*** -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Chronic pulmonary disease -0.054*** -0.001*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.001*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Rheumatic disease -0.006*** 0.000*** -0.002*** 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Mild liver disease -0.001 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Diabetes with chronic complication -0.011*** 0.000*** -0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Renal disease -0.011*** 0.000*** -0.007*** -0.011 0.000 -0.003
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005)
Malignancy -0.007*** 0.000*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 0.000*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Moderate or severe liver disease -0.001 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Metastatic solid tumor -0.002*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 73,544 73,544 73,544 156,021 156,021 156,021
HRRs 11 11 11 11 11 11
Note: First three columns display estimated coefficients from pre-entry regressions of left-hand-side variables on three
proxies for ownership. Second three columns display interaction term estimates from differences-in-differences regressions
of observables on a dummy for post-entry period, alone and interacted with three proxies for ownership. Standard errors
clustered by year in parentheses.
In contrast, consider the results in the second row of Table 1.16, which show the results of a
regression of an index of observable patient sickness (obtained from a probit from the full panel
of 90-day mortality on all patient characteristics) on the proxies for physician ownership. 47 Each
similarly small and insignificant.
461f physician-owner quality effects and unobserved patient type have countervailing effects on mortality, e.g.,
if physician-owners treat sicker patients but provide higher-quality care, then this specification would not detect
differences in patient population in the pre-period.
4 7 The remainder of the rows show the results for individual patient characteristics; in the pre-period, it appears
that physician-owners treated younger, more often male and white patients with fewer comorbidities.
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of the first three columns shows a small but significant negative relationship between physician
ownership and observable patient sickness; for the first proxy, the probability of ownership, the
magnitude of the association between ownership and observable sickness is largest, indicating a
difference between owners and non-owners of approximately 1/5 of a standard deviation. These
results indicate that physician owners treated an observably different patient population in the
period prior to POH entry even though there was no difference in unobserved mortality risk.
The above results give evidence that physician owners and non-owners did not have unobservably
different patient populations prior to POH entry, but it may be the case that entry induced a change
in referral patterns to owners. To examine this possibility, I also explore whether the distribution
of patients of owners vs. non-owners changed upon POH entry. Because I am now looking over
periods during which the hospital market changed drastically, I must now focus on observed patient
characteristics only rather than unobserved sickness, as any estimate of unaccounted-for mortality
risk would mechanically be a function of the chosen hospital and thus of physician type. I ran a
regression of patient characteristics separately on the proxies for potential ownership, an indicator
for the period after POH entry, and an interaction between the ownership proxies and the post-entry
dummy, on the full panel of 156,021 patients:
Xit a + p1OwnerVarp + 2 AfterEntryit + t 3 OwnerVarp * AfterEntryit +uipt
where Xipt is a patient characteristic thought to be a determinant of mortality. Consider the second
row of Table 1.16. As discussed above, the first three columns show a significant negative relation-
ship between overall sickness and the proxies for ownership in the pre-entry period; the second three
columns show at most a small and insignificant negative effect of POH entry on the relationship
between ownership and observable patient sickness. The association between observable sickness
and ownership is much larger in magnitude than that between residual sickness and ownership in
the pre-entry period, so that the magnitude of the effect of ownership on residual sickness upon
entry is likely to be similarly small and insignificant. Thus, using the results for observable sickness
upon entry as a rough proxy for changes in the residual sickness of owners' patient population upon
entry, we would expect the patient population of owners to be at most very slightly healthier than
that of non-owners in my sample - the strongest estimated effect is that the patients of an owner
physician with Pr{own} = 1 had an average index of observable sickness which was lower by 0.11
than the patients of non-owners in the post-entry period; this effect is about 20% of a standard
deviation of the sickness index.4 8 The observed differences dwarfed the unobserved differences in
the pre-entry period, so any unobserved differences across physician type in the post-entry period
are likely to be far smaller.
To sum up, I found no evidence of a difference in unexplained mortality across physician type in
4 8The remainder of the table shows the detail for individual patient characteristics, for which the effects of POH en-
try on patient population are somewhat mixed. Upon POH entry, physician-owners appear to begin treating a slightly
younger population with a different distribution of patient comorbidities, some favorable and some unfavorable.
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the period prior to POH entry. I found no strong evidence of a change in observed illness severity
across physicians upon POH entry; the largest effect was small relative to the standard deviation
of total observed sickness and not statistically significant. Given that it is unobserved patient
illness severity that I am concerned with, these results do not suggest that my model estimates are
substantially biased due to unobserved patient sorting across physician types.
1.7.2 Relationship between unobserved sickness and POH entry
Using these panel data, I am also able to examine the relationship between unobserved patient type
and POH entry. I perform this check for two reasons. First, in my choice model, I assume that per-
physician ownership shares are not endogenous with respect to unobserved patient type. Second,
my instrumental variables approach requires that the instrument, differential distance between the
nearest POH and the nearest non-physician-owned hospital, not be correlated with mortality except
through its effect on hospital choice.
First, if physician-owned hospitals enter with different per-physician ownership shares as a
function of unobservable patient health, e.g., if POHs enter with a larger per-physician ownership
share in areas with unobservably healthier patients, then my estimates on each term with ownership
share in the choice equation may be biased. I examine the relationship between unobserved patient
sickness and physician ownership share by performing a similar pre-entry regression to the one
outlined above:
mit = + Xit + pT-i +eit
where T is the maximum physician ownership share as of 2005 in patient i's market. That is, I
regress mortality on all patient characteristics and the greatest eventual physician ownership share.
The estimated coefficient of interest is f^ = -9.60e -06 and the standard error is 0.0000433, so that
the measured relationship between aggregate physician ownership and unobserved mortality risk
is negative, but small and insignificant. This result does not suggest that my results for physician
ownership shares would be biased due to unobserved patient population.
Second, my instrumental variables strategy assumes that the excluded instrument, distance
from the patient to the nearest POH, is not correlated with the outcome of interest, 90-day mor-
tality, except through the endogenous variable, treatment at the POH. In a parametric model such
as the multivariate probit used in this paper, assumptions of normality and linearity are sufficient
for identification, but an appropriate exclusion restriction allows the estimation to rely less heavily
on these assumptions; as noted by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), bivariate probits can provide
misleading results based primarily on functional form assumptions, but the appropriate choice of
instrument can contribute substantially to identification. Distance to hospital is commonly used in
the literature on hospital quality (see, e.g., McClellan and Newhouse (1997); Gowrisankaran and
Town (1999)), but this instrument may be suspect for this application as POHs are relatively new
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and may have entered in areas close to unobservably healthy patients. On the other hand, this
application has the advantage that pre-entry data exist and may provide evidence on the distribu-
tion of patient sickness relative to the eventual location of POHs. To explore this relationship, I
regressed 90-day mortality on all patient and hospital characteristics and distance to the nearest
physician-owned hospital using only pre-entry data. The coefficient on differential distance to the
eventual site of the nearest POH is -0.0001196 and has a standard error of 0.0002508. The neg-
ative coefficient indicates that, in the pre-entry period, patients located relatively far away from
the eventual site of the nearest POH had better mortality outcomes. It is conceivable that POHs
located in areas with worse existing hospitals, which may generate this effect; nevertheless, the
result does not suggest that the exclusion restriction fails in this application.
1.7.3 Identification of potential physician-owners
Finally, in this study I use a probabilistic approach to identification of the treatment patterns of
physician-owners relative to non-owners which imposes quite limited assumptions on the behavior
of owners. In particular, as noted in Section 1.4, I assume that all physicians filing claims on at
least two admissions at POHs in 2005 are equally likely to be physician-owners, which has the
advantage of not privileging procedure-based specialists such as interventional cardiologists and
cardiac surgeons in the assignment of ownership. Other studies (see, e.g., Mitchell (2005)) examine
ownership behavior by assigning ownership to physicians based on treatment patterns; I now present
results using an alternative method in which I "pick" owners.
In this approach, I rank physicians by the total number of cardiac admissions, then by the
total number of all admissions, on which they were present at the POH. 4 9 For hospitals with P
owners, I assign ownership to the top-ranked P physicians. Because only admissions data contains
hospital identifiers, this criterion has the disadvantage of potentially over-assigning ownership to
physicians treating admitted patients and thus favors surgeons and interventional cardiologists over
other types of cardiologists who are more likely to treat on an outpatient basis (e.g., non-invasive
cardiologists perform stress tests, EKGs, echocardiograms and see patients in a clinical setting;
invasive cardiologists who are not ICs do everything non-invasive cardiologists do plus diagnostic
angiography, which can be done on an inpatient or outpatient basis (Johnson, 2009)). As expected,
this approach assigns ownership to a greater number of the decision-making physicians in my
sample; under the probabilistic approach, approximately 400 sample physicians are expected to
have been owners, while the "pick" owners approach assigns ownership to 516 sample physicians.
The results are displayed in Table 1.17. The coefficients on general hospital characteristics
are consistent with previous specifications. However, the preferences of non-owners and owners
are somewhat different, both on average and varying with patient characteristics. Under this
approach, non-owners have a stronger negative preference for treating patients at the POH, which
4 9 This procedure was performed by linking the 20% carrier (physician) claims file with the 100% inpatient admis-
sions file by patient identifier and date in order to identify the hospital of admission.
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is consistent with the fact that non-owners by this algorithm by definition have at most a small
number of POH referrals. They still have a (marginally) significant preference for treating younger
patients with less favorable demographics and fewer non-cardiac comorbidities at the POH rather
than the community hospital - other estimates of non-owner preferences of patient characteristics
have the opposite sign, but are not statistically distinct from previous estimates.
Table 1.17: Choice results - alternative owner identification method, multiple sickness indexes
specification, specialty hospital markets only
Distance
Government
For-Profit
Teaching
RNs/bed
POH
POH*Potential Owner
POH*Age
POH*Demographic Index
POH*Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Diagnosis Index
POH*Owner
POH*Owner*Age
POH*Owner*Demographic Index
POH*Owner*Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Owner*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index
POH*Owner*Diagnosis Index
Share
Share*Age
Share*Demographic Index
Share*Card. Comorbidity Index
Share*Non-Card. Comorbidity Index
Share*Diagnosis Index
N
Joint Model
No IV
No Unobs. Sickness
Est. Std. Err.
-1.226*** (0.036)
-1.274*** (0.170)
-0.506*** (0.088)
0.421*** (0.111)
0.058 (0.073)
-1.413*** (0.203)
0.186 (0.636)
-0.017** (0.008)
3.508* (2.027)
0.015 (0.249)
-0.620* (0.355)
-0.135 (0.199)
4.665*** (0.635)
0.005 (0.011)
3.946 (3.266)
0.482 (0.371)
-0.476 (0.441)
0.330 (0.291)
-0.125 (0.115)
0.005 (0.004)
-1.112 (1.549)
-0.171 (0.125)
0.254** (0.117)
-0.216 (0.175)
42,579
Note: Results for joint choice-outcome model without unobservables.
Owners chosen as top-ranked physicians by total number of admissions
at POH; admissions count based on link of 20% carrier file with 100%
inpatient admissions file using patient identifier and date. Sickness in-
dexes generated using coefficients on patient characteristics from IV es-
timation, separating demographic characteristics, cardiac comorbidities,
non-cardiac comorbidities, and primary diagnosis dummies. Standard
errors from nonparametric bootstrap with 100 repetitions in parenthe-
ses.
The preferences of physician owners on average and varying with overall patient sickness are
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similar to the main specification except regarding the index of patient demographics, which is not
strongly informative of patient sickness, so I will disregard it. Now, the average predicted probability
of a physician owner sending a patient of average health to the physician-owned hospital is only 76%
(as opposed to 83% in the main specification). The effect of a standard deviation increase in non-
cardiac comorbidities on the average predicted probability of treatment at the POH is larger than
in the main specification (approximately a 3pp decrease), but is not statistically significant. The
results on ownership share are also similar to the estimates from the main specification, except that
positive selection of patients with non-cardiac comorbidities by physicians with greater ownership
is marginally significant under this alternative algorithm.
Taken together, the results for physician-owners using this method, which primarily assigns
ownership to procedural-based specialties and may erroneously identify non-owners as physician-
investors, exhibits similar patterns as in the main specification, and is supportive of my finding of
no substantial physician-owner cherry-picking on observable measures of patient health.
1.8 Conclusion
There is significant controversy regarding the welfare effects of physician ownership of hospitals,
generally centering around whether estimated quality at physician-owned hospitals is driven by
improvements in care or by cherry-picking of healthier, potentially more profitable patients. The
key insight of this paper is that differences in patient population across hospitals are not necessarily
indicative of distorted treatment behavior on the part of physician-investors; estimates of quality
at physician-owned hospitals must account for potential selection of healthier patients into those
facilities, but at the same time, estimates of cherry-picking must account for potential optimal
matching based on differential suitability of certain patients to specialized facilities. Further, one
must consider the preferences of owners relative to non-owners in order to determine cherry-picking
based on physician ownership, as some selection behavior may be based on patient preferences;
e.g., healthier patients may seek out the comfortable environment at POHs relatively more than
sicker patients. My approach estimates the choice and outcome processes jointly to allow for both
optimal matching and cherry-picking, and I use a probabilistic approach to identify the preferences
of owners relative to non-owners. The results presented above provide evidence on both sides of
the debate over physician ownership.
First, my results indicate that treatment at a physician-owned hospital can lead to substan-
tial improvements in mortality risk - for a moderate-severity patient, treatment at a POH leads
to a 1.1pp decrease in mortality risk, which is large relative to average mortality of about 3.3%
for that patient class. Relative quality is somewhat attenuated for patients who are sicker along
some dimensions, such as non-cardiac comorbid conditions, indicating there could be an optimal
matching rationale for sending sicker patients away from POHs, but these effects are sufficiently
small that there does not appear to be a sample of patients for whom treatment at a POH is detri-
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mental. Estimates are similar with and without instrumental variables, indicating that selection
on unobservables is not a substantial driver of the reduced form quality differences across hospital
type. Further, quality benefits appear to be comparable to those available at non-physician-owned
cardiac hospitals, indicating that specialization may drive quality effects rather than ownership.
My results do not favor the POH opponents' view that physician-owners cherry-pick profitable
patients. I find evidence of only slightly more favorable selection on one measure of patient sickness
(non-cardiac comorbid conditions) by owners relative to non-owners; such selection is not statisti-
cally significant and standard errors are sufficiently small that, even according to the most extreme
interpretation, physician-owners will prefer to treat the majority of even quite sick patients at their
owned facility. Point estimates regarding selection on other measures of patient health indicate the
opposite of cherry-picking behavior by owners, but the estimates and standard errors are generally
small enough to indicate essentially no strong selection effects. Interestingly, neither preferences for
the average patient nor preferences for relatively sicker patients are exacerbated by physicians hav-
ing a greater personal ownership share in the owned facility, indicating that ownership per se drives
physician preferences much more than the actual financial stake. This may be due to physician
owners maximizing total hospital surplus rather than personal surplus when deciding on treatment
location.
Taken together, the results of my model indicate that the hospital choice incentives of physician-
investors in POHs do not appear distorted, while quality improvements at POHs are large, par-
ticularly for moderate-severity patients. The results are robust to alternative specifications and
several checks of my assumptions regarding both unobserved patient illness and physician owner-
ship. The results suggest that the banning of further physician ownership as part of the ACA may
have detrimental effects on patient health.
The evidence on quality improvements suggests that investigation of expenditures for owners
vs. non-owners in the unified model is a direction for future research. Similarly, the evidence of
cherry-picking on measures of health would be enriched by further research into cherry-picking
on profitability directly using data on hospital reimbursements and costs. Finally, this study has
focused on hospital choice and outcomes for a sample of admitted patients; future research will
explore physician incentives at the margin of treatment intensity.
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1.9 Appendix A: Details on Physician-Owned Hospital Dataset
In order to construct a dataset of physician-owned hospital characteristics, I began with a list of
all physician-owned hospitals from the membership rolls of the industry group Physician Hospitals
of America (PHA) in 2009 (Physician's hospitals, 2009) and from the annual reports of MedCath,
Inc., a public for-profit company whose business model is partnership with physicians to develop
physician-owned hospitals. A Lexis Nexis news search and close examination of the websites of
cardiac specialty hospitals identified in the inpatient claims data (using the measure of specialization
defined in Section 1.4) uncovered no physician-owned hospitals not already in PHA's member list
or MedCath's archives. Each hospital in the PHA member list or MedCath's financial reports was
initially classified as providing cardiac services if such services were listed on its website. Hospitals
listing no cardiac services were excluded from my sample. Table 1.18 displays the ownership and
specialization of all physician-owned facilities identified using this procedure.
All of the above facilities can be linked to the inpatient admissions data except for Heart-
land Memorial Hospital. In order to focus on hospitals which are sufficiently comparable to the
physician-owned cardiac hospitals that are the primary subject of my analysis, I further limit
the set of physician-owned hospitals to those with at least thirty admissions in surgical cardiac
DRGs in 2005. This refinement eliminates Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital, Dupont Hospital, and
Olympia Medical Center from my sample of physician-owned hospitals. For the remaining hospi-
tals, I performed a search of public corporation annual reports to shareholders, news articles, and
press releases. I also compared the resulting data with a spreadsheet received from PHA dated
March 2011 and with conversations with Dr. John Harvey, President and CEO of Oklahoma Heart
Hospital, and Mr. Lynn Jeane, COO of Kansas Heart Hospital. I was able to identify, for each
sample hospital, the following characteristics: ownership type (fully physician-owned, joint venture
with non-profit hospital, joint venture with private corporation), date hospital opened, aggregate
physician ownership share, and number of physician owners. Where possible, data on physician
ownership share and number of physician owners were determined for 2005. For several hospitals,
data were available for periods before and after the study year of 2005; for those hospitals, I as-
sumed a constant growth rate in number of physician investors per year to determine the number
of owners in 2005. For the remaining hospitals, where ownership variables are only available before
or after the study year, the median growth rate of 0.125 investors per year observed among sample
hospitals with multiple ownership count observations was applied to the figure which was closest
to contemporaneous for the given hospital to obtain an estimate of number of investors in 2005.50
Sources are displayed in Table 1.19.
After linking carrier claims to hospitals using beneficiary identifiers and dates in the inpatient
database, I flag as potential owners at each physician-owned hospital those physicians in appro-
priate specialties present on at least two inpatient admissions in the 20% carrier claims sample in
5 0 Imputation using median growth rate in percentage rather than level terms generated nearly identical results.
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Table 1.18: Entry, all physician-owned hospitals providing cardiac services
Hospital
Arizona Heart Hospital
Arkansas Heart Hospital
Aurora BayCare
Medical Center
Avera Heart Hospital
Bakersfield Heart Hospital
Baylor Heart and Vascular
Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital
Crestwood Medical Center
Dayton Heart Hospital
Doctors Hospital
at Renaissance
Dupont Hospital
Fresno Heart Hospital
Galichia Heart Hospital
Harlingen Medical Center
Heart Hospital of Austin
Heart Hospital of Lafayette
Heart Hospital New Mexico
Heartland Memorial Hospital
Indiana Heart Hospital
Kansas Heart Hospital
Louisiana Heart Hospital
Lubbock Heart Hospital
NEA Medical Center
Nebraska Heart Institute
Oklahoma Heart Hospital
Olympia Medical Center
St. Francis Heart Hospital
St. Vincent Heart Center
TexSAn Heart Hospital
Tucson Heart Hospital
Wisconsin Heart Hospital
2005.51 Two of the physician-owned hospitals in my dataset, the Oklahoma Heart Hospital and the
Aurora BayCare Medical Center, have made current lists of their physician investors available on
their websites. I examined these lists to aid in identification of potential physician-investors based
5
'For this purpose, I use carrier claims to identify potential owners because the inpatient files only list identifiers
for attending, operating, and "other" physician, while the carrier files contain identifiers for any physician who had
an office visit, performed a test, consulted with, or otherwise treated the patient, giving me a more comprehensive
list of physician IDs even though the carrier file is only a 20% sample.
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Market
Phoenix, AZ
Little Rock, AR
Green Bay, WI
Sioux Falls, SD
Bakersfield, CA
Dallas, TX
Norwalk, CA
Huntsville, AL
Dayton, OH
Edinburg, TX
Fort Wayne, IN
Fresno, CA
Wichita, KS
Harlingen, TX
Austin, TX
Lafayette, LA
Albuquerque, NM
Munster, IN
Indianapolis, IN
Wichita, KS
St. Tammany Parish, LA
Lubbock, TX
Jonesboro, AR
Lincoln, NE
Oklahoma City, OK
Los Angeles, CA
Tulsa, OK
Indianapolis, IN
San Antonio, TX
Tucson, AZ
Wauwatosa, WI
Opened
Jun-98
Mar-97
2001
Mar-01
Oct-99
2002
1957
1965
Sep-99
1997
2001
Oct-03
Dec-01
Oct-02
Jan-99
Mar-04
Oct-99
1994
Feb-03
1999
Feb-03
Jan-04
1998
May-03
Aug-02
Dec-04
Apr-04
Dec-02
Jan-04
Oct-97
Jan-04
Specialized?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Table 1.19: Sources, physician-owned hospitals providing high-acuity cardiac services
Hospital Source(s)
Arizona Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); MedCath to build (1997); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Arkansas Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Meyer (1998); Sorrel (2007); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Aurora BayCare Medical Reilly (2002)
Center
Avera Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Serafini (2005); For the record (1999); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Bakersfield Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Bedell (1998); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Baylor Heart and Vascular Ornstein (1999); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Crestwood Medical Center Crestwood CEO (2008)
Dayton Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Lamb (1999); Neal (2003)
Doctors Hospital at Smith (2005); Kirchheimer (2010); Sack and Herszenhorn (2009)
Renaissance
Fresno Heart Hospital Correa (2004, 2006)
Galichia Heart Hospital Sommers (2001); Galichia Heart Hospital (2002); Newton (2002)
Harlingen Medical Center MedCath Corporation (2005); Smith (2005)
Heart Hospital of Austin MedCath Corporation (2005); Park (1998)
Heart Hospital of Lafayette MedCath Corporation (2005); Specialty hospitals (2005); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Heart Hospital New Mexico MedCath Corporation (2005); Gallagher (1998); Quigley (2002); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Indiana Heart Hospital Flynn (2003); Single source (2002); Casalino, et al. (2003)
Kansas Heart Hospital Agovino (2003); Griekspoor (2005); Zigmond (2008); Mr. Lynn Jeane (conversation 3/22/11);
PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Louisiana Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Butler (2004); Chapple (2003); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Lubbock Heart Hospital Senator planning legislation (2003); Lubbock Heart Hospital (2009); Indeed (2001); PHA
spreadsheet (2011)
NEA Medical Center NEA Clinic selects TouchWorks (2003); NEA Clinic and Baptist Memorial (2007)
Nebraska Heart Institute Vogeler (2004); Aksamit (2004); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
Oklahoma Heart Hospital Flynn (2003); PHA spreadsheet (2011); Dr. John Harvey (conversation 3/24/11)
Olympia Medical Center AHA seeks doc disclosure (2006); Hospital renaming (2005)
St. Francis Heart Hospital Rogoski (2006); Zigmond (2008); Kelly (2004)
St. Vincent Heart Center Reilly (2002); PHA spreadsheet (2011)
TexSAn Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Danner (2011)
Tucson Heart Hospital MedCath Corporation (2005); Erikson (2001); MedCath Corporation (2006); PHA
spreadsheet (2011)
Wisconsin Heart Hospital Flynn (2003); Romano (2007); Boulton (2005); Manning (2003); Dang (2002)
on referral patterns and specialization. 52 Flagging as potentials those physicians in the appropriate
specialties present on at least two inpatient admissions in 2005 (the primary algorithm used) identi-
fied 33 of the 34 physician-investors at Oklahoma Heart Hospital, while "picking" the top admitting
physicians as investors identified only 24 physician-investors correctly. Neither method was very
successful at identifying current physician-investors at the non-specialized Aurora BayCare (the
two methods identified 50 and 33 current investors, respectively), so I focus on patients treated at
cardiac POHs in the majority of my analyses. Physicians treating patients at multiple physician-
owned hospitals were only flagged as potential owners at the hospital for which they were present
on more admissions, under the assumption that physician-owners have an average preference for
treating patients at their owned hospital over another physician-owned hospital.
5 2Oklahoma Heart Hospital's physician-investors have the following specializations: cardiology, internal medicine,
pulmonary disease, thoracic surgery, peripheral vascular disease, vascular surgery, cardiac surgery, and emergency
medicine. Aurora BayCare's physician-investors have a wide range of specializations, the majority being anesthesiol-
ogy, emergency medicine, and ophthalmology.
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I also eliminate from my sample the Arkansas Heart Hospital, whose doctors were subject
to economic credentialing by competing hospitals during the sample period (Sorrel, 2007), the
Wisconsin Heart Hospital, which competed with the physician-owned Heart Hospital of Milwaukee
that closed in late 2004 (Boulton, 2005), and Doctors Hospital at Renaissance, which had far more
physician-investors (over 300) than ever practiced substantially at the facility. For each hospital
eliminated from the sample, all other hospitals in the hospital's HRR are eliminated as well so that
the competitive environment for each included market is represented in full.
After making these restrictions, I obtain a sample of 20 physician-owned cardiac hospitals and
4 physician-owned non-specialty hospitals.
1.10 Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 1-6: Mukamel, et al. (2006) model of CABG treatment
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Greater Price
Transparency in Health Care:
Evidence from Hospital Charges
2.1 Introduction
The concept of "consumer-driven health care" in the age of spiraling U.S. health care costs has
become the subject of intense interest, particularly as the popularity of high-deductible health
insurance products has growni and as the proportion of Americans without insurance has climbed.
In March 2006, the Bush administration announced plans to publicize the prices the government's
health programs pay hospitals and physicians for common medical procedures, as part of an effort
to "inject more free-market principles into health care" (Lueck, 2006). The logic that consumers
armed with better information would factor cost into their health care utilization decisions and
price-shop among competing hospitals, leading to lower consumption of expensive services and
more competitive prices, has also prompted many states to institute regulatory price-reporting
requirements in order to facilitate consumer search. On the other hand, many hospitals and health
care policy experts have argued that transparency efforts will have either no effect or a negative
effect on welfare. One such argument is that, due to limited incentives for most (i.e., insured)
consumers to price-shop and to the complexity of health care episode pricing, transparency will
have no effect on consumer or hospital behavior. An even more pessimistic argument is that price
'The best-known of these, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), were created by a Medicare bill on December 8,
2003. HSAs allow individuals to save for future health expenses tax-free. They also include insurance coverage, but
for catastrophic medical expenses only. For this reason, they are often closely associated with consumer-driven health
care because of the consumer's greater incentive to participate in health care decision-making when they are expected
to pay 100% of the cost. (U.S. Treasury, 2010) Aetna executive Kathleen Campbell has stated that the insurer's
high-deductible policyholders were "three times more likely to use its online price information than those with less at
stake." (Weaver, 2010)
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reporting will facilitate collusion among competing health-care providers and result in increased
prices.
This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of several competing hypotheses regarding price
transparency in health care. I use a differences-in-differences approach to analyze longitudinal
hospital admissions data from thirty-one states over the period 2003-2007, during which period
eighteen states in the data had in place or instituted statewide price transparency initiatives.
I also investigate whether states with transparency initiatives exhibit different trends in prices
prior to transparency. I evaluate two types of transparency requirements, one mandating the
posting of hospital chargemasters (the full set of hospital list prices) on-site at the hospital, and
another requiring that average or median charges for some or all inpatient services be reported
on a public Web site. 2 I analyze two longitudinal data sets, one a complete panel for six states
and the other a repeated cross-section sample of hospitals in thirty one states, to examine the
effects of these two types of transparency policies on hospital charge-setting practices. In addition
to measuring the overall effect of transparency initiatives on the mean and dispersion of hospital
prices, I investigate whether the price changes associated with transparency vary with hospital
and diagnosis characteristics in order to shed light on the extent to which different mechanisms,
including consumer search and hospital price coordination, may contribute to the average price
patterns.
The main finding of this evaluation is that transparency is associated with small increases in
mean inpatient hospital charges. The estimates indicate that Web-based transparency require-
ments are associated with about a 4% increase in inpatient hospital prices; on-site transparency
requirements are associated with a 1-2% increase in inpatient prices, but the estimates are not
often statistically significant. I do not find evidence that either type of transparency requirement
has a substantial impact on price dispersion. The results controlling for pre-transparency trends
in prices, focusing on Web-based requirements, are qualitatively similar, though the magnitudes of
the estimates vary somewhat by specification.
I also examine how the price changes associated with transparency vary with hospital owner-
ship, local market concentration, the elective status of the particular diagnosis/procedure, and the
extent to which the hospital's local population is publicly or privately insured. These analyses
can shed light on several questions for which the competing theories of price transparency have
explicit predictions. For example, do hospitals with a greater profit-maximization motive, and
which are potentially differentially sensitive to changes in consumer search parameters or collusive
possibilities, alter charge-setting behavior? Are charges more sensitive to transparency policies in
highly-concentrated geographic areas? Do procedures which are more often sought on an elective
basis tend to have disparate price patterns relative to others due to greater incentive for or ease
2 In all cases studied here, the prices disclosed are list prices rather than the discounted prices generally paid by
patients with public or private insurance. The implications of this feature of the regulations will be discussed in detail
in Section 2.3.
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of consumer search in the presence of transparency initiatives? Finally, do hospitals whose patient
population is less likely to be insured exhibit differential price patterns? Although price trans-
parency is associated with price increases on average, I do find that, among for-profit hospitals,
there is an association between transparency and lower average price increases. I also find that
hospitals in areas with a greater uninsured patient population exhibit lower price increases than
those in average markets.
The empirical results are not consistent with the position that hospital charges are uninformative
or that transparency of this form primarily facilitates consumers search on average. The results
are for the most part consistent with a model in which price disclosure decreases price competition,
though the results for markets with greater uninsurance are also consistent with consumer search
having a countervailing influence on prices.
This paper proceeds in five sections. Section 2.2 discusses previous work on price transparency
in health care and other markets and describes the price transparency interventions in the treat-
ment states. Section 2.3 lays out the competing hypotheses I propose to test using this analysis.
Section 2.4 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 2.5 presents empirical results.
Section 2.6 concludes and discusses implications for welfare.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Previous research on price disclosure
Most empirical work on the effects of price disclosure has focused on measuring the effects of
advertising. A common approach exploits cross-sectional variation in advertising prohibitions. One
of the earliest of these, Benham (1972), notes that some states prohibit advertising of eyeglasses
and eye examinations and finds that, in 1963, prices were substantially lower in states which
allowed advertising. Kwoka (1984) also considers the effect of advertising restrictions on pricing of
optometric services, observing in a study with somewhat richer data on the extent of advertising
and local restrictions that providers in markets without advertising restrictions have significantly
lower prices, among nonadvertising providers as well as advertising providers although the effect
is much stronger for the latter. Kwoka also notes that providers spend less time on examinations
in non-restrictive markets, a finding which may be important for welfare considerations in our
application. Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) study the effects of advertisement on liquor prices, using
the Supreme Court's reversal of Rhode Island's statewide ban on liquor advertisement as a quasi-
natural experiment. Using panel data on liquor prices from Rhode Island and Massachusetts
(where advertising was legal throughout the relevant time period) and a differences-in-differences
approach, they find substantial cuts in prices after the ban is lifted, but only for products which are
advertised. In contrast to previous results, they find that nonadvertising stores do not cut prices
for goods advertised by rivals. Finally, they find no evidence of a decrease in dispersion due to
advertising.
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The empirical approach pursued in this project is similar to that used in the advertising litera-
ture, but the application is one in which the health care "product" is such that there are numerous
obstacles to consumer search over and above even those present in other professional services mar-
kets such as optometry. Empirical research on health care price disclosure is limited 3 and the
existing evidence to date is not encouraging. In an evaluation of the New Hampshire HealthCost
Program, an initiative which collected and posted cost estimates from multiple commercial insurers'
claims data starting in February 2007, Tu and Lauer (2009) found that prices did not decrease or
converge for services whose prices were reported on the HealthCost Web site. The authors attribute
the lack of a change to weak provider competition based on consumers' lack of shopping incentives
when less than 5% of insured consumers were enrolled in high-deductible plans. Tu and Lauer's
findings are not directly comparable to those of the current study, as the consumers most exposed
to variation in hospital charges (the relevant price studied in this project) are uninsured; however,
Tu and Lauer's results provide insight into the problem of facilitating price competition in health
care. Indeed, in a survey study of consumer shopping for self-pay procedures such as LASIK surgery
and dental crowns, Tu and May (2007) found that patients of these procedures were most likely to
base their provider choice on word-of-mouth recommendation and physician referrals rather than
price-shopping.
There are also empirical studies that focus on the potential for price transparency to facilitate
collusive behavior. For example, in a study of the Danish market for ready-mix concrete, Albek,
Mollgaard, and Overgaard (1997) examine the effect of government-mandated price transparency.
In 1993, the Danish antitrust authority decided to publish firm transaction prices for two grades of
ready-mixed concrete, a relatively homogeneous product, for the purpose of promote competition.
The authors found that, contrary to the authority's goal, prices converged significantly across firms,
but rose sharply to a level 15-20% higher than prices before publication. This application is similar
to the one considered in this paper in that it eliminates the endogeneity of the advertising choice,
with the caveat that the market for a homogeneous product such as concrete is drastically different
from the complex health care environment.
In this project, I use data from more than half of all U.S. states, with substantial variation
in the timing of price transparency initiatives, to provide the first comprehensive evaluation of
price transparency effects in health care. I consider transparency in hospital charges, which are
relevant for the consumers most likely to be exposed to hospital price variation (the uninsured),
and I explicitly consider the potential for transparency to have anticompetitive effects on prices.
3 There is a more substantial body of literature on health care quality disclosure, noting that quality can have
perverse competitive effects and result in welfare decreases, as in the case of cardiac surgery report cards in which
providers increased selection behavior in order to obtain higher grades; Dranove and Jin (2010) provide a survey.
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2.2.2 Institutional setting
As noted above, by now more than thirty states have joined the push for more transparency in
hospital pricing, mainly by making some or all hospital list prices available to interested consumers.
In this Section, I briefly describe hospital pricing behavior broadly and the price transparency
policies that pertain in the states for which I have data and in which one or more transparency
initiatives was in place during 2003-2007. A summary of the relevant initiatives is presented in
Appendix Table 1.
2.2.2.1 Hospital pricing
Health care providers receive different prices from different types of patients. The reimbursement
rates hospitals may receive from individuals who are insured under Medicare or Medicaid are
generally set according to a fixed formula, but the prices paid by uninsured or privately insured
consumers can vary widely. First, there is the provider's "list price" (I will use the terms "list price"
and "charge" interchangeably throughout the text), the amount the provider would bill a patient
with no insurance or one with a health plan that has no contract with the provider. Hospital
charges are more than twice the actual cost of furnishing care on average, and because these high
costs are often charged to uninsured patients, they are not often fully recovered - one study using
2003 data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey notes that only nine percent of self-pay
hospital inpatients paid the hospital's full charges, while many services were written off as charity
care or bad debt (Merlis, 2007). Second, the price that is paid for services to insured patients
whose insurers have contracts with the provider is a negotiated rate which generally varies across
all insurer-provider pairs. The prices studied in this project are the former, the list prices which
are usually the subject of transparency initiatives.
2.2.2.2 On-site transparency requirements
The less common of the price-reporting requirements considered in this paper is the requirement
that hospitals post their entire book of list prices, the chargemaster or Charge Description Master
(CDM), at the hospital's location for consumers to examine. As of 2007, three states for which
data are available had such a requirement in place.
In 1995, Arizona's legislature passed Revised Statute 36-436.01, which requires that all hospitals
must keep their existing chargemasters on file with the Department of Health Services and post it
in a conspicuous place in the hospital's reception area (A.R.S. §36-436.01, 1995.) This requirement
is accordingly assumed to be in effect throughout 2003-2007.
In 2003, California assemblyman Dario Frommer introduced Assembly Bill 1627. The so-called
"Payers' Bill of Rights" required all licensed California general acute care hospitals, psychiatric
acute hospitals, and special hospitals, except for "small and rural" hospitals, to make a written or
electronic copy of its charge master available at the hospital location or on its Web site, along with
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a list of charges for twenty five "common" services or procedures.4 A. B. 1627 went into effect on
July 1, 2004, with the additional stipulation that charge masters be filed annually thereafter with
OSHPD. OSHPD reserved the right to post prices for up to 10 inpatient or outpatient procedures
on its Web site at the time, but according to Jonathan M. Teague, Manager of OSHPD's Healthcare
Information Division, that option was never exercised before the Payer's Bill of Rights was modified
in 2005.5 In California, data on each hospital's level of compliance is unclear. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that some hospitals required that individuals schedule an appointment to explain the
chargemaster, and it seems that only a few hospitals posted their lists on the Web (Lagnado,
2004). Furthermore, although data on the lists of "common" procedures posted by hospitals is not
available as of this writing, the California Assembly found compliance with that part of the Payers'
Bill of Rights unsatisfactory, as hospitals were often lax in submitting their charges to OSHPD
(Most hospitals have not submitted, 2005), and the lists of twenty five procedures being provided
to the public were of questionable value, such as prices for 15 minutes of "gait training" (Frommer
sends bill, 2005). For these reasons, the original California regulation will be considered strictly as
an on-site chargemaster reporting requirement, separate from the Web site requirements considered
below.
In November 2006, Ohio passed House Bill 197 requiring each hospital to make its price informa-
tion list for a large set of common procedures available on its Web site and post an announcement
of the list's availability on site (Ohio Department of Health, 2011). As the initial price data was
available at the level of hospital charge item and was not collected in any central location, I consider
Ohio to have had a CDM reporting requirement as of November 2006.
2.2.2.3 Web-based transparency requirements
The most popular price transparency initiative studied in this project is one in which all hospitals
(sometimes excluding rural or specialized facilities) in the state would post summary charges for
some or all hospital services on a central Web site. These requirements are discussed in detail here.
Two states, Arizona and Ohio, instituted modifications to their original CDM-posting require-
ments during the study period. Arizona began posting hospital-specific prices for several dozen
charges for rooms and specific tests across hospitals in January of 2006 (Arizona Department of
Health Services, 2006).6 Ohio's Health Care Guide, with links to charges for room and board,
4 The bill also required posting of "clear and conspicuous" notices in its emergency department, admissions office,
and billing office to inform patients of the charge master's availability, as well as information about where to obtain
information regarding hospital quality, including hospital outcome studies available from the Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) and hospital survey information available from the Joint Commission
for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. No self-reporting of outcomes was required (Calif. A. B. 1627, 2003).
5 J. M. Teague, personal communication, July 29, 2010.
6 Another legislation, Arizona Revised Statute 36-125 (2005), requires that the state publish a semiannual
"brochure" comparing hospital charges within regions for common diagnoses and procedures (National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL), 2010); however, Martha LaVoy, Financial Reporting Manager of Arizona's Department of
Health Services, states that no such brochure is published by the department and that she is not aware of price report-
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emergency department, operating room, delivery, physical therapy and other procedures as well as
each hospital's top sixty DRGs, launched in July 2007 (Ohio Hospital Association, 2007; National
Partnership for Women and Families, 2012).
California also instituted a Web-reporting initiative after its original CDM requirement. In 2005,
the California Assembly attempted to improve the value of reporting by introducing Assembly Bill
1045, effective January 1, 2006. The bill replaced the original provision that each hospital provide
a list of average charge for twenty five procedures with a modified requirement to provide a list of
charges for twenty five common outpatient procedures and the twenty five most common inpatient
procedures, the latter as grouped by Medicare diagnosis-related group (DRG) (Calif. A. B. 1045,
2005).7 The price lists must be available to any person upon request as well as reported to OSHPD
annually each July 1 to be posted on the Web.8 OSHPD posts each hospital's average charges
for statewide top twenty five DRGs as well as each hospital's top twenty five (OSHPD, 2011A;
OSHPD, 2011B). According to Jonathan Teague, Manager of OSHPD's Healthcare Information
Resource Center, exact historical dates are not available, but the determination of top twenty five
inpatient DRGs from state inpatient data would be finalized in late summer of each year and posted
on the Web at that time, so the effective date for all features of California A. B. 1045 will be taken
to be July 1, 2006 (J. M. Teague, personal communication, July 30, 2010).9
Minnesota, Nevada, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin do not have CDM requirements but
do require hospitals to post some or all of their prices on a central Web site. Minnesota's M.S.A.
§62J.82 requires a Web-based system for reporting average charge, average charge per day, and
median charge for the 50 most common inpatient DRGs and the 25 most common outpatient surgical
DRGs (NCSL, 2010). As required under Nevada's Revised Statutes, Section 439B, a publication
called "Personal Health Choices" has been published annually since 1988, with average charge for
up to 39 common DRGs from 25 acute care hospitals (Nevada State Health Division, 2005). Under
South Dakota's Senate Bills 169 and 182, a Web site was created at the state government's Web site
to list median prices for each hospital's top 25 inpatient procedures (NCSL, 2010). Vermont's Act
ing online prior to 2006 (M. LaVoy, personal communication, March 27, 2012; M. LaVoy, personal communication,
March 28, 2012).
7 The legislation also required each hospital to provide any uninsured person, upon request, a written estimate
of the amount the hospital will charge, based on average length of stay and services provided for the person's
diagnosis, except for emergency services (Calif. A. B. 1045, 2005). Colorado, Nebraska, and Texas have similar
legislated requirements (NCSL, 2010). Such requirements, being individual-specific and thus difficult to compare at
an aggregate scale, will not be considered explicitly in this study.
8To encourage compliance, A. B. 1045 added the provision that a hospital be liable for a small ($100 per day)
civil penalty if it did not file the required information with OSHPD.
9 For the sake of consistency, in all of the following analyses, I analyze Web-based transparency requirements from
the date of Web posting or Web site launch. This is a more conservative approach; data intended for the Web will
be obtained from inpatient discharge data from previous periods, so that some changes in hospital pricing behavior
taking place prior to a site's launch will be analyzed as part of the pre-requirement period. Additional specifications
excluding data for the full calendar year preceding Web site launch (the period during which the first set of inpatient
data for posting would be collected) will be shown as a robustness check of the main results.
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53 is similar to Nevada's requirement; a hospital report card, with quality data and average charges
for 39 specific DRGs for all hospitals, has been published annually since February 2005 (State of
Vermont, 2011). Chapter 153 of Wisconsin's Statutes led to the development of Wisconsin Hospital
PricePoint, showing average charges for the majority of DRGs (Haugh, 2005; Vock, 2006; Zigmond
and Evans, 2006; Wisconsin Hospital Association (WHA), 2008). PricePoint was launched in
February 2005 and became the model for many other states' hospital pricing sites.
A number of other states' hospital associations have launched price-reporting Web sites with-
out regulatory fiat in the period of study. Georgia (2007), Iowa (2007), New Hampshire (2006),
Oregon (2005), Texas (2007), Utah (2006), and Washington (2007) have all launched versions of
Wisconsin's PricePoint Web site (WHA, 2007A; Iowa Hospital Association, 2006; WHA, 2006A;
WHA, 2005; WHA, 2006B; WHA, 2007C). 10 Similarly, in 2007 the New Jersey Hospital Associ-
ation launched New Jersey Hospital Price Compare (New Jersey Hospital Association, 2012), the
Tennessee Hospital Association launched Tennessee Hospital Inform (Schatz, 2007), and the West
Virginia Health Care Authority (WVHCA) launched CompareCareWV (WVHCA, 2007), each of
which using a similar format to that of PricePoint, with average prices for over 100 DRGs.
While many Web transparency initiatives make average charges available for any DRG for which
inpatient data exists, some states only report charges for "top" DRGs, where the cutoff varies
from state to state. For example, the full list of California's historical statewide top twenty five
inpatient DRGs and their descriptions for 2003 through 2007 are shown in Appendix Table 2. The
descriptions of these DRGs vary widely, from "chest pain" to "normal newborn" to "rehabilitation."
Most of the required DRGs appeared in all years, with some exceptions due to changes in DRG
classification. 1 The determination of the "top 25" is not described explicitly on OSHPD's Web site,
but a comparison of the "top 25" that would result from the state inpatient data and the "top 25"
on OSHPD's Web site indicates that state "top 25" inpatient DRGs were determined by admissions
rather than being weighted by charges or prices.12
2.3 The Effects of Transparency: Competing Hypotheses
Three competing hypotheses of the effect of price transparency on hospital charge-setting behavior
emerge from the academic and political debates over health care price transparency legislation
and price disclosure more broadly. I describe each of these hypotheses and the arguments of their
proponents, then present the associated predicted price responses on average and varying with
10 New Hampshire also started posting insurer prices by hospital on its HealthCost Web site in 2007 (Tu and Lauer,
2009).
"For example, DRG 416, "septicemia age > 17," was split into DRG 575, "septicemia with mechanical ventilation
96+ hours age > 17," and DRG 576, "septicemia without mechanical ventilation 96+ hours age > 17," for fiscal year
2007.
1 21t should be noted that there is substantial variation in the importance of the state "top 25" for individual
hospitals; the median hospital in 2006 had less than half of its top twenty five DRGs (by count or total charges)
appear in the state list.
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"product" (diagnosis/ procedure) and "firm" (hospital) characteristics.
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Price irrelevance
Since the advent of moves toward transparency in health care pricing, many hospitals and other
health care policy experts have argued that, due to limited incentives for most (i.e., insured)
consumers to price-shop, and to the complexity of health care episode pricing, transparency will
have no effect on consumer or hospital behavior. As noted by Uwe Reinhardt of Princeton,
Until now, the U.S. health care 'market' has been analogous to an imaginary world in
which, say, employers offered to reimburse their employees 80 percent of the 'reasonable
cost' of all attire deemed 'necessary' and 'appropriate' on the job but, under the contracts
negotiated with department stores by the fiscal intermediaries administering this 'Clothes
Benefit Program,' employees had to enter department stores blindfolded. Only months
after a shopping trip would the employees receive from the fiscal intermediary a so-called
Explanation of Benefits (EOB) statement, explaining how much the employee had to pay
for whatever he or she had stuffed, blindfolded, into the shopping cart. (Reinhardt, 2006)
In essence, consumer search is hampered by unobservability of prices, but also by complicated
insurance contracts and a lack of consumer agency in the determination of the "product" being
purchased, as physicians play a large part in determining the services to be provided for a given
diagnosis. Existing estimates of the elasticity of health utilization with respect to observable simple
prices (copays for physician office visits and prescription drugs), which may represent an upper
bound on the elasticity of consumption with respect to inpatient hospital prices, are small (arc-
elasticities of -0.10; see Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight, 2010). This implies that transparency
of the sort contemplated by the Bush administration in 2006 would have no substantial effect
on most consumers. As noted above, the information currently available regarding the effects of
transparency in hospital care is consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., Tu and Lauer, 2009), though
existing studies have only examined states individually and over short panels.
A further argument in favor of the irrelevance hypothesis regards the nature of the price trans-
parency initiatives contemplated in this study. I study hospital charges, off of which actual prices
for individuals covered under public or private insurance are substantially discounted. According
to a survey of hospitals by the Lewin Group, charges are occasionally based on cost and can be sen-
sitive to the hospital's competitive environment, but "[w]ith over 45,000 items in the charge master,
the vast majority of items have no relation to anything" (Dobson, et al., 2005). To the extent that
the fact that the patient population which is billed at full charges is small leads hospitals to update
the charge master infrequently, this would further undermine the usefulness of charge-posting for
informing consumer or hospital behavior.
Under Hypothesis 1, price transparency will have no effect on the mean or variance of prices
for any diagnosis or hospital.
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2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Consumer search
The primary argument in favor of price transparency legislation has been to facilitate consumer
price search and in doing so contain health care costs. One law in California had as its express
purpose "'to goad hospitals to limit or change their markup policies,' [said] the law's sponsor,
assemblyman and majority leader Dario Frommer." He further noted that "'[tihe hospital industry
initially fought the bill ... and then worked to amend it. Eventually it withdrew its objections"'
(Lagnado, 2004). In discussing Texas's 2007 transparency legislation, State Sen. Robert Duncan
(R-Lubbock) said, "Having witnessed the recent years' incredible growth in the cost of health care,
it's become clear we need more transparency for Texans considering their medical needs. ... This
new law will move the Texas health care industry toward becoming a more market-driven entity,
which will ultimately benefit consumers and practitioners" (Schatz, 2007).
Although hospital charges may have limited relevance for many consumers of hospital services,
the population most likely to be billed based on list prices is also the population most exposed
to health care costs out of pocket - the uninsured. Moreover, the uninsured are one of the more
financially vulnerable populations in the U.S. Although households below a certain income level,
which varies according to local regulation as well as specific hospitals' charity care policies, will
often qualify for free or subsidized care, uninsured patients with only moderately low income will
be billed full list prices that can be more than double the prices negotiated with insurers.13 These
consumers have substantial "skin in the game" and could benefit greatly from price-shopping among
competing hospitals. Consider the California price data presented in Figure 2-1, showing that, for
a select set of services, price-shopping could save an individual thousands of dollars.
To the extent that hospital charge transparency facilitates consumer search, the economic theory
of consumer search yields several predictions for the effects of transparency on charges. In the past
50 years, several theories have emerged regarding the effects of consumer search on prices. In
models with heterogeneous consumers and identical firms, the Nash equilibrium price tends toward
the Bertrand Nash equilibrium of marginal cost as the cost of search goes to zero (Stigler, 1961;
Stahl, 1989). Under some assumptions regarding the distribution of consumers' search costs, the
variance of prices will also decrease as search costs decrease, though not necessarily to zero (Stigler,
3 1t may also be the case that privately insured consumers consult hospital price sites to gain information about
their own costs. Data on the correspondence between list prices and actual prices are not generally publicly avail-
able. However, Oregon makes available, through its Compare Hospital Costs site, the average payment for more
than 80 medical procedures at Oregon hospitals based on payments by the nine largest health insurers. A compari-
son of statewide average charges (list prices) obtained from Oregon's PricePoint site (http://www.orpricepoint.org/,
accessed 4/1/2012) with statewide average prices for the largest health insurers obtained from Compare Hospital
Costs (http://www.oregon.gov/OHA/OHPR/RSCH/comparehospitalcosts.shtml, accessed 4/1/2012) provides some
evidence on this point. For 33 DRGs available from both sources, the ratio of average/median charges to aver-
age/median costs ranges from 0.2 to over 10, but is about 2.3 on average. There is a strong positive correlation
between average charges and prices, though the correspondence is far from one-to-one - a log-log regression of price
on charge (mean or median) yields a coefficient of approximately 0.3 (SE = 0.13).
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Figure 2-1: Hospital list prices in California, 2004 (Lagnado, 2004)
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1961; Stahl, 1996). Thus, Hypothesis 2 predicts that price transparency will decrease both the
mean and variance of hospital charges overall.
Hypothesis 2 also yields predictions on how price effects may vary with diagnosis and hospital
characteristics. First, to the extent that hospitals are pricing closer to monopoly levels prior to
transparency, transparency effects will be stronger for those hospitals. Consider the monopoly
pricing Lerner index, supposing the marginal cost of a given service is c:
PM - c
If the pre-transparency elasticity is Epre and the post-transparency elasticity is Epost -- pre + A
with A < 0, then the proportional change in equilibrium price in response to transparency is:
|ln PnPost - 1n Pm,pre - In(6Pe _- 1) - In(Pre + A) - (EP + A + 1) - InE".
First, holding A fixed, this expression is increasing in all EPre < -114, indicating that the absolute
value of the proportional change in equilibrium price is decreasing in the absolute value of the
demand elasticity - products that are more elastic in the pre-period will have lower markups above
cost, so the price will decrease less for those products, all else equal. Markets which are more
concentrated are expected to have lower pre-transparency elasticity (higher markups), so under
Hypothesis 2 prices in those markets are expected to decrease more under transparency. Similarly,
hospitals which are otherwise more likely to have higher markups pre-transparency (i.e., for-profit
hospitals) are also expected to experience larger price changes under transparency. Second, holding
Epre fixed, the above expression is decreasing in A; in words, larger increases in the elasticity
1 4The Lerner index does not apply where Epr" > -1 as may be the case in health care markets, but the logic of
this argument still has intuitive value.
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of demand with respect to price (lower A) imply larger decreases in price due to transparency.
For example, if the price elasticity increases only for elective procedures and not for emergency
procedures (only elective patients begin using posted prices to search across hospitals), then only the
price of elective procedures is expected to decrease under transparency. In this scenario, the variance
of price is only expected to decrease for the procedures which experience enhanced consumer search
capability. 15
There may be some cases where the pre-transparency elasticity is higher and transparency
increases that elasticity more, as may be the case in markets with a large uninsured population
that may be both more price-sensitive overall and more incentivized to shop under transparency; the
effect of transparency on price for such cases relative to the average is ambiguous under Hypothesis
2.
In sum, Hypothesis 2 predicts decreases in the mean and variance of price overall, larger average
price decreases in more concentrated markets, among for-profit hospitals, and for primarily elective
procedures, and larger price variance decreases for primarily elective procedures. The differential
effect of transparency on markets with fewer insured consumers could have either sign.
2.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Hospital coordination
There are also concepts in the dynamic oligopoly literature that yield predictions for this appli-
cation. As noted by Michael Cowie, a former official at the Federal Trade Commission, "collusion
among companies to raise prices is more likely in industries where pricing terms are known among
competitors" (Goozner, 2010). That is, price publishing may serve as a coordination device for a
collusive oligopoly. 16 Since collusive arrangements will tend to sustain prices above competitive
levels, this theory predicts that the transparency efforts would yield higher average prices. Further,
this theory would also predict that transparency will lead to less price dispersion due to oligopoly
coordination.17
Under Hypothesis 3, hospitals which pre-transparency have lower markups are expected to ex-
perience higher price increases under transparency. For example, hospitals in more concentrated
regions and for-profit hospitals are expected to have higher markups pre-transparency, so the ex-
pected changes under transparency are expected to be lower. However, hospitals in more concen-
trated regions may find coordination easier, which would have a countervailing effect. Similarly, to
15 In related research, Sorensen (2000) finds that both markups for and dispersion in the prices of prescription
drugs across pharmacies are lower for drugs which are purchased repeatedly than for one-time prescriptions.
1 6 1t should be noted that the temptation to undercut in pricing will be closely related to the potential for stealing
market share; if consumers do not search, then undercutting cannot be profitable. However, for simplicity, we will
not discuss the relationship between the two theories explicitly here. The idea is that, given that price-posting
cannot make consumer search more difficult, we might examine the behavior of oligopolists holding the potential for
consumer search constant to get a lower bound on the relationship between regulation and coordination.
1
7 In the context of contracted prices, Cutler and Dafny (2011) express a related concern that price transparency
would limit hospitals' ability to price discriminate, leading to higher prices on average.
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the extent that patients seeking elective procedures or uninsured patients are more price-sensitive,
their price-cost markups will be lower pre-transparency, but their monopoly prices will also be
lower (the value of coordination is lower), so the relative effect of transparency on these consumers
is ambiguous. Regarding price dispersion, regions and products for which coordination is easier
and/or more valuable are expected to exhibit greater decreases in price dispersion under price
transparency.
In sum, Hypothesis 3 predicts an increase in the mean of price overall, a decrease in the vari-
ance of price overall, larger average price increases for for-profit hospitals, and larger price variance
decreases in more concentrated areas and for non-elective procedures. The relative effect on av-
erage price for more concentrated areas, elective procedures, and in areas with greater uninsured
population is ambiguous.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not mutually exclusive, so to the extent that both consumer search and
hospital collusion are present, their effects may counteract one another. I will discuss the resulting
interpretation of the data in Section 2.5.
2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Data
In order to investigate the effects of transparency requirements on hospital pricing and competition,
I use two different data sources. The first, from the Health Care Utilization Project State Inpatient
Database (HCUP-SID), includes the universe of inpatient discharge abstracts for 2003 through 2007
from all Arizona, California, Colorado, New Jersey, New York, and Washington acute care hospi-
tal discharges, as well as discharges from specialty hospitals, such as acute psychiatric hospitals.
Among other information, each SID observation includes a hospital identifier, month of admission
and discharge, patient age, race, and gender, DRG, diagnosis ID for up to twenty five diagnoses,
procedure ID and date information for up to twenty one procedures, length of stay, expected pay-
ment source, total charges, and admission type (emergency, urgent, or elective). I also use data for
these states and twenty five others from the HCUP National Inpatient Sample (NIS). NIS data are
similar to SID data, but rather than containing all inpatient discharge abstracts for any given state,
they are designed to approximate a 20% sample of U.S. community hospitals, defined by the AHA
to be all non-federal, short-term, general, and other specialty hospitals, excluding hospital units of
institutions. Specifically excluded from the NIS are short-term rehabilitation hospitals, long-term
non-acute care hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, and alcoholism/chemical dependency treatment fa-
cilities. The NIS is a repeated cross-section rather than a panel, so that the majority of hospitals
analyzed (51%) appear in only a single year.
Effective October 2007, CMS revised the DRG classification system into over 700 Medicare-
severity DRGs (MS-DRGs); I have excluded discharges occurring after the reclassification from the
sample so that DRG (the effective "product" in this analysis, the level at which prices are analyzed
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and often reported) is more consistent over time, making my effective sample period 2003 through
quarter three of 2007. Each analysis also includes DRG fixed effects to control for differences in
case mix across hospitals and over time. 18
The price variable analyzed in this analysis is total charge for inpatient admission. Total
charges include, but are not limited to, daily hospital services, ancillary services and any patient
care services. Physician and other professional fees are excluded. 19 See Table 2.1 for a summary
of charges for the top ten DRGs by state. Total charge can exhibit a great deal of heterogeneity
within a given set of procedures and diagnoses. In order to ensure that prices are contemporaneous
and sufficiently comparable across observations, I exclude observations for which there is more than
one month between admission and discharge, and those for which any procedure took place during
a different month.
In the primary analysis, the outcome variables of interest are the median and average prices
for each DRG-hospital-month combination, leaving 7,934,305 observations in the SID sample and
5,953,213 observations in the NIS sample. All of the "top" DRGs listed in Table 2.1 are quite
costly, the least expensive being the cost of a normal newborn (median cost of about $1,800) and
the most expensive being heart failure (median cost of about $14,100). There is strong state-level
persistence in charge levels - California and New Jersey tend to be the most expensive states for
most procedures, while South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia tend to be the least expensive.
Table 2.2 shows characteristics of sample admissions from the SID and NIS data. Average
age and percent female are fairly consistent across state, around 47 years and 59%, respectively. 20
Average length of stay is 4.7 days, the statewide average ranging from 3.3 days in Utah to 5.8 days
in New York.
The payer variable distinguishes among Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay (unin-
sured or insured with non-contracted insurer), and other. The self-pay population is the only one
that is directly subject to full charges21 ; however, while actual reimbursements will vary by patient,
charges for individual line items are consistent across payers and so admissions for all payers are
included in this sample. Table 2.2 shows that the proportion of payers who are expected to self-pay
varies by state - the median proportion of self-pay/ uninsured inpatients is 0.042, but reaches 10%
18DRG fixed effects will not control for other changes the DRG classification system over time - e.g., a particular
primary diagnosis may be reassigned to another DRG in a given period - but such factors will apply equally across
all hospitals and will be captured in time fixed effects.
1 9Charges from each source are cleaned by HCUP processing so that: values are rounded to the nearest dollar;
total charges are top-coded - a total charge of "9999999" indicates that actual charges exceed seven digits; and total
charges are allowed to be between $25 and $1.0 million in 2003 through 2006, and between $100 and $1.5 million
in 2007. All Kaiser Foundation hospitals in California report zero charges because they use capitations. Shriners
Hospitals in Los Angeles and Northern California report zero charges because they do not charge their patients.
These hospitals are excluded from the sample.
2 0Utah is an outlier with respect to patient age - the average sample inpatient in Utah was only 37 years old.
2
'Hospitals may point to charges when re-negotiating reimbursement rates with private or government insurers,
but it is unclear how these prices might be a necessary negotiating tool over and above cost data.
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Table 2.1: Charge summary by state
State File Admissions Chronic Pneumonia Heart Chest Esophagitis Caesarian Vaginal Newborn Normal Psychoses
Obstructive Failure Pain Section Delivery with Newborn
Pulmonary Problems
Disease
AZ SID 1,104,574 $17,607 $19,496 $20,219 $12,251 $16,931 $12,702 $6,723 $3,841 $1,785 $16,645
CA SID 6,803,603 $26,452 $30,393 $30,218 $13,892 $22,945 $18,825 $9,529 $6,356 $2,563 $17,157
CO SID 744,280 $16,069 $17,659 $19,213 $10,720 $15,519 $13,027 $6,650 $3,651 $1,752 $10,804
NJ SID 1,633,902 $41,779 $45,031 $48,233 $19,900 $34,013 $22,012 $13,612 $9,935 $6,184 $31,828
NY SID 3,603,790 $17,029 $20,725 $20,925 $8,976 $16,304 $11,898 $7,061 $5,397 $3,156 $27,990
WA SID 924,441 $12,308 $13,199 $14,301 $8,938 $12,648 $10,960 $6,038 $3,870 $1,786 $15,189
CT NIS 157,316 $14,815 $17,082 $17,926 $9,475 $14,942 $13,013 $7,432 $5,893 $2,803 $15,065
GA NIS 443,716 $12,795 $14,849 $14,100 $8,960 $12,066 $10,798 $6,395 $2,914 $1,505 $8,785
IA NIS 135,161 $9,912 $10,388 $10,769 $6,628 $9,016 $9,294 $4,559 $3,527 $1,787 $8,716
IL NIS 556,080 $14,921 $17,271 $17,554 $10,048 $13,965 $12,614 $6,952 $4,276 $2,177 $10,506
IN NIS 263,242 $10,941 $12,531 $12,507 $7,618 $10,628 $9,618 $5,481 $3,318 $1,879 $7,798
KS NIS 113,527 $11,996 $13,167 $14,030 $8,276 $10,893 $10,337 $6,179 $3,804 $2,061 $9,160
KY NIS 216,443 $10,725 $11,812 $12,441 $7,819 $9,636 $8,114 $5,274 $3,067 $1,698 $8,621
MI NIS 227,470 $13,586 $14,776 $15,628 $9,646 $13,279 $11,073 $6,360 $4,115 $1,847 $10,221
MN NIS 218,285 $12,346 $13,591 $15,323 $8,151 $12,079 $12,864 $6,387 $3,561 $2,137 $13,115
MO NIS 278,652 $13,368 $15,562 $16,058 $9,636 $13,310 $10,875 $6,537 $3,478 $1,851 $9,667
NC NIS 447,726 $11,560 $13,432 $13,195 $7,997 $10,551 $9,339 $4,871 $2,594 $1,285 $8,983
NE NIS 50,961 $12,348 $12,670 $13,909 $7,378 $9,654 $9,305 $4,638 $3,666 $1,545 $9,516
NH NIS 55,144 $11,919 $13,305 $13,799 $8,346 $12,192 $9,777 $5,179 $2,705 $1,751 $11,328
NV NIS 130,909 $23,322 $27,910 $27,359 $14,729 $21,450 $13,010 $6,374 $3,886 $1,633 $24,747
OH NIS 505,323 $11,589 $13,162 $14,244 $8,444 $11,150 $9,462 $5,880 $3,240 $1,856 $9,519
OR NIS 133,438 $11,668 $12,900 $12,734 $7,158 $10,470 $10,946 $5,169 $3,288 $1,692 $10,686
RI NIS 74,584 $11,662 $13,395 $13,935 $7,147 $11,112 $13,019 $8,211 $4,957 $2,057 $16,417
SC NIS 176,726 $17,047 $20,168 $18,250 $9,939 $14,891 $11,238 $6,394 $3,630 $1,800 $12,955
SD NIS 21,016 $9,087 $8,775 $8,558 $5,575 $7,523 $8,786 $4,370 $3,583 $1,770 $9,773
TN NIS 334,250 $11,724 $13,751 $14,023 $9,364 $11,491 $9,461 $5,636 $3,139 $1,509 $11,479
TX NIS 1,154,164 $19,908 $22,661 $21,716 $12,010 $16,296 $11,636 $6,538 $4,608 $1,737 $12,612
UT NIS 127,831 $10,421 $11,510 $11,677 $7,360 $9,919 $7,537 $4,222 $2,708 $1,465 $10,169
VT NIS 40,518 $9,102 $9,876 $9,813 $5,890 $8,522 $9,005 $4,823 $2,751 $1,493 $7,746
WI NIS 186,438 $11,066 $12,661 $12,772 $7,570 $10,430 $10,397 $5,053 $3,337 $1,820 $8,191
WV NIS 112,646 $9,041 $10,762 $10,482 $7,048 $8,680 $7,682 $4,629 $2,479 $1,264 $8,035
Note: Average charges from HCUP-SID and HCUP-NIS databases for DRGs 88, 89, 127, 143, 182, 371, 373, 390, 391, and 430.
Top 10 DRGs chosen based on ranking of total admissions in 2003-2007.
in New Jersey.2 2
For the majority of states, I am able to link hospitals in the HCUP data to variables from
the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals for each year to obtain further information on hospital and
market characteristics. 23 For the current analyses, I link the HCUP sample to AHA data on location
and type of ownership (government, non-for-profit, for-profit). I estimate using health service area
(HSA) codes from these data a Herfindahl-Hirschman index over admissions for the local HSA code,
which I use as a proxy for local market concentration. 24 I also calculate, for each HSA, a proxy for
2 2 This fact may be due to differences in the insurer-provider contracting environment across state - the rate of
uninsurance in New Jersey in 2004-2005 was lower than the national average (14.8% vs. 15.7%). See DeNavas-Walt,
et al., 2006.
2 3 Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas do
not permit identification of individual hospitals in their admissions data.
2 4 Health Service Areas (HSAs) were originally defined by the National Center for Health Statistics, part of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to be a single county or cluster of contiguous counties which are relatively
self-contained with respect to hospital care. There are approximately 800 HSAs in the United States.
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Table 2.2: Sample characteristics by state
State File Admissions Hospitals Female Age Length of Stay Unins. Public Ins. Private Ins.
AZ SID 3,420,482 89 0.58 44 4.2 0.03 0.57 0.34
CA SID 17,879,386 453 0.57 44 4.8 0.03 0.56 0.35
CO SID 2,183,708 81 0.60 43 4.1 0.06 0.41 0.47
NJ SID 5,431,269 97 0.58 49 5.0 0.10 0.45 0.44
NY SID 12,117,808 247 0.57 48 5.8 0.05 0.60 0.33
WA SID 2,900,095 170 0.59 46 4.0 0.03 0.52 0.42
CT NIS 530,676 24 0.58 50 4.2 0.02 0.58 0.38
GA NIS 1,406,172 129 0.60 45 4.1 0.06 0.56 0.34
IA NIS 452,148 91 0.60 51 4.0 0.04 0.57 0.38
IL NIS 1,740,497 138 0.59 49 4.2 0.04 0.57 0.35
IN NIS 809,654 80 0.60 49 4.3 0.04 0.57 0.37
KS NIS 346,854 87 0.61 49 3.8 0.05 0.53 0.36
KY NIS 738,808 85 0.59 50 4.2 0.04 0.62 0.26
MI NIS 770,576 77 0.59 51 4.2 0.02 0.57 0.39
MN NIS 693,649 85 0.60 47 3.6 0.05 0.42 0.50
MO NIS 998,443 89 0.58 49 4.3 0.04 0.60 0.32
NC NIS 1,477,603 88 0.59 47 4.3 0.07 0.59 0.30
NE NIS 161,203 61 0.59 47 3.7 0.02 0.55 0.42
NH NIS 196,392 20 0.57 50 4.2 0.05 0.52 0.41
NV NIS 376,512 28 0.58 44 3.9 0.06 0.39 0.46
OH NIS 1,652,322 99 0.59 49 4.1 0.05 0.57 0.36
OR NIS 410,928 47 0.60 46 3.6 0.04 0.49 0.42
RI NIS 183,945 9 0.64 42 4.3 0.03 0.55 0.40
SC NIS 580,165 37 0.61 48 4.3 0.05 0.60 0.31
SD NIS 063,091 31 0.61 51 3.6 0.03 0.61 0.35
TN NIS 1,175,537 94 0.59 49 4.4 0.04 0.63 0.30
TX NIS 3,376,996 295 0.61 42 4.2 0.08 0.55 0.32
UT NIS 317,815 34 0.62 37 3.3 0.03 0.45 0.48
VT NIS 138,297 12 0.57 48 4.2 0.03 0.58 0.37
WI NIS 648,427 102 0.58 48 3.8 0.03 0.53 0.41
WV NIS 390,066 43 0.60 52 4.3 0.04 0.62 0.27
Note: Sample characteristics from HCUP-SID and HCUP-NIS databases for all DRGs in 2003-2007.
the uninsured population using the total (over all hospitals) percentage of admissions which are self-
pay (uninsured). These characteristics are displayed in Table 2.3. There is a lot of variation across
state in the percent of sample hospitals which are for-profit - several states (Connecticut, Iowa,
Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont), have no sample hospitals which are for-profit, while others
(Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah) have 25% or more for-profit hospitals. Average market
concentration is fairly similar across states - Arizona is the least concentrated, while Vermont is
the most concentrated, but the spread in their average HHIs is only 0.1. As in the previous table,
the majority of states service a population that's about 3-4% self-pay, but there are outliers in New
Jersey (10.7% self-pay in the average hospital's region) and, to a lesser extent, Nevada and North
Carolina.
Finally, in the empirical analysis described below, I distinguish between diagnoses for which
prices were reported and those which were not subject to transparency requirements. For on-site
charge master reporting, each hospital was required to post the complete set of list prices at the
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Table 2.3: Sample hospital characteristics by state
State File Hospitals For-Profit Elective Hosp. HHI for HSA % Unins. For HSA
AZ SID 80 32 20 0.082 3.2%
CA SID 403 115 53 0.118 3.6%
CO SID 81 9 17 0.138 7.8%
NJ SID 92 7 10 0.157 10.7%
NY SID 242 2 38 0.115 4.5%
WA SID 168 10 66 0.141 3.2%
CT NIS 24 0 0 0.151 2.4%
IA NIS 91 0 38 0.169 4.4%
IL NIS 138 13 19 0.135 4.3%
KY NIS 85 13 20 0.163 4.7%
MN NIS 85 0 20 0.173 3.6%
MO NIS 89 15 24 0.120 4.3%
NC NIS 88 9 9 0.161 7.0%
NH NIS 20 2 2 0.170 5.4%
NV NIS 28 11 5 0.102 6.5%
OR NIS 47 1 7 0.164 4.0%
RI NIS 9 0 0 0.122 3.1%
UT NIS 34 12 6 0.145 3.3%
VT NIS 12 0 0 0.191 4.2%
WI NIS 102 7 7 0.150 3.4%
WV NIS 43 9 8 0.164 4.1%
Note: All sample hospital characteristics from HCUP databases 2003-2007. HHI calculated
as HHIr = ZrCR s , where R is the set of all hospitals in region code r.
hospital location, so I consider all DRGs to have been subject to these requirements. For Web
reporting requirements, some states only required a small subset of prices to be reported while
others reported separate prices for more than 100 DRGs. When a particular state only reported
prices for a specific set of DRGs, I consider only those DRGs to have been subject to transparency
(California, Nevada, and Vermont are the states falling into this category during the sample period;
see Appendix Table 1 for detail). For the two states (Minnesota and South Dakota) which required
reporting of the "top X" DRGs but for which archival data on the reported DRGs are not available,
the top X DRGs are flagged by ranking DRGs according to total admissions in the year prior to
the year of reporting, and those DRGs are considered subject to Web reporting. For the PricePoint
states and other states with 100+ DRGs reported, all DRGs are considered subject to the Web
reporting requirement; alternative analyses where only the top 100 DRGs are included in the
analysis show results are unchanged.25
"There are two states in the data for which Web sites posted prices at a level other than DRG: Arizona and
Ohio (Arizona Department of Health Services, 2012; Ohio Hospital Association, 2005). In the analyses presented, all
DRGs in those states are assumed to be reported, but alternative analyses excluding those states leave the estimates
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2.4.2 Empirical methodology
In this Section, I describe the regression specifications used in this paper to test the competing
hypotheses outlined above. The following Section presents results.
The main question of this paper is whether hospital price transparency requirements, be they for
on-site chargemaster reporting or Web site reporting, impact the charges that hospitals set. First,
I ask whether there appear to be aggregate effects of reporting on charges. I will use regression
analysis to examine this question statistically. First, because I wish to examine different types of
policy changes occurring at different times for different states, I will use the following differences-
in-differences empirical approach:
In phrdt - At + ar + Y d + 61onsitert + 62websitedrt + Chdt
where Inphrdt is the log charge for diagnosis d at hospital h in region r at time t, At is a time
fixed effect, ar is a region fixed effect, -d is a DRG fixed effect, and 61 and 62 are measuring
the aggregate effects of the two different types of transparency initiatives. Time fixed effects are
included to account for trends in hospital pricing over time, region fixed effects are included to
account for regional variation in price-relevant factors such as time-invariant demand and cost
shifters, and DRG fixed effects are included to control for imbalance in the health care services
provided across states and over time. This approach will account for endogeneity of transparency
regulation to the extent that unobservables which contribute to regulation are invariant within state
across time or within time across state. In order to account for potential bias due to imbalance
in the set of observations across hospitals over time, or due to state-specific differences in the
demand or cost conditions across DRGs, additional specifications include hospital fixed effects or
state-specific fixed effects for the top 50 DRGs by admissions.
I perform the analysis described above on both the SID and NIS samples. Generally, standard
errors are clustered at the ZIP code level to allow for correlation within region over time, but
additional results with state-clustered standard errors are presented as well so that NIS states
without ZIP information may be included. 26
The results of the above specification will shed light on average effects of transparency. However,
I have a diverse sample, with hospitals with different ownership structures and facing different
competitive pressures, and a large set of products, across which consumer search behavior may
vary greatly. Thus, as described in Section 2.3, I perform additional analyses to estimate separate
effects for different hospital-product type combinations:
In Phrdt - At + ar + -Yd + 6 1onsitert + 62websitedrt + rh0nlsitertXhdt + Tl2websitedrtXhdt + Ehdt
unchanged.
26 As discussed in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), clustered standard errors with too few clusters may
be downwardly biased - the SID and NIS samples have six and thirty one states, respectively, so these results will be
considered only as supplementary evidence to the main results.
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where Xhdt is a set of hospital and product covariates for which transparency effects may be expected
to vary.
2.5 Empirical Results
In this Section, I discuss the results of my analysis of hospital charges under price transparency
initiatives, on average and interacted with hospital- and DRG-level controls, as well as the dis-
persion of prices under transparency. First, I present the overall results regarding mean price
changes associated with price transparency. The estimates, which indicate across all specifications
that transparency is associated with a small increase in average prices, are inconsistent with the
hypotheses that hospital charges are irrelevant or that transparency facilitates consumer search
on balance. They do not, however, reject the hypothesis of disclosure facilitating collusion among
health care providers. Second, I show that price increases associated with transparency are damp-
ened among for-profit hospitals and in areas with a greater proportion of uninsured patients; either
of these effects is consistent with a model of oligopoly coordination or of consumer search. Further,
there appears to be no effect of market concentration on price patterns under transparency and the
evidence on transparency effects interacted with DRGs and hospitals whose inpatient admissions
are most commonly elective is somewhat mixed. Finally, I show the results of my analysis of price
dispersion under the two transparency initiatives in each data set, which indicate that transparency
has no substantial positive or negative effect on price dispersion in inpatient care. In sum, the re-
sults do not support the hypotheses that price transparency has no effect or a negative effect on
prices on average, but the interactions are not inconsistent with consumer search playing a role in
equilibrium.
2.5.1 Effects of transparency requirements across all hospital charges
In order to analyze the effect of price transparency requirements on overall hospital charges, I
estimated the above specifications on both the SID panel with complete data for six states and on
the NIS data set with repeated cross-sectional data for thirty one states. The results are similar
across all specifications, indicating that Web-based price transparency is associated with a small
but significant increase of around 3-4% in hospital prices, while on-site transparency has a smaller
positive effect of around 1-2% that is generally not statistically significant. These results do not
support Hypotheses 1 or 2, which predict zero or negative effects of price transparency on mean
hospital price; they are consistent with Hypothesis 3, in which price transparency serves to increase
prices by enabling oligopoly coordination, but only for those prices which are more visible (as on a
public Web site).
Table 2.4 shows the effects of the two price transparency requirements on overall mean hospital
charges for the full panel of inpatient admissions in the SID data set. Several specifications are
presented, with different sets of fixed effects to control for unobserved regional variation in demand
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and competition. Columns (1) and (3) include state fixed effects (with state-specific DRG fixed
effects and pooled DRG fixed effects, respectively), columns (2) and (4) include ZIP code fixed
effects (with state-specific DRG fixed effects and pooled DRG fixed effects, respectively), and
columns (5) and (6) include hospital fixed effects.27
The first row of results shows the estimated effect of Web reporting on mean hospital charges.
In these results, once local region-specific information is controlled for using ZIP or hospital fixed
effects, the results are quite similar across specifications (see columns (2), (4), (5), and (6)). In
each case, the results indicate that Web transparency implies a statistically significant positive
effect of 0.03-0.04 on the log of mean price; that is, posting a DRG's average charges on the Web is
associated with a 3-4% increase in that diagnosis's average charge after transparency.28 In practical
terms, for the least expensive of the most common DRGs (normal newborn) this implies a price
increase of $54-$72 (over the median cost across states of $1,800), while for the most expensive of
the most common DRGs (heart failure) this implies a price increase of $423-$564 (over the median
cost across states of $14,100). The results when only state fixed effects are included are slightly
smaller (implying a 1-1.5% increase in charges) and are not statistically significant. Using only state
fixed effects is likely insufficient to control for variation in demand or competition across regulatory
regions in the data, particularly as the sample is unbalanced in hospitals, so it is necessary to
include either ZIP or hospital fixed effects to isolate time effects; however, it is encouraging that
the results with state controls only are qualitatively similar to richer specifications.
The second row of results shows the effect of on-site charge master reporting on mean hospital
charges. The point estimates are strongly consistent across all specifications, indicating a small
positive effect of 0.012-0.019 on the log of mean price, so that on-site transparency implies a price
increase of about 1.5%, which is about half the size of the Web transparency effects. These results
are generally not significant across specifications.
The results presented above only pertain to three states which instituted transparency initiatives
during the sample period; next, I describe the results of the same specifications from the NIS data,
which cover eighteen states with transparency requirements during the study period. Table 2.5
shows the effects of the two price transparency requirements on overall mean hospital charges for
all NIS states for which data over the full study period are available. The same specifications
are presented as above: columns (1) and (3) include state fixed effects (with state-specific DRG
fixed effects and pooled DRG fixed effects, respectively), columns (2) and (4) include ZIP code
fixed effects (with state-specific DRG fixed effects and pooled DRG fixed effects, respectively), and
columns (5) and (6) include hospital fixed effects. Note that, as discussed above, a number of NIS
states do not have ZIP code information available and are thus dropped from the analysis.
The first row of results, regarding the effect of Web reporting on mean hospital charges, show
2 7The hospital fixed effects results are different in columns (5) and (6) because the latter include ZIP code clustered
standard errors, and some hospitals in the SID data set did not have ZIP information available.
2
8Specifications where the outcome variable was median price at the hospital-DRG-month level were basically
identical in direction and magnitude, so I've omitted them from this discussion.
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Table 2.4: Overall effect of transparency on mean prices, SID data, 2003-Q3 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Web reporting required 0.015 0.046*** 0.010 0.039*** 0.042** 0.043***
(0.021) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007)
On-site reporting required 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.019*
(0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
N 7,934,305 7,868,038 7,934,305 7,868,038 7,934,305 7,868,038
State fixed effects Yes Yes
ZIP fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Hospital fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
State-specific DRG effects Yes Yes No No No No
SE Cluster Level State ZIP State ZIP State ZIP
Note: Results from regression of mean price on specified fixed effects and indicators for trans-
parency requirements in effect. Superscript *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. State-specific DRG fixed
effects for top 50 DRGs (by admissions, in overall sample) only; in specifications with state-specific
DRG fixed effects, fixed effects for all other DRGs are pooled across states. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses.
that the results regarding Web transparency in the NIS sample are qualitatively similar to those
seen above for the SID panel data. Looking across all specifications, the results indicate that Web
transparency implies a statistically significant positive effect of 0.02-0.034 on the log of mean price;
that is, posting a DRG's average charges on the Web is associated with a 2-3.5% increase in that
diagnosis's average charge after transparency. For a relatively inexpensive admission of a normal
newborn, this implies a price increase of $36-$64; for an expensive heart failure admission, this
implies a price increase of $285-$502. The results when hospital fixed effects are included (columns
(5) and (6)) are on the smaller side but still qualitatively consistent with Web price transparency
having a small positive effect on prices. Most hospitals appear in only one year of the NIS sample
because it is a repeated cross section, so hospital fixed effects may not control very well for persistent
regional variation in demand or competitive environment; the results are shown as supplementary
evidence of overall price results for the full set of states, including those without ZIP information.
The second row of results shows the effect of on-site charge master reporting on mean hospital
charges. As in the SID results, the point estimates indicate a small positive effect of 1-2% on mean
price, and these results are generally not significant across specifications.
2.5.2 Effects of transparency requirements across all hospital charges: control-
ling for pre-trends
As noted in my discussion of the empirical methodology, this differences-in-differences approach
will account for endogeneity of transparency regulation only to the extent that unobservables which
contribute to regulation are invariant within state across time or within time across state. One
potential concern with this approach is that states instituting transparency initiatives may have
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Table 2.5: Overall effect of transparency on mean prices, NIS data, 2003-Q3 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Web reporting required 0.033** 0.034*** 0.030* 0.031*** 0.018 0.024**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
On-site reporting required 0.017 0.012. 0.016 0.011 0.018** 0.029
(0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.025) (0.008) (0.018)
N 5,953,213 3,850,406 5,953,213 3,850,406 5,953,213 3,850,406
State fixed effects Yes Yes
ZIP fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Hospital fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
State-specific DRG effects Yes Yes No No No No
SE Cluster Level State ZIP State ZIP State ZIP
Note: Results from regression of mean price on specified fixed effects and indicators for trans-
parency requirements in effect. Superscript * * * indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. State-specific DRG
fixed effects for top 50 DRGs (by admissions, in overall sample) only; in specifications with state-
specific DRG fixed effects, fixed effects for all other DRGs included pooled across states. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses.
differential trends in pricing than non-transparency states, even absent regulation. To investigate
this issue, I examine the time trends of prices in each sample before and after transparency, and
provide some statistical tests. All analyses are qualitatively in agreement with the differences-
in-differences estimates, and the NIS analyses, which cover the most states with transparency
initiatives, are also similar in magnitude. Given these results, I proceed in the following sections
with the differences-in- differences approach.
First, consider in Figure 2-2 a graph of time effects on charges by state from the SID data,
controlling for DRG fixed effects. The vertical lines indicate the timing of the several price trans-
parency initiatives present in the SID states, three Web transparency initiatives (in California, New
Jersey, and Washington), and one on-site transparency initiative (in California; an on-site initia-
tive was in effect in Arizona throughout the study period). The plots show that hospital charges
are fairly volatile and increased substantially over the study period in all states, and there are no
visible trend breaks at the timing of any of the transparency initiatives. Interestingly, the lines for
California and Arizona, for New York and New Jersey, and for Colorado and Washington seem to
move together, indicating that there may be regional shocks affecting prices.
These visual patterns do not strongly suggest evidence of a systematically different pre-transparency
price trend among adopting states; however, there may be small differences not visible to the naked
eye which may bias the results in the above table, and a plot of the NIS price trends for thirty-
one states will be too busy to be visually informative. To investigate this further, I perform the
following regression:
A =max A
In pst - At + as + 'd + 6siteonsitest + A 6 1(t - tweb _ + Edt
A=min A
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Figure 2-2: Time effects by state, SID data
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Note: Time effects obtained from regression of mean charge on state-specific time effects and DRG fixed effects, SID states. Vertical
lines indicate timing of on-site (CDM) and Web-based transparency initiatives.
where 6A captures the effect on log prices of being A quarters past the date of Web transparency
for the given state (tWeb). The coefficient 60 is normalized to equal 0, so all other prices are relative
to the quarter in which transparency was enacted. 29 This specification is more flexible than the
differences-in-differences specification analyzed above; the identifying assumption is now that, in
the absence of transparency initiative, any pre-initiative differences between transparency states
and non-transparency states would have continued on the same trends.
Figure 2-3 displays the trend in SA for the full SID sample. Multiple SID states enacted
transparency initiatives late in the study period (New Jersey and Washington; see Figure 2-2
above); in order to show results for a balanced pre- and post-transparency sample, Figure 2-4
displays the trend in SA for the SID states (Arizona and California) with at least one year pre- and
post-Web transparency. In each regression, non-transparency states were included to help identify
the quarter fixed effects. Each figure shows a slightly increasing trend in log prices both before
and after transparency, which may indicate that transparency states are ones in which prices were
2 9 On-site transparency is included as a control but not analyzed explicitly in this specification, as there are limited
states with such initiatives in either dataset and the above analyses showed no evidence of a price effect of on-site
transparency.
95
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
o-0.05
0
Figure 2-3: Time trends pre- and post-transparency, full SID panel
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Note: Time effects obtained from regression of mean charge on state fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, DRG fixed effects,
and dummies for number of quarters pre- and post-Web transparency initiatives, SID states. Full sample. On-site transparency
included as a control. 95% confidence intervals shown with dashed line, based on state-clustered standard errors.
growing more quickly. Save for a few coefficients two years prior to transparency in Figure 2-3, no
individual coefficients are statistically different from zero. However, such a factor could bias the
differences-in-differences analyses in the previous section, so it will be necessary to analyze these
patterns statistically and shed light on this potential concern. Notably, the increasing trend pre-
transparency is more starkly evident in the first Figure with the unbalanced panel and, given the
volatile pattern well before the timing of transparency, this pattern may be driven by the volatile
prices observed for New Jersey in Figure 2-2 above (New Jersey is dropped from the balanced
panel).
Next, consider the same graphs for the NIS data. Figure 2-5 displays the trend in 5A for the full
NIS sample; Figure 2-6 displays the trend in 3A for the set of NIS states (seven total) with at least
one year pre- and post-Web transparency. These plots, each with a greater number of states with
transparency initiatives, show less reason for concern that a pre-trend in prices in transparency
states could be biasing the previous section's results. In Figure 2-5, the plot of coefficients for
the full sample, there is a volatile but slightly increasing trend in prices in transparency states
in the pre-period, with a more pronounced and statistically significant increase, then decrease in
prices in the post-transparency period. In Figure 2-6, the plot of coefficients for the balanced NIS
sample with seven transparency states, there is no clear trend in prices for transparency states
in the pre-period - prices appear to decrease, then increase in the year prior to transparency; in
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Figure 2-4: Time trends pre- and post-transparency, balanced SID panel
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Note: Time effects obtained from regression of mean charge on state fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, DRG fixed effects,
and dummies for number of quarters pre- and post-Web transparency initiatives, SID states. Balanced sample with full year
pre- and post-transparency. On-site transparency included as a control. 95% confidence intervals shown with dashed line,
based on state-clustered standard errors.
the post-period, there is a pronounced increase in prices after the first quarter post-transparency,
though standard errors are fairly large.
In order to examine the phenomena observed in the Figures 2-3 through 2-6 more rigorously, I
compare the n-quarter change in prices after transparency to the n-quarter change in prices prior
to transparency. That is, I compare the following test statistic to zero, for varying values of n:
Yn = (6n - 60) - (60 - 6-n).
For example, Y4 captures the change in log prices in transparency states in the first year after
the Web transparency initiatives relative to the change in log prices in the last year prior to
transparency. The results of these tests are reported in Table 2.6.
First consider the results in the first column, for the full SID panel and n = 2, 4, 6 (the maximal
number of post-transparency periods in the SID states is 18 months). The first row indicates that
transparency states experienced 1.5% lower prices in the first six months after transparency than
they would have had their price trends continued on (this estimate is marginally significant). The
following two rows indicate price increases of 0.5% and 1.2% relative to trend in the first year and
eighteen months after transparency, respectively; neither estimate is statistically significant. Thus,
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Note: Time effects obtained from regression of mean charge on state fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, DRG fixed effects,
and dummies for number of quarters pre- and post-Web transparency initiatives, NIS states. Full sample.
although the full SID sample results indicate that prices in SID states increased relative to trend
after the first six months after Web transparency, the results are smaller than in the differences-in-
differences specification and not significant, indicating the latter may be biased due to differential
trends in transparency states.
As noted above, these results may be driven unduly by the early trends in states for which
limited post-transparency data are available (New Jersey and Washington); the second column
provides the same analysis for a balanced panel with those states omitted. The results again
indicate a small (0.5%) decrease in price relative to trend in the first six months and an increase
in price relative to trend at one year after transparency. The latter estimate indicates a significant
(at the 5% level) 1.2% increase in average prices after Web transparency. The comparison of the
unbalanced and balanced estimates is likely due to the early volatility in New Jersey's prices seen in
Figure 2-2; the latter results are more supportive of the original differences-in-differences estimate
of a 3-4% effect of Web transparency, though the smaller magnitudes are somewhat concerning.
The SID data contain somewhat limited post-transparency data for examining the trends of
interest; next, consider the results from the NIS sample, which contains substantially more state-
quarters post-Web transparency. In the third column of Table 2.6, the estimates confirm the visual
finding from Figure 2-5 of an initial increase, then decrease, in prices after Web transparency. Six
months out, average prices were 3.9% higher than they would be given the pre-transparency trend;
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Note: Time effects obtained from regression of mean charge on state fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, DRG fixed effects,
and dummies for number of quarters pre- and post-Web transparency initiatives, NIS states. Balanced sample with full year
pre- and post-transparency.
one year after the initiatives, prices were 7.6% higher than they would be given the pre-transparency
trend. Each of these estimates is statistically significant at the 5% level. Later on, these effects
decrease, indicating only 5.1% higher prices at eighteen months (not statistically different from
zero) and 0.7% and 3.6% lower prices relative to trend at two years and thirty months after Web
transparency, respectively. These results are more encouraging regarding the main differences-
in-differences specification; the pre-trend is not strongly increasing, and the post-transparency
estimates look similar on average to the estimates from Table 5 of an increase of around 2-3% after
Web transparency.
The NIS data also include some states with Web transparency initiatives late in my study
period; to provide further evidence on these findings, consider the final column of Table 2.6, which
analyzes the NIS states with data at least one year pre- and post-Web transparency. These results
are similar to those in the third column; even restricting the set of transparency states, I observe
a 2.6% increase at six months after transparency relative to trend, and a 8.9% increase relative to
trend one year after Web transparency.
On balance, these analyses are qualitatively in line with those of the differences-in-differences
analyses in the previous section, with some caveats. First, the SID estimates are smaller in mag-
nitude than the differences-in-differences results; however, the unbalanced panel appears driven by
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Table 2.6: Overall effect of transparency on mean prices,
Q3 2007
allowing for differential pre-trends, 2003-
SID Data NIS Data
Full Sample Balanced Sample Full Sample Balanced Sample
First Six Months -0.015* -0.003 0.038** 0.026
(0.051) (0.687) (0.012) (0.363)
First Year 0.005 0.012** 0.073* 0.085*
(0.805) (0.032) (0.067) (0.082)
First 18 Months 0.012 0.051
(0.643) (0.129)
Second Year -0.007
(0.662)
First 30 Months - - -0.037
(0.113)
N 7,934,305 3,294,165 5,953,213 2,543,389
Note: Statistical tests of the hypothesis Y, = 0, varying n in half-year intervals up to n = 10,
both unbalanced and balanced SID and NIS samples. p-values from F-tests using state-
clustered standard errors. All regressions include state, DRG, and quarter fixed effects;
non-transparency states included to help identify overall time trends. ** denotes significance
at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level.
early volatility in the New Jersey price data, for which there is no apparent explanation in the ob-
servable data, and the balanced panel includes only two states with transparency initiatives. The
NIS estimates in this section fit well with the differences-in-differences results in both analyses,
but the pattern of prices may indicate that transparency states experience price decreases a few
years after the Web initiatives; my study period does not extend far enough in time to examine
this phenomenon further and the existing estimates are not significant. Given this examination, I
proceed with the differences-in-differences specification in the following sections, but return to this
issue in the discussion.
2.5.3 Variation in the effects of transparency requirements with hospital and
diagnosis type
The above results group all hospitals and products (DRGs) together; however, I have two samples
with a diverse set of hospitals and products across which competition and consumer search behavior
may vary greatly. Thus, it seems likely that the aggregate effect may obscure some interesting
underlying effects. In this Section, I show results where the transparency effects are allowed to be
different for DRGs which are more likely to be admitted on an elective basis, at hospitals which
are more likely to provide elective services, in more concentrated geographic regions, at for-profit
hospitals, and in regions serving a greater proportion of uninsured individuals. The "elective"
controls are dummies for DRGs and hospitals being in the highest quintile by percent of admissions
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which are elective across all DRGs and hospitals, respectively. These variables are intended to
proxy for ease of search in the sense that elective procedures are likely to have lower search costs
than other health care admissions, particularly relative to emergency procedures. I control for
geographic concentration using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index over admissions for the HSA code.
The "for-profit" control is an indicator for the hospital being investor-owned - hospitals without
data in the AHA are omitted because they do not have information on ZIP code for the HHI
construction or on ownership. The percent uninsured in the local HSA is included as a continuous
control. The results vary somewhat by specification, but again suggest that price transparency is
associated with small increases in hospital prices, and further suggest that price increases are lower
at for-profit hospitals and in regions with a greater uninsured population.
Table 2.7 displays the results of specification where transparency effects are allowed to vary by
DRG and hospital characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the SID data with ZIP
code and hospital fixed effects, respectively; columns (3) and (4) display the results for the NIS
sample with ZIP code and hospital fixed effects, respectively. The first two rows of Table 2.7 show
that hospitals which are more likely to provide elective procedures are not associated with different
prices than other hospitals, but that for-profit hospitals have 30-40% higher charges.
The next five rows of the table show the effects of Web price transparency initiatives on hospital
charges, alone and interacted with DRG and hospital characteristics. The first of these rows
shows the baseline effect of Web transparency efforts, which are similar to the effects of Web price
transparency on average charges discussed above. There is little evidence in the SID results in
columns (1) and (2) that the effects of Web transparency are differentially stronger or weaker for
elective procedures or hospitals or in more concentrated regions. The point estimates with regard to
a differential effect of Web transparency for elective DRGs or hospitals suggest that "more" elective
DRGs/hospitals have a 1-2pp greater increase in price upon transparency, but the estimates are
smaller than their standard errors. The estimates for greater market concentration (HHI) are
essentially zero. The estimates from the SID data do show evidence that price increases are smaller
(or nonexistent) at for-profit hospitals and hospitals located in regions with more self-pay patients
for-profit hospitals have 3-4pp lower price increases and regions with a standard deviation higher
population uninsured have a 2pp lower price increase, under Web transparency.
The results from the NIS sample as seen in columns (3) and (4) exhibit somewhat different
patterns. The NIS results indicate that more elective DRGs have about 6pp higher price increases
under Web transparency, but that more elective hospitals do not exhibit differential Web trans-
parency effects, in contrast to the SID results (the NIS results are small and negative, while the
SID results were small and positive). The discrepancies in estimates across the two samples sug-
gest that transparency effects may vary by region. As in the SID sample, the NIS sample shows an
essentially zero interaction between Web transparency and market concentration. The NIS results
for the interaction between Web transparency and for-profit ownership, and between Web trans-
parency and percent uninsured, exhibit similar patterns to the SID estimates, indicating for-profit
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Table 2.7: Interacted effects of transparency on mean prices, 2003-Q3 2007
(2)
Elective Hosp.
For-Profit Hosp.
Web reporting required
Web*Elective DRG
Web*Elective Hosp.
Web*HHI
Web*For-Profit
Web*%Unins.
On-site reporting required
On-site*Elective DRG
On-site*Elective Hosp.
On-site*HHI
On-site*For-Profit
On-site*%Unins.
(4)(1)
0.004
(0.075)
0.250***
(0.065)
0.044***
(0.008)
0.005
(0.010)
0.025
(0.020)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.045**
(0.017)
-0.020**
(0.008)
0.026**
(0.013)
0.117***
(0.012)
-0.088
(0.079)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.118***
(0.026)
0.001
(0.015)
N 7,881,416 7,881,416 3,848,096 3,848,096
ZIP fixed effects Yes Yes
Hospital fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Data source SID SID NIS NIS
Note: Results from regression of mean price on specified fixed effects and
requirements in effect, alone and interacted with hospital- and DRG-level co-
variates. Superscript * * * indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. All
specifications include DRG fixed effects. Estimates with state-specific DRG
fixed effects are similar and omitted from results. ZIP-clustered standard er-
rors in parentheses.
ownership and percent uninsured have a countervailing effect on the price increases associated with
transparency, but the estimates are noisy relative to the size of the parameters.
102
0.046***
(0.007)
0.010
(0.010)
0.026
(0.016)
0.000
(0.007)
-0.029**
(0.013)
-0.022**
(0.009)
0.018
(0.012)
0.119***
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.029)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.109***
(0.020)
-0.002
(0.014)
(3)
0.043
(0.074)
0.325***
(0.067)
0.033**
(0.014)
0.061***
(0.012)
-0.032
(0.029)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.042*
(0.022)
-0.016
(0.012)
0.032
(0.024)
0.014
(0.013)
0.024
(0.134)
0.045**
(0.022)
-0.092*
(0.048)
-0.028
(0.020)
0.021*
(0.012)
0.064***
(0.013)
-0.031*
(0.016)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.015)
-0.011
(0.012)
0.030*
(0.018)
0.014
(0.012)
0.110
(0.097)
0.016
(0.017)
-0.085**
(0.037)
-0.031*
(0.018)
The final five rows of the table show the effects of on-site price transparency initiatives on
hospital charges, alone and interacted with DRG and hospital characteristics. The first row shows
the baseline effects of chargemaster transparency efforts, which are slightly larger than the average
charge effects discussed above, indicating a price increase of 2-3% in baseline prices after trans-
parency. The results are noisy and vary by specification, but again indicate a small increase in
prices after transparency which is inconsistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. As with the Web trans-
parency interaction results, there is a discrepancy between the SID and NIS estimates with regard
to the interaction between on-site transparency initiatives and primarily elective procedures and
hospitals; the SID estimates suggest that price increases after on-site transparency are substan-
tially larger (by about 12pp) for elective DRGs, while the NIS estimates are much smaller and not
significant. The results for the interaction between on-site transparency and elective hospitals have
different signs across the two samples, but none of the estimates is statistically different from zero.
These discrepancies may again suggest that the effects of transparency on demand or competition
for elective procedures vary by region.
The differential effects of on-site transparency for hospitals in more concentrated regions show
no strong patterns - the NIS estimate with ZIP code fixed effects is positive and marginally signifi-
cant, indicating a larger price increase in more concentrated regions after transparency on the order
of 4.5pp. However, the results have large standard errors and vary across specification. All speci-
fications indicate that the price differential at for-profit hospitals is substantially lower in regions
that institute on-site transparency requirements - the effect size is about half the for-profit price
differential and may account for the discrepancy between the baseline effects in the model with
interactions being larger than the average effects for on-site transparency discussed in the previous
section.3 0 Finally, the results for both the SID (with hospital controls) and NIS data indicate that
price increases associated with on-site price transparency are slightly lower (up to 3pp) in regions
with a greater uninsured population, but the results are not generally significant.
2.5.4 Transparency and price dispersion
Another prediction generated by models involving transparency, whether due to oligopolistic co-
ordination or to consumer search, is that greater transparency should be associated with a lower
variance of prices. To test this prediction, I perform the same regression analyses presented in
previous sections, but now with the log standard deviation of price at the HSA code level as the
left-hand side variable. Table 2.8 displays the results with and without interactions with indica-
tors for more elective DRGs and for more concentrated geographic regions, and with a continuous
control for the percent uninsured in the local HSA. In each case, observations are excluded where
fewer than two hospitals existed in any HSA-period.
30 1t should be noted again here that for-profit hospitals are more popular in Arizona and California, the two states
with charge master reporting requirements which could be linked to AHA data on ownership, than in other states
included in the sample, so that effects may be magnified due to differential trends in prices among for-profit hospitals.
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Columns (1) and (3) show results with and without interactions for the SID sample; columns
(2) and (4) show results with and without interactions for the NIS sample (which, because it is
a repeated cross-section, has fewer observations). There are several things of note in the Table.
First, for the baseline region and non-elective DRG, Web transparency is associated with zero effect
or a small positive effect (2.5%) on the standard deviation of prices, indicating no convergence in
prices upon Web transparency. On-site transparency is associated with about a 3-4% decrease in
the standard deviation of prices, though the estimates are not significant.
The interactions between transparency initiatives and DRG and region characteristics are gen-
erally small, negative, and insignificant, indicating weak convergence in prices upon transparency,
with a few notable exceptions. First, there appears to be no differential effect of Web transparency
on dispersion for elective DRGs, but in the SID sample there is a large positive estimate for the in-
teraction between on-site transparency requirements and elective DRGs; it appears that the spread
of prices for more elective procedures is 7pp larger in the SID data when charge master reporting
is required. As noted in the discussion of Table 2.7, Arizona and California are the only two states
with charge master reporting requirements which are included in the regressions with controls, so
it is unclear what implications this result might have more broadly. Both samples indicate lower
price dispersion (by 1-3pp) for areas with greater self-pay populations under Web transparency ini-
tiatives, though the estimate is only significant for the SID data; the same estimated interactions
with the on-site transparency requirements are extremely noisy, having standard errors exceeding
the baseline estimates.
In sum, the majority of the point estimates indicate that there is zero effect or a small negative
effect of transparency on the dispersion of prices, but the results vary by specification and thus do
not strongly favor any of the Hypotheses discussed in Section 2.3.
2.6 Discussion
Legislative pushes for greater disclosure of price and quality information in health care have been
very controversial. Proponents of price disclosure tend to invoke economic theory in their argu-
ments, stating that price transparency will facilitate rational consumer search behavior. A direct
corollary of this argument is that firm behavior will be affected, and in many models will be af-
fected in such a way that the mean and variance of prices decrease, enhancing consumer welfare.
Some opponents of disclosure argue that price-shopping for health care is impossible, and that
transparency regulations are pure folly with an added administrative burden; others argue that
transparency will have anticompetitive effects.
Using two datasets connecting regional transparency policies to hospital charge and charac-
teristics data, I find no evidence that charge-reporting requirements on the Web or on-site at
hospitals result in decreased average prices or decreased dispersion in prices. In contrast, I find
that price transparency requirements are associated with small increases of about 2-4% in the mean
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Table 2.8: Effects of transparency on price dispersion, 2003-Q3 2007
Web reporting required
Web*Elective DRG
(1)
0.025**
(0.013)
(2)
0.
(0.
Web*HHI
Web*%Unins.
On-site reporting required
On-site*Elective DRG
-0.046
(0.033) (0
On-site*HHI
On-site*%Unins.
N 1,186,523 31
Source SID
Interactions No
Note: Results from regression of the log st
specified fixed effects and requirements in
(3)
effect, alone and interacted
with hospital- and DRG-level covariates. HSA codes with only a single
hospital excluded from each analysis. Superscript * * * indicates signif-
icance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *
indicates significance at the10% level. All specifications include DRG
and HSA fixed effects. HSA-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
of inpatient hospital prices overall, without any associated change in price dispersion. Web based
transparency requirements appear to be associated with larger price increases, which may suggest
a rationale for hospital associations' willingness to adopt Web transparency systems after the first
few legislated Web sites were launched. The patterns in mean price changes do not reject a model of
price disclosure facilitating collusive oligopoly; further, I find that mean price increases are smaller
for for-profit hospitals and in regions with a greater uninsured population, which is consistent with
the predictions of the oligopoly hypothesis or with a countervailing effect of consumer search on
hospital price coordination.
The majority of specifications considered in this study assumed parallel trends in log prices
absent transparency initiatives. In order to shed further light on the above results, I also compared
price trends in adopting states before and after transparency, focusing on Web transparency. The
results are generally consistent with the findings described above, indicating a small increase in
prices after Web transparency. One set of estimates indicates that initial increases in prices may
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(4)
0.001
(0.043)
-0.013
(0.046)
-0.017
(0.025)
-0.014
(0.019)
-0.048
(0.065)
0.003
(0.061)
-0.082
(0.080)
-0.048
(0.060)
311,261
NIS
Yes
of price on
000 0.025*
043) (0.013)
- -0.004
(0.020)
- -0.013
(0.010)
- -0.031***
(0.006)
).044 -0.034
.061) (0.036)
- 0.073***
(0.026)
-0.005
(0.032)
- 0.076
(0.049)
1,261 1,186,523
NIS SID
No Yes
andard deviation
be undone after the first two years after Web transparency; the results are not significant and there
are limited data post-transparency, so the implications of these estimates are unclear.
The results of this study favor the more pessimistic view of price transparency in health care, at
least in the context of hospital charges. While I cannot reject the hypothesis that price transparency
may facilitate consumer search, on balance I find that any search effects that do exist in the area
of hospital care are outweighed by countervailing forces, potentially due to anticompetitive effects
of price disclosure. The welfare implications of this analysis appear unambiguously negative. The
increase in price associated with transparency is small and applies only to a small swath of the
population, the non-indigent uninsured, but it has been shown that the costs of medical care
can have a devastating impact on such households. For example, it has been shown that out-of-
pocket medical costs are pivotal in roughly 26 percent of personal bankruptcies among low-income
households (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011). Further, the lack of a positive impact on consumer
welfare through increased competition implies that the costs of transparency adoption are, at least
in the short term, purely wasteful.
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107
Appendix Table 1: Summary of Price Transparency Initiatives, All States 2003-2007
State Description Law Data DRG List Level of Price Quality Data? Chargemas Written Web Site Source(s)
Reported ter Post Estimate Post Date
Date Date
AZ Hospitals must post their chargemasters Rev. Stat. 36-
in a conspicuous place in the hospital's 436.01
reception area. DHS began posting
several dozen charges for rooms and
tests across hospitals in Q1 2006.
A B. : Hospitals nust make A. B. 1627; A.
available their chargemasters and post a 1045
notice that it is available; they must also
make a list of the charges for 25 common
services or procedures available upon
request. A. B. 1045: Each hospital must
compile a list of the average charges for
the 25 common inpatient and outpatient
procedures, by DRG, and submit these
lists to OSHPD to be posted online (Excel
format). Hospitals must provide
uninsured persons with a written
estimate of expected cost of non-
emergency services.
NIS; SID n/a Service No 1997 1/24/06 NCSL, 2010; A.R.S. § 36-436.01, 1995; Arizona
B. NIS; SID
description
Top 25 A. B. 1627:
hospital
charge code;
A. B. 1045:
DRG
Same site 7/1/04
Department of Health Services, 2012; Arizona
Department of Health Services, 2006.
7/1/06 U----7/1A/06 Cal  , ; daif. A. B. 1627, 2003; C A. B: 1045, 2005 OSHPD,
2011A; OSHPD, 2011B.
CO C.R.S. 6-20-101: Requires hospitals to Rev. Stat. 6-20-
disclose the average facility charge for 101
frequently performed inpatient procedure
prior to admission for such procedure.
NIS; SID
CT All negotiated agreements between 1994 Deregulation NIS
hospitals and insurers must be filed with
Office of Health Care Access. Discounts
by payer made public.
GA Georgia Hospital Association launched NIS
Georgia Hospital Price Check (based on
PricePoint) in 2007.
IA Health care quality and cost transparency H. B. 2539 NIS
work group created to recommend
legislation to provide transparency to
health care consumers. Iowa Hospital
Association launched Iowa PricePoint in
January 2007.
IN Legislation requires web-based system M.S.A. § 62J.82 NIS
for reporting charge information,
including average charge, average charge
per day and median charge, for the 50
most common inpatient DRGs and the 25
most common outpatient surgical DRGs.
n/a C.R.S. 6-20- Different site
101:
procedure
n/a Aggregate No
100+ ORG Different site
100+ ORG Different site
Top O RG U Different site-
7/1/04 NCSL, 2010.
Sorensen, 2003.
1/1/07 Georgia Hospital Association, 2007; Wisconsin Hospital
Association, 2007A.
1/10/07 NCSL, 2010; Iowa Hospital Associati on, 2006.
9/29/06 NCSL, 2010; Benson, 2006.
Appendi
MO Hospitals and health care providers must S. B. 1279 NIS
provide charge data to the Department of
Health and Senior Services, which will
publish an annual consumer guide to be
made available to the public for a
reasonable charge.
NC Legislation requires that a report that Gen. Stats. Ch. NIS
includes a comparison of the 35 most 131E-214.4
frequently reported charges of hospitals
and freestanding ambulatory surgical
facilities be made available to the
Division of Facility Services of the
Department of Health and Human
Services.
NE Hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers Neb. Rev. St. § 71- NIS
must provide a written estimate of the 2075
average charges for health services.
x Table 1: Summary of Price Transparency Initiatives, All States 2003-2007, cont'd
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n /a 1984
NCSL, 2010; Miss. S. B. 1279.
NCSL, 2010; Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services
Research, 2011.
NCSL, 2010.
NH New Hampshire Comprehensive Health Title XXXVII,
Information System (CHIS) publishes Chapter 420-G,
data on interactive website called New Section 11a
Hampshire HealthCost. Pooled hospital
price site launched March 2005;
comparison website launched February
2007. Includes median prices for insured
(user inputs insurance carrier, deductible,
and coinsurance) and uninsured
(assuming 15% discount off list price)
patients. PricePoint launched in May
2006.
NJ New Jersey Hospital Price Compare
website, with general DRG search and
top 25 DRG search, launched in 2007.
NV PricePoint launched in 2007. Nevada NRS 439B.400
Personal Health Choices, with discharge
data (including average charge for up to
39 common DRGs) from 25 acute care
hospitals, published annually since 1988.
NY Since 1999, the New York State Health
Accountability Foundation has displayed
data on Medicare reimbursement and
quality.
OH Hospita s mu t make its price information H. B 197
list for a large set of common procedures
available on its web site and post an
announcement of the list's availability on
site. Ohio Health Care Guide launched in
July-August 2007 with charges for room
and board, emergency department,
operating room, delivery, physical
therapy and other procedures as well as
too sixtv DRGs.
NIS PricePoint:
All;
HealthCost:
Select set
PricePoint:
DRG;
HealthCost:
Office visits,
outpatient
diagnostics,
ER visits,
outpatient
surgeries,
inpatient
maternity
Different site
NIS; SID 100+ DRG Different site
NIS PHC: 39
Specific;
PricePoint:
100+
NIS; SID
DRG Different site
n/a n/a
NIS Top 60;
Specific
services
DRG; Service
description
Same site 11/1/06
5/1/06; NCSL, 2010; Tu and Lauer, 2009; Wisconsin Hospital
2/28/07 Association, 2006A.
1/1/07 New Jersey Hospital Association, 2012.
1988; WHA, 2007B; Nevada State Health Division, 2005.
6/1/07
New York State Health Accountability Foundation, 2011.
8/1/07 Ohio Department of Health, 2011; Ohio Hospital
Association, 2007; National Partnership for Women and
Families, 2012.
Appendix Table 1: Summary of Price Transparency Initiatives, All States 2003-2007, cont'd
OR Legislation would ensure transparency of SB329 NIS
the costs of and charges by accountable
health plans and providers. PricePoint
launched in 2005. Compare Hospital
Costs site, showing average payment for
more than 80 medical procedures at
Oregon hospitals, based on payments by
the nine largest health insurers, launched
in 2007.
SD Hospital pricing Web site to Iist he SI169 SB182 IS
median prices for each hospital's top 25
inpatient procedures for which there are
at least 10 cases during the 12 months
preceding the report.
TN Tennessee Hospital Inform publishes NIS
median charges for common DRGs;
largest hospital system (HCA) excluded.
TX Legislation requires that an estimate of SB1731 NIS
facility charges for health care services
must be provided no later than 10
business days after the date the estimate
is requested. Texas Hospital Association
launched Texas PricePoint several months
before law went into effect.
UT PricePoint launched in 2006.
VT Vermont hospitaIs rmust publish annual Act 53
hospital community reports containing
information about quality, financial
health, costs for services, and other
hospital characteristics.
WA PricePoint launched in 2007.
WI Wisconsin hospitals must report prices to Chapter 153, Wis.
the WHA Information Center, effective Stats.
March 1, 2004.
WV CompareCareWV, with average facility
and professional charge and quality
ratings for many inpatient and outpatient
services, launched in 2007.
PricePoint:
100+; CHC:
80 Specific
DRG Different site
Top 25 DRG Different site
100+ DRG No
100+ DRG Different site
100+ DRG Different site
39 Specific ORG Same site
NIS
NIS
NIS; SID 100+ DRG Different site
NIS 100+ DRG Different site
NIS 100+ DRG Same site
4/22/05; NCSL, 2010; Wisconsin Hospital Association, 2005;
8/1/07 California HealthCare Foundation, 2007A.
6/2/06 NCLI, 2oi; South Dalkot tate Department of Heal th
2006.
4/23/07 California HealthCare Foundation, 2007B.
9/1/07 3/27/07 NCSL, 2010; Schatz, 2007; Johnson, 2007.
12/1/06 NCSL, 2010; WHA, 2006B.
2/15 State ermont,
2/2/07 WHA, -07C.
2/1/05 Haugh, 2005; Vock, 2006; Zigmond & Evans, 2006;
WHA, 2008.
1/1/07 West Virginia Health Care Authority, 2007.
Appendix Table 2: top 25 DRGs required by OSHPD, 2005-2007
DRG Description 2005 2006 2007
14 INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE OR CEREBRAL INFARCTION x x x
88 CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE PULMONARY DISEASE
89 SIMPLE PNEUMONIA & PLEURISY AGE > 17 W CC
127 HEART FAILURE & SHOCK
138 CARDIAC ARRHYTHMIA & CONDUCTION DISORDERS W CC
143 CHEST PAIN
167 APPENDECTOMY W/O COMPLICATED PRINCIPAL DIAGNOSES W/O CC
174 GASTROINTESTINAL HEMORRHAGE W CC
182 ESOPHAGITIS, GASTROENTERITIS & MISC DIGEST DISORDERS AGE > 17 W CC
204 DISORDERS OF PANCREAS EXCEPT MALIGNANCY
209 MAJOR JOINT & LIMB REATTACHMENT PROCEDURES OF LOWER EXTREMITY
277 CELLULITIS AGE > 17 W CC
296 NUTRITIONAL & MISC METABOLIC DISORDERS AGE > 17 W CC
316 RENAL FAILURE
320 KIDNEY & URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS AGE > 17 W CC
359 UTERINE & ADNEXA PROC FOR NON-MALIGNANCY W/O CC
370 CESAREAN SECTION W CC
371 CESAREAN SECTION W/O CC
372 VAGINAL DELIVERY W COMPLICATING DIAGNOSES
373 VAGINAL DELIVERY W/O COMPLICATING DIAGNOSES
390 NEONATE W OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS
391 NORMAL NEWBORN
416 SEPTICEMIA AGE > 17
430 PSYCHOSES
462 REHABILITATION
475 RESPIRATORY SYSTEM DIAGNOSIS W VENTILATOR SUPPORT
527 PERCUTANEOUS CARDIOVASCULAR PROC W DRUG ELUTING STENT W/O AMI
544 MAJOR JOINT REPLACEMENT OR REATTACHMENT OF LOWER EXTREMITY
558 PERC CARDIOVAS DX W DRUG-ELUTING STENT WO MAJOR CARDIOVASCULAR DX
576 SEPTICEMIA W/O MECHANICAL VENTILATION 96+ HOURS AGE > 17
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x x
x x
x x
x
x
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x
x
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x
x
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x
x
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x
x
x
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x x x
x x
x x x
x x
x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneity in High Math
Achievement Across Schools:
Evidence from the American
Mathematics Competitions
3.1 Introduction
There has been great recent interest in educational productivity. Differences across schools can
provide insights both into the magnitude of improvements that educational reforms might bring
and into how improvements might be achieved. Little of this literature focuses on high-achieving
students. We think this is unfortunate for several reasons. First, high-achieving students are
important: they make important contributions to scientific and technical fields, to human-capital
intensive industries, etc.2  Second, cross-country comparisons report that the U.S. trails other
countries in the fraction of students achieving very high math scores as well as in mean scores. 3
'This chapter is co-authored with Glenn Ellison. This project would not have been possible without
Professor Steve Dunbar and Marsha Conley at AMC, who provided access to the data as well as their insight.
Hongkai Zhang provided outstanding research assistance. Victor Chernozhukov provided important ideas and help
with the methodology. We thank David Card and Jesse Rothstein for help with data matching. Financial support
was provided by the Sloan Foundation and the Toulouse Network for Information Technology. Much of the work was
carried out while Glenn Ellison was a Visiting Researcher at Microsoft Research.
2 See Hoxby (2002) for a quick discussion of educational productivity as a source of U.S. comparative advantage.
Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Hanuschek and Woessmann (2008) provide surveys of the empirical literature on
education and growth. Some notable examples of high-achieving high school students with a large economic impact
are Microsoft's Bill Gates, who coauthored a computer science paper as a Harvard freshman, Google's Sergey Brin,
who finished in the top 55 on the 1992 Putnam Exam, and Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg, who finished 13th on the
Algebra test at the 2001 Harvard-MIT Math Tournament.
3 Hanushek, Peterson and Woessmann (2011) note that "most of the world's industrialized nations" have a higher
percentage of student reaching advanced levels on the 2006 PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment)
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Third, policies may have very different effects on high-achieving and average students. 4 In this
paper we explore heterogeneity in the rates with which different schools produce high-achieving
math students using data from the American Mathematics Competitions. We note that there
are large differences related to student demographics and estimate the distribution of unobserved
school effects after controlling for some of these. We find substantial heterogeneity among schools
with similar demographics. This includes a thick upper tail of schools that produce many more
high-achievers than would be expected given their demographics.
The primary data source for our study is the Mathematical Association of America's AMC 12
contest. The "contest" consists of a 25-question multiple choice test on precalculus topics which
is given annually to over 100,000 U.S. students at about 3,000 high schools. The test is explicitly
designed to distinguish among students at very high achievement levels. 5 Our primary measures
of high-achievement will be the number of students in each school achieving AMC 12 scores above
various cutoffs. We match AMC schools to schools surveyed by the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) and to census data to obtain other covariates and conduct most of our analyses
on the set of public, coed, non-magnet, non-charter U.S. high schools that administer the AMC 12
and could be matched to NCES data. Section 2 discusses the data in more detail.
Section 3 begins with some simple comparisons which illustrate the tremendous variation in the
number of high-achieving students that different schools produce. Most of the section is devoted to
negative binomial regressions examining how the number of students with high AMC 12 scores is
related to demographics and school characteristics. A number of factors that one might expect to
be correlated with high math achievement are indeed very strong predictors. Among these are the
fraction of students who are Asian-American and the fraction of adults in the area with graduate
degrees. One feature that may not completely align with expectations is the income-achievement
relationship: income is positively correlated with high achievement in the full national sample, but
once we restrict to the relatively high quality schools which offer the AMC tests, there are fewer
high-achieving math students in more affluent areas. The negative binomial regression models also
provide a quantification of our earlier informal observation that there is a great deal of heterogeneity
of outcomes beyond that which is captured by our demographic controls.
Another main objective of our paper is to provide estimates of the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity across schools. The literature on teacher quality contains several interesting papers
presenting histograms of how many teachers fall into various performance bins, and we think it
is similarly interesting to learn how many schools produce high-achieving students at less than
one-half of the expected rate, how many produce such students at more than twice the expected
rate, and so on. Section 4 describes how we construct our estimates. The method involves a
test. On the 2009 PISA, just 1.9% of U.S. students achieved "Level 6" scores, whereas the OECD average was 3.1%
and Singapore had 15.6% of its students at this level. This contrasts with PISA's reading tests, where the U.S.'s
perentage of "Level 6" students is well above the OECD average (1.5% vs. 0.8%).
4See Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) and Dee and Jacob (2009) for recent empirical studies of such differences.
'See Ellison and Swanson (2010) for some evidence that the test is able to make meaningful distinctions.
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series expansion similar to that of Gurmu, Rilstone, and Stern (1999), but relies on a different
characterization of the likelihoods. Appendix I contains more detail on the estimation along with
Monte Carlo estimates illustrating the performance of the estimator.
Section 5 presents estimates of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity across schools. Our
main qualitative findings are that many schools produce high-achieving students at much less than
the average rate and that there is a strikingly thick tail of extremely successful schools. For example,
we estimate that about 38% of schools produce high-scoring students at less than one-half of the
average rate for schools with similar characteristics, and that 2% of schools produce high-scoring
students at more than five times the average rate. We also provide estimates of the heterogeneity
of school effects relevant to subpopulations, including the likelihood of producing high-achieving
female students. Here, the estimates suggest that many schools are extremely unlikely to produce
high-achieving girls.
Our data and analysis also have a number of inherent limitations. Most notably, we have no
quasi-experimental variation to separate productivity differences from selection effects: part of the
outcome heterogeneity described in Section 5 is due to the self-selection of high-ability students into
certain public schools. Section 6 examines another data source that may provide some insight on
this: it examines differences in the rates at which different schools produce students with extremely
high SAT scores, which should be less affected by variation in what schools teach. We find that the
estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity derived from this measure of high achievement
does not have the thick tail we see in the estimates derived from AMC data. If self-selection of
high-ability students is equally or more important in the production of students with very high SAT
scores as it is in the production of students with very high AMC scores, then this would suggest
that self-selection is not responsible for the thick upper tail in the AMC data. Other limitations of
our data are that the AMC tests are not universally (or randomly) administered within schools, so
the heterogeneity will also reflect differences in participation rates among high-achieving students,
and that the AMC tests are given in a self-selected set of mostly high-performing schools, so that
most of our discussion will be about this subset rather than the U.S. as a whole.6 We present some
evidence related to these issues by examining extremely high-scoring students and by looking at
counts of high-scoring students by home ZIP code.
Our work is related to a number of literatures. One is the literature on quality differences across
schools. This includes papers examining how inputs affect achievement (Coleman (1966), Hanushek
(1986), Card and Krueger (1992), etc.) and papers that focus on differences in productivity holding
inputs constant. Papers examining effects of competition (Hoxby (2000)), vouchers (Hoxby (2000,
2002)) and charter schools (Angrist et al. (2002), Dobbie and Fryer (2009), Hoxby, et al. (2009))
are obviously well ahead of ours both in their controls for selection effects and in their ability to tie
heterogenous outcomes to school characteristics that could potentially be altered by school reforms.
6 The AMC 12 is offered at about 10% of U.S. high schools. Ellison and Swanson (2010) note that this does
appear to include the high schools attended by the majority of National Merit Semifinalists.
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Heterogeneity beyond that which can be explained by observables is less often the focus of
educational economics research, but has been discussed in various papers. Going back to Coleman
(1966), papers have noted that differences in school-mean test scores are small when the variation in
scores within a school is the point of comparison. 7 Going further in this direction, Rothstein (2005)
notes that much of the variation across schools can be explained using a small set of demographic
variables: he finds that four demographic variables reflecting racial composition and parental ed-
ucation and a control for participation rates account for 80% of the variation in school average
SAT scores. This suggests that there is little variation in school quality apart from quality that
is correlated with socioeconomic characteristics. Relative to this literature our paper can be seen
as noting that the basic message is different when one looks at high-achieving students instead of
average students: there is a lot of variation across schools and the differences are not as highly cor-
related with socioeconomic characteristics. (Of course, the points of comparison relative to which
we informally say there is "a lot" of variation are not the same as that of the other literatures.)
There are also a number of papers that discuss high-achieving students. Hanushek, Peterson,
and Woessmann (2011) note that PISA data indicate that U.S. trails most OECD countries in
the fraction of students reaching high levels of math achievement. Using a concordance between
PISA and NAEP scores, they note that while there are large differences across U.S. states, even the
best performing U.S. states (and high-performing demographic groups) have a lower percentage
of high achievers than do many countries. A number of papers have noted that No-Child-Left-
Behind (NCLB) and similar proficiency-based reforms create an incentive for schools to focus on
students near the cutoff and that resource diversion could harm high-achieving (and very low-
achieving) students. Some empirical analyses, e.g. Krieg (2008), find that reforms hurt high-
achieving students, whereas others, e.g. Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) and Dee and Jacob (2009)
find that reforms helped high-achieving students less than average students, but that the effect
on high-achieving students is insignificant or positive. The papers above assess performance using
state proficiency tests and/or the NAEP and focus on students at the 90th percentile as their high-
achieving population. We focus on higher achievers at roughly the 99th and 99.9th percentiles.
Andreescu et al. (2008), focuses on a yet much higher percentile (roughly the 99.9999th), and has a
related message in noting that the highest achieving students are a highly nonrepresentative sample
of the U.S. population ethnically and in the schools they attend.
Another related literature is that on estimating the distribution of teacher qualities. Both in
and outside of academia there has been a lot of recent interest in estimating teacher "value-added"
by comparing end-of-year test scores to prior-year test scores. 8 Academic papers recognize that
each teacher's quality is measured with error (see, e.g., Kane and Staiger (2002)) and it has become
standard to "shrink" point estimates to give an unbiased estimate of the underlying variance of
7 See, for example, Kane and Staiger (2002).
8See, for example, McCaffrey et al. (2004), Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2005), and Kane and Staiger (2008).
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teacher fixed effects. Gordon, Kane,and Staiger (2006) provide plots of estimated distributions of
teacher qualities obtained using such a method. They also report that cross-school differences in
mean teacher quality are small compared to the within-school variation, accounting for about 5%
of the total variation.
The methodological part of our paper is a small contribution to the econometric literature on
count data models. This literature contains many alternatives to the Poisson model that can better
fit datasets in which conditional means and variances are not equal. For example, the classic nega-
tive binomial model does this by allowing for gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity.9 Two
approaches to semiparametric estimation have been developed for applications where (as in our
case) the distribution of underlying heterogeneity is an object of interest. 10 Brannas and Rosen-
qvist (1994) develop an estimator along the lines of Simar (1976) and Heckman and Singer (1984)
which involves modeling the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity as a finite number of mass
points. Gurmu, Rilstone and Stern (1999) develop a series estimator which involves representing
the unobserved heterogeneity as the product of a gamma-distributed density and function which
is flexibly represented via an orthogonal polynomial expansion. Our primary motivation for not
simply adopting one of these estimators is that previous Monte Carlo studies have suggested that
they may not work well in our application. Heckman and Singer (1984) report that their method
is better at estimating structural parameters than at estimating distributions of heterogeneity; and
Gurmu et al. (1999) find that they do not estimate the distribution of heterogeneity well when the
underlying distribution is log-normal (which may be relevant to our application because our data
suggest fat tails).-" Our approach is similar to that of Gurmu et al. (1999) in that we also specify
the distribution of underlying heterogeneity as a product of a gamma-like density and a flexible
orthogonal polynomial term using Laguerre polynomials. The main difference is that we exploit
other properties of the Laguerre polynomials to derive a different expression for the probability of
each outcome.1 2 Our expression does not involve the moment generating function and Monte Carlo
estimates indicate that it can work reasonably well even with a fat-tailed distribution.
9 Several other models allow for unobserved heterogeneity of other forms, and there are also approaches that focus
directly on flexibly estimating discrete distributions without an underlying Poisson model. See Cameron and Trivedi
(1998), Guo and Trivedi (2002), and Winkelmann (2008) for overviews.
l 0There are also semiparametric estimators in other branches of the count-data literature, e.g. Cameron and
Johansson (1997).
"Their estimator does appear to provide reliable estimates of the systematic relationships for a broad range of
distributions. The Monte Carlo result on the difficulty in recovering a log-normal density using their estimator is not
unexpected: the estimator can be seen as flexibly estimating the moment generating function of the distribution of
heterogeneity. The log-normal distribution is sufficiently fat-tailed so that the moment generating function does not
exist.
1
2 Our approach also has several weaknesses relative to that of Gurmu et al. (1999). Most notably, their approach
can be applied to any conditional mean function whereas ours works only for conditional mean functions of the form
E(y JX) = exO. Their expansion is also guaranteed to produce a valid estimated density whereas our estimated
densities can take on negative values.
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3.2 Data
The primary subject of our analysis is a database of scores on the Mathematical Association of
America's AMC 12 contest from 2007.13 The AMC 12 is a 25-question, multiple choice test that is
explicitly designed to identify and distinguish among students at very high performance levels. It
is taken by a self-selected sample of mostly high-achieving students, but the average score among
U.S. students is just 66.3 of 150.14 We will focus primarily on very high-achieving students who
scored above 100 on the exam. As discussed in Ellison and Swanson (2009), scoring 100 on the
AMC 12 can be thought of as comparably difficult to scoring 800 on the math SAT. The primary
advantage of the AMC 12 is that it is more reliable in this range and can also draw consistent
distinctions at much higher percentiles. Approximately 5% of U.S. participants scored in excess of
100 on the AMC 12 (which places them approximately in the 99th percentile of the SAT-taking
population) and approximately 0.5% scored in excess of 120.
Our raw data are at the individual level, but only minimal information about each student is
available - age, grade, gender, home ZIP - so we will mostly aggregate the data to the level of the
high school (or home ZIP code) and treat schools as the unit of observation. 15 The primary school
level variables we analyze are counts of the number of students in the school scoring at least 100
or 120.
We combine the AMC data with demographic information on participants' schools and areas
of residence. ZIP code level demographics were taken from the U.S. Census. School level variables
are constructed by matching to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) database for
2005-2006. The NCES collected private school data from schools that responded to the Private
School Universe Survey (PSS). Data on public schools are from the NCES Common Core of Data,
which is collected annually from state education agencies. School name, city, and state data were
linked to the AMC data using the CEEB code search program provided on the College Board's
website. CEEB codes for schools participating in the AMC 12 were then matched to NCES data
by school name, city, and state. Of the 3,730 schools with numerical CEEB codes in the AMC
data, 3,105 were matched to schools in the NCES data. 16 Among the variables we will use in our
analyis are the number of students enrolled in each school, the percent of students belonging to
13The AMC 12 is open to all students in grades 12 and below. Approximately 88% of the participants are in 11th
or 12th grade.
4 Students receive 6 points for each correct answer and 1.5 points for each answer left blank so scores range from
0 to 150.
'
t The AMC 12 contest is offered twice each year. The exams are different and students are allowed to take both,
which about 2% of the participating students do. We matched such records as well as we could and included only
scores from the later test date for dual takers.
16311 of the remaining 625 schools do not appear in the NCES data because they are not in the U.S., and a further
158 could not be matched because they did not have official CEEB identifiers and were thus not linked to school data
of any kind. It was not possible to match the remaining 156 schools by the identifiers reported by the College Board
or NCES. Some of the remaining schools with valid CEEB codes may not appear in the NCES survey data because
private schools are not required to fill out the PSS.
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various racial and ethnic groups, the percent of students qualifying for free lunch and the school's
Title I status. We also use information from the NCES to restrict the sample to public, co-ed,
non-magnet, non-charter U.S. high schools in most analyses.
3.3 Differences Across Schools: Magnitudes and Sources of Het-
erogeneity
We begin this section by noting a basic fact: there is tremendous variation in the number of
high-achieving students who are coming out of different schools and home ZIP codes. We then
examine the relationship between the number of high-scoring students in a school and observable
demographic characteristics, noting both that there are a number of strong patterns and that there
is a great deal of residual heterogeneity among seemingly similar schools.
3.3.1 A first look at differences across ZIP codes
A simple way to illustrate the heterogeneity in student outcomes in the AMC data is to look at
counts of the number of students residing in each ZIP code who scored least 100 on the AMC 12.
There are about 32,000 residential ZIP codes in the U.S. and about 5,000 U.S. students scored over
100 on the 2007 AMC 12. If all students were equally likely to score 100 on the AMC 12, then
(taking into account that some ZIP codes are more populous than others) we'd expect that about
10 percent of ZIP codes would have one AMC high scorer and about 2 percent would have two high
scorers. Less than one percent of ZIP codes would have more than two high scorers and extreme
concentrations would be very rare: there is less than a 0.0001 chance that even a single ZIP code
would have ten or more high scorers. Reality looks very different from this. On the low end, 94
percent of ZIP codes have no students scoring at least 100 on the AMC 12, which is much higher
than the expected percentage of 88%. On the high end fifty eight ZIP codes have ten or more such
students!
The raw differences noted in the previous paragraph reflect various factors: socioeconomic
differences in the student populations; differences in school quality; and differences in whether
interested students are even able to take the AMC 12.17 Table 3.3.1 presents some additional data
on the most successful ZIP codes as an informal introduction to findings we'll present later.
One of our main findings will be that there's a thick upper tail of extremely successful schools.
The first ten rows of Table 3.3.1 illustrate this by listing the ten ZIP codes in which the highest
number of AMC 12 high scorers reside. Each of these ZIP codes had at least twenty students
scoring at least 100 on the AMC 12, which means they are more than 20 standard deviations above
average. Although they are more populous than average, they are still all at least 4 standard
deviations above average in the number of high scorers per capita.
1 7Although the vast majority of students take the AMC 12 in their own high school, interested students may also
be able to take the test at a nearby college or at a number of other locations.
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Another of our main findings will be that there are strong demographic predictors of high
achievement. The table reports a few demographics. In addition to being more populous than
the average ZIP code, the highest-achieving ZIP codes tend to have above-average incomes, many
highly educated adults, and large Asian-American populations. The second-most successful ZIP
code (Exeter, NH) no doubt owes its success to the presence of an elite boarding school, but most
of the rest are simply parts of some major metropolitan area in which most students attend a
highly-regarded public school. The presence of two Naperville ZIP codes suggests that aggregating
up to schools rather than ZIP codes may be more informative. 18 Our formal analyses will include
the listed variables among others and will focus on standard public schools.
The bottom half of Table 3.3.1 illustrates both that demographics have predictive power and
another finding: a great deal of variation remains even when we compare areas/schools with similar
demographics. In these rows we present some data on a comparison set of ZIP codes which are
similar to those in the top half of the table. For each ZIP code in the top half we chose the ZIP
code sharing the same first two digits which had the smallest weighted sum-of-absolute differences
in the listed characteristics other than population. 19 The substantial number of high AMC scorers
in the comparison ZIP codes suggests that there are strong demographic predictors of high AMC
scores: the comparison ZIP codes average of 3.3 high scorers whereas the average across all ZIPs
nationwide is just 0.2. But the comparison ZIP codes are still quite far behind the ZIP codes
in the top half of the table: an illustration of our observation that there is a lot of unexplained
heterogeneity in the upper tail.
3.3.2 Demographic patterns in high math achievement
In this section we aggregate our data to the level of the school or ZIP code and look at the
relationship between the number of high-achieving students and school/ZIP code demographics.
The first column of Table 3.3.2 presents coefficient estimates (with t-statistics in parentheses)
from a simple negative binomial regression with the number of students in the school scoring at
least 100 on the AMC 12 as the dependent variable. A number of the strong effects match one's
intuition. Parental education is very important: a one percentage point increase in the fraction
of adults in the ZIP code with bachelors' and graduate degrees increases the expected number of
AMC high-scorers by 3.1 and 5.9 percent, respectively. The school's ethnic makeup also matters
in that a one percentage point increase in the Asian-American population of a school increases the
expected number of AMC high scorers by over two percent. (Percent white is omitted from the
regression.) There are also fewer high scorers in schools with more students qualifying for the free
lunch program.
18The 65040 ZIP code is actually split between Naperville North and Naperville Central High School, which most
students in 60565 attend. Some students in these ZIP codes also attend the Illinois Math and Science Academy,
which is located about 10 miles away.
19 The weights are taken from a regression model predicting the number of high scorers.
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Table 3.1: ZIP codes with the most AMC 12 high scorers and comparison ZIP codes
ZIP # AMC12 # per Med. % %
City Code Over 100 10K pop. Pop. Income Grad. Asian
San Jose, CA 95129 43 11.4 37,674 79,489 24.8 41.3
Exeter, NH 03833 28 14.6 19,129 51,858 16.3 1.0
Sugar Land, TX 77479 27 4.8 55,682 96,118 21.3 22.9
Saratoga, CA 95070 27 8.8 30,590 138,206 33.3 28.3
Fremont, CA 94539 25 5.3 46,997 101,977 26.5 49.5
Naperville, IL 60540 25 5.9 42,100 87,514 26.4 8.7
Naperville, IL 60565 21 5.2 40,503 97,807 22.9 9.7
Gaithersburg, MD 20878 21 3.8 55,186 84,330 29.6 18.7
Bayside, NY 11364 20 5.8 34,575 54,031 15.1 32.9
McLean, VA 22101 20 7.0 28,550 125,105 45.0 10.9
Santa Clara, CA 95054 0 0.0 12,860 85,124 18.1 46.1
Spofford, NH 03462 0 0.0 1,729 50,885 16.3 0.0
Missouri City, TX 77459 5 1.5 32,774 84,901 17.9 14.0
San Jose, CA 95120 5 1.3 37,175 120,117 26.2 22.9
Fremont, CA 94555 2 0.6 33,811 84,442 18.6 53.8
Northbrook, IL 60062 5 1.2 40,175 89,164 26.7 10.4
Hinsdale, IL 60521 3 0.8 37,489 91,727 25.2 7.7
Rockville, MD 20850 5 1.5 33,277 74,655 31.1 17.3
Glen Oaks, NY 11004 1 0.7 14,760 55,156 14.7 29.7
Vienna, VA 22182 7 3.1 22,758 120,075 36.4 13.0
All U.S. ZIPs Mean 0.2 0.1 8,901 39,394 6.3 1.4
(Std. Dev.) (0.9) (0.9) (13,105) (16,427) (6.6) (4.1)
An effect that may not match intuition is the income
makeup of the school and parental education we find that
effect: after controlling for the ethnic
there are fewer high scorers in higher-
income areas. It should be kept in mind that the negative income effect is occurring after we
restrict to schools offering the AMC and include the fraction of students qualifying for free lunch as
a covariate. One thought on why this might occur, other than from a selection effect, is that social
norms or the college application process may lead students in wealthier schools to spend more time
on other activities, such as athletic and arts programs, debate teams, model UN, etc., rather than
developing their math skills to a very high level.
The second column of the table looks at students reaching an even higher achievement threshold:
scoring 120 on the AMC 12. (They can be thought of as above the 99.9th percentile among college-
bound students).2 0 Given that most students who would score 120 on the AMC are probably taking
the test, the results here should be less affected by differences in how widely administered the AMC
is at each school. The effects noted in the previous paragraph remain present and generally increase
2 0 Given our restriction to public, non-magnet, non-charter, coeducational schools, there are ??? students in our
sample at this threshold.
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Table 3.2: High math achievers vs. school characteristics
High SAT
Variable AMC 12 High Scorers Scorers
log(Num. of Students)
Adult frac. BA
Adult frac. Grad
log(ZIP median income)
ZIP frac. urban
School frac. Asian
School frac. black
School frac. Hisp.
School frac. female
Title 1 school
School free lunch frac.
log(Population)
log(Award ratio)
Constant
1.01
(13.33)
3.14
(4.71)
5.94
(11.13)
-0.94
(6.88)
0.52
(2.48)
2.08
(7.48)
-0.05
(0.15)
-0.38
(1.16)
0.01
(0.00)
-0.04
(0.48)
-2.39
(5.46)
1.32
(6.20)
5.36
(3.46)
7.27
(6.67)
-1.36
(4.39)
0.43
(0.68)
2.44
(4.17)
0.14
(0.17)
-1.81
(1.81)
2.92
(0.83)
0.12
(0.56)
-2.92
(2.30)
4.75
(10.58)
6.98
(17.51)
0.73
(8.34)
0.32
(2.40)
3.70
(12.60)
-1.10
(5.31)
-1.58
(7.13)
1.11
(30.51)
1.05
(12.22)
3.18
(4.72)
6.29
(12.41)
-0.90
(6.72)
0.55
(2.34)
2.00
(7.51)
-0.39
(1.08)
-0.77
(2.04)
0.30
(0.20)
-0.11
(1.15)
-2.22
(4.62)
1.15 -0.92 -22.22 0.32
(0.70) (0.23) (22.43) (0.96)
1.17
(11.51)
3.66
(4.69)
6.53
(11.82)
-1.17
(7.75)
0.31
(1.26)
1.19
(3.91)
0.09
(0.21)
-1.57
(3.11)
2.28
(1.41)
-0.12
(1.08)
-2.75
(4.59)
0.83
(15.21)
6.47
(3.53)
1.18
(10.78)
3.72
(4.48)
6.61
(11.60)
-1.17
(7.74)
0.31
(1.17)
1.15
(3.80)
0.06
(0.13)
-1.73
(3.18)
2.66
(1.56)
-0.14
(1.15)
-2.71
(4.37)
0.84
(14.44)
6.32
(3.38)
Threshold 100 120 100 100
Unit of obs. School School ZIP School School School
Pseudo R 2  0.15 0.16 0.35 0.20
Est. Method NB NB NB semi-P NB semi-P
& 1.02 2.77 1.42 0.48
(Std. Error) (0.07) (0.48) ( ) - (0.08)
# of obs. 2,165 2,165 31,740 2,165 2,165 2,165
# of high scorers 4,926
in magnitude, suggesting that the earlier results were not due to this type of selection.
Our school-level estimates reflect a highly nonrepresentative sample of the U.S. population:
we only include schools offering the AMC and these are disproportionately high-achieving schools
located in relatively wealthy areas. To give a sense of where AMC high scorers are coming from
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relative to the whole U.S. population, the third column of Table 3.3.2 goes back to the ZIP code as
the unit of observation and presents estimates from a negative binomial regression with the number
of resident students scoring at least 100 on the AMC 12 as the dependent variable.2 1 Coefficients
here should be thought of as reflecting both differences in math achievement and differences in
access to the AMC. The effects of greater education in the adult population become larger in these
results, as we might expect given that the availability of the AMC may be correlated with parental
education. The coefficient on income becomes positive and highly significant. A couple of factors
may be responsible for the change. One is that access to the AMC may be increasing in income.
Another is that there may be a nonmonotonic relationship between income and investments in
reaching high levels of math achievement: it may increase through much of the income distribution
(all of which is relevant for this regression) and then turn down at the very top (which is more
relevant once we restrict to AMC-offering schools).
3.3.3 Magnitudes of unobserved heterogeneity
The negative binomial regression model also provides a simple estimator of the degree of unobserved
heterogeneity that remains across schools after controlling for a given set of variables. We present
some such estimates here.
Recall that the negative binomial regression model assumes that Y is a Poisson random vari-
able with mean exiui, where ui is an independent mean one gamma-distributed random variable
reflecting underlying heterogeneity not captured by the observed Xi. The negative binomial model
estimates both the coefficients # on the X's and an extra parameter a which is the variance of
the ui. Estimates of this parameter from each of the negative binomial models discussed in the
previous section are presented in Table 3.3.2.
To provide more of a feel for the magnitude of the unobserved heterogeneity relative to the
heterogeneity captured by our demographic controls Table 3.3.3 reports the estimated standard
deviation of u (the square root of 6) from negative binomial regressions of the number of high-
scoring AMC students in a school/ZIP code on different sets of controls.
The first row presents results with almost no controls: the number of high scorers in a ZIP code
is the dependent variable and the only control is the ZIP code's population. The standard deviation
of u is 2.59 for the count of students scoring over 100, and 3.92 for the count of students scoring over
120, indicating substantial unobserved heterogeneity in the number of high scorers beyond what can
be explained by population variation alone. The estimated SD(u) is much greater for the higher
score threshold, indicating that unobserved factors are more important at higher performance levels.
The second row illustrates the effect of introducing the same demographic controls used in the ZIP
code regressions displayed in Table 3.3.2. Introducing controls reduces the unobserved heterogeneity
by half for each score threshold. The unobserved heterogeneity remains large in a practical sense
2
'Here, the ethnic composition variables are for the student's home ZIP code rather than the school.
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and remains highly statistically significant.2 2 One might imagine that the unobserved heterogeneity
is entirely due to differences between areas that offer the AMC and areas that do not. To examine
this hypothesis, the third row restricts the sample to ZIP codes that had at least one student
take the AMC 12; this restriction reduces the estimated SD(u) only slightly. The final two rows
use schools as the unit of observation and restrict attention to public, non-magnet, non-charter,
coeducational U.S. high schools in which the AMC 12 was offered. These estimates are in the same
range as those observed for the ZIP-level analyses and exhibit similar patterns in that the measure
of dispersion is higher for the higher thresholds and lower once we introduce controls. Even the
numbers in the bottom row, however, are again very large in a practical sense. For example, the
standard deviation of the unobserved heterogeneity would be 1 if 50% of all schools gave students no
chance of achieving a high score on the AMC 12 and the other half gave twice the average chance,
and it would be two if 80% of schools gave students zero chance of reaching high-achievement levels
and 20% gave students five times the average chance. For the true values to be 1.12 or 2.06 there
must be many schools which give students very little chance of reaching high achievement levels
and other schools that give a much better than average chance.
An overall impression from these data is that there are several factors that are very strong
predictors of whether a school/ZIP code will have many high-achieving math students, but that
there are also substantial differences across seemingly similar schools.
Table 3.3: Magnitude of unexplained variation u
AMC 12 > 100 AMC 12 > 120
Student Student
Groups Sample Controls SD(u) Groups Sample Controls SD(u)
ZIP All Pop. Only 2.59 ZIP All Pop. Only 3.92
ZIP All Yes 1.19 ZIP All Yes 1.65
ZIP AMC taking Yes 1.12 ZIP AMC Taking Yes 1.61
Schools Public Enrollment 1.58 Schools Public Enrollment 3.15
Schools Public Yes 1.12 Schools Public Yes 2.06
3.4 Methodology for Estimating the Distribution of Unobserved
Heterogeneity
In this section we describe how we estimate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity across
schools and provide some simulation results.
2 tests of the null that SD(u) = 0 are rejected at the 0.001 level in each case.
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3.4.1 Estimation method
Suppose the count variable yi is distributed Poisson (Ai), where Ai = eZiouj, zi is a vector of
observable characteristics, and ui is an unobserved characteristic with a multiplicative effect on the
Poisson rate. Assume that the ui are i.i.d. random variables independent of the zi with continuous
density f on (0, oc) and E(uj) = 1. We wish to estimate both the coefficients 0 on the observable
characteristics and the distribution f of the unobserved effects.
Our approach is similar to that of Gurmu et al. (1999) in that we use a series expansion and
exploit known properties of the orthogonal polynomials involved to facilitate maximum likelihood
estimation. Given any function f and any constant a we can write f(x) = xe-xg(x). If g(x) is well
behaved in the sense that f xae- xg(x)| 2dx < 00, then g(x) can be represented as a convergent
sum
00
g(x) = 9j LZ (x)
j=0
where L a) (x) is the jth generalized Laguerre polynomial, L() (x) -- J (-1)(j+ 2 Express-
ing the distribution in this way makes it possible to evaluate the likelihood of each outcome without
integrating over the unobserved parameter ui.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the model described above. Then,
Pr{yi = klzi} = +,,O -++1[ o F(f+a+1) -ez3 (_ (k+o) o ei) (
The derivation of the formula exploits several properties of the Laguerre polynomials. Details
are given in the Appendix.
Given the formula above it is natural to estimate the model by maximum likelihood: we simply
treat 3, a, and the g3 as parameters to be estimated as in a series estimation.2 4 For the estimated
f (u) to be a valid density, the estimated parameters a, go, 91,... , 9N must be such that
f u0e-".o gaL() (u) du = 1; and
* uae-u E 0 gj L a) (u) > 0 for all u c (0, o0).
The first of these conditions holds if and only if go = 1/F(a + 1). We impose this restriction in
all of our estimations. The second constraint is not as easy to express as a parameter restriction.
We will not impose it as a constraint, but do add a penalty function (described in the Appendix)
2 3The coefficients gj are given by
/ L () zo_ x dxe
S (j+ F('(a + 1)
2 Finite sums gN=g L(') (x) will approximate the true distribution as N -- 00. Defining ||g - gN 11
f,"_0 (g(x) - gNw2 dz We have Ig - gN1 < 3=cN+ (j-)3
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to the likelihood when the density is not everywhere positive, which in practice has the effect of
making the estimated densities at most slightly negative. 25
The function f(x) can in theory be estimated consistently by allowing the number of terms N to
grow at an appropriate rate or by choosing it in other other ways like cross-validation. In practice,
the number of Laguerre coefficients that can be estimated may be quite limited unless the dataset is
very large. It is for this reason that we wrote the density in the form f(x) = xe- E __ g La)(x)
rather than just as Ej. g L (x). When N = 0 the a parameter gives the model the ability to fit
a range of plausible densities with just a single estimated parameter: the renormalized distribution
with parameter a has mean 1 and variance 1/(a+ 1). This allows the model produce an exponential
distribution (a = 0), unimodal distributions concentrated around one (the distribution is unimodal
with mode a if a > 0), and distributions with more weight on extreme u's than the exponential
(a (E (- 1, 0)). 26
3.4.2 Simulation results
Our primary motivation for estimating the model as described above instead of directly following
previous approaches is that simulations have suggested that previous approaches may not work
well in practice when the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is fat tailed.2 ' To assess how
our method might work in practice and how many terms N one might want to include in the series
expansion we also conducted simulation experiments described in the Appendix using exponential,
log-normal, and uniform distributions for the unobserved heterogeneity. A very rough summary
is that our approach seems to work reasonably well in the exponential and log-normal cases. Es-
timating the upper tail is easier than estimating the density at low values of u: it is inherently
very difficult to distinguish whether a school is producing 0.1 or 0.01 high-achieving students per
year. The simulations also suggest that including N = 4 terms in the series expansion may a good
choice for balancing flexibility vs. overfitting given the number of observations in our dataset and
the magnitudes of the counts. In our empirical analyses, we will generally present estimates that
use N = 4 terms in the series expansion.
2 5Our specification of the model also includes the scaling assumption that E(uilz) = 1. This is necessary for
identification when the set of explanatory variables z contains a constant and the distribution of u is to be estimated
semiparametrically. This condition can also be easily imposed as a parameter restriction: it is satisfied if and only
if gi = a/Fl(a + 2). When only a finite number N of terms are included in the series expansion, however, imposing
this constraint is not necessary for identification, and the restriction is not imposed in the estimates reported in this
paper. Instead, we estimate the model without the restriction and just renormalize the estimated distributions of u
to have mean 1 by dividing by their expectations when graphing them.
26 The pure Poisson model with no unobserved heterogeneity is obtained as a special case as a -+ oc.
21See Gurmu et al. (1999) p. 141.
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3.5 Distributions of Unobserved Heterogeneity Across Schools
We noted in section 3 that there are substantial performance differences across schools with similar
demographics. In this section, we explore the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in more
detail. The estimates will quantify our earlier informal remarks that there is a thick upper tail of
schools that are much more successful than the average school, and provides a number of other
insights.
3.5.1 Differences across seemingly similar schools
We begin by estimating a model of the production of AMC 12 high-scorers similar to the benchmark
negative binomial regressions of Section 3, but employing the methodology described in Section 4.
Specifically, we estimate the model using the number of students in each school scoring at least 100
on the 2007 AMC 12 as the dependent variable and use the same demographics as in Table 3.3.2
as control variables. Again, the sample is the set of coed public, non-magnet, non-charter schools
offering the AMC 12 that we were able to match to the NCES data.
Our primary interest in this section will be on the distribution of unobserved school effects.
The top panel of Figure 3.5.1 graphs the probability density function from which the unobserved
school effects ui are estimated to be drawn. The x-axis corresponds to different possible values
of the unobserved effect, e.g. a value of u = 1 corresponds to a school that produces AMC 12
high scorers at exactly the mean rate, a value of u = 0.5 corresponds to a school that produces
high-scorers at half of this rate, etc. The curve is like a histogram giving the relative frequency
of the values of u in the population of schools. The substantial differences between schools with
similar demographics are clearly visible in the figure: it looks nothing like a distribution that is
highly concentrated around u = 1. Instead, it is a spread-out distribution that is skewed to the
right. There are a large number of schools that produce AMC 12 high scorers at well below the
average rate. For example, about 38% of schools are estimated to produce high scorers at less
than one-half of the average rate. At the other extreme, there is a tail of highly successful schools.
For example, about 9% of schools are estimated to produce high scorers at more than double the
average rate. The dashed lines in the figure are 95% confidence bands for the estimated density.28
They indicate that the estimates are quite precise throughout most of the range, and then become
much less precise in the lower tail.
While the density function looks roughly like an exponential in the range that is graphed, there
is a notable departure in the right tail - the upper tail of the estimated distribution is much thicker
than that of an exponential distribution (or normal distribution). The bottom panel of Figure 3.5.1
illustrates this by graphing in bold the CDF of the estimated distribution for u's ranging from 3
28The confidence bands in this figure were generated using the parametric bootstrap procedure described in the
Appendix. We also generated confidence bands using the nonparametric bootstrap procedure described there. They
are quite similar (though slightly wider).
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Figure 3-1: Distribution of school effects: AMC 12 high scorers
Distribution of School Effects: Students Scoring 100+ on the AMC 12
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to 10. The estimates indicate that there are a substantial number of schools which produce high-
achieving math students at five to ten times the average rate for a school with their demographics.
The dashed lines again give a 95% confidence interval. They indicate that the thick tail is a
statistically significant phenomenon.
Our semiparametric estimation procedure also yields estimated coefficients on the demographic
variables, which are presented in the fourth column of Table 3.3.2. The estimates are very similar
to the estimates from the negative binomial regression as shown in the first column of the same
table. The main implication to take away is that our earlier negative binomial regression results
appear to be robust to modeling the unobserved heterogeneity more flexibly.
3.5.2 Female students
Given the underrepresentation of female students among high math achievers it seems natural to
explore differences in how often schools produce high-achieving female students. In this section,
we present estimates similar to those in the previous section, but focusing on how often schools
produce high-achieving girls. A negative binomial regression similar to those used in Section 3 but
examining the number of high-scoring female students per school suggests that school effects are
more important for girls: the estimated 6 is 1.88 (s.e. 0.26) whereas it was 1.02 (s.e. 0.07) when
we examined high-scoring students of either gender.
Figure 3.5.2 presents graphs of the estimated distribution of the unobserved differences u across
schools estimated using data on the number of female students scoring at least 100 on the AMC
12. The top panel shows the PDF for u's in [0,3] and the bottom panel shows the estimated CDF
for the upper tail of schools. Again, the bold lines are the estimated PDFs and CDFs of the school
effects relevant to girls and the thinner dashed lines are 95% pointwise confidence bands.
The estimated distribution is qualitatively similar to what we reported in our earlier analysis
of how often schools produced high-scoring male or female students in a couple respects. First,
there are a large number of schools where girls are relatively unlikely to reach high levels of math
achievement. For example, about 28% of schools are estimated to produce high-scoring girls at
less than one-fourth of the average rate. Second, there is a small but very thick upper tail of
schools where girls are many times more likely to succeed than are girls in an average school with
comparable demographics.
In Ellison and Swanson (2010) we noted that there is a large gender gap among high-achieving
students in the AMC data: there is roughly a 4:1 male-female ratio among student scoring at least
100 on the AMC 12; and the average number of girls per school reaching this level is just 0.26.
Hence, the estimate that there are a substantial number of schools that produce high-scoring girls
at less than one-fourth of the average rate is very discouraging: it implies that these schools produce
high-scoring girls at a rate of well less than one per decade. But the presence of the right tail is
encouraging. The 9 9th percentile school is estimated to produce high-scoring girls at more than ten
times the rate of the average school with comparable demographics.
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It implies that there are a number of schools that produce high-scoring girls at a rate that
surpasses the rate at which the average school produces high-scoring boys.
.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.95
Figure 3-2: Distribution of school effects: female AMC 12 high scorers
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The estimated distributions suggest that there are more schools in the lower and extreme upper
tails for girls. But the imprecision of the estimates makes it difficult to make statistically significant
statements about where exactly in the distribution the extra variance is coming from. A number of
potential explanations could be given for why there might be more schools in the lower tail when we
examine high-achieving girls. For example, the dispersion of school effects would be larger for girls if
there is variation in how encouraging/discouraging schools are toward girls independent of a general
school-quality effect. Another plausible story might be that girls are relatively disadvantaged when
a school's "honors" math classes are not taught at a very high level (perhaps because girls are less
liable to complain or take supplementary online classes).
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3.5.3 School effects at higher achievement levels
The AMC data also make it possible to study the distribution of students at even higher math
achievment levels. Here, we present an estimated PDF of school effects estimated using the number
of students scoring at least 120 on the AMC 12. We have two motivations. First, it seems natural
to take advantage of a relatively rare opportunity to examine where 9 9 .9 +h percentile students
are coming from. Second, looking at such a high percentile will help to purge the results of one
selection effect. It is unlikely that much of the differences across schools could be due to differences
in the degree to which schools encourage their high-achieving students to take the AMC 12 because
it is unlikely that students would reach such a high level of mastery if they were not planning
to participate in contests like the AMC. Recall that the negative binomial regressions presented
in Table 3.3.2 indicated that there was more unobserved heterogeneity across schools when we
examined students scoring at least 120 on the AMC 12.
The top panel of Figure 3.5.3 presents the estimated PDF for u's between 0 and 3, and the
bottom panel shows the upper tail of the CDF. Again the estimates are in bold with 95% pointwise
confidence bands around them. The estimated distribution of school effects once again has a very
thick upper tail. This supports the hypothesis that the upper tail heterogeneity is not just an
artifact of selection into taking the AMC test. Comparing the estimated density to that estimated
earlier from data on students scoring at least 100, we find two main differences: more schools
are now estimated to be very far below average; and more schools are now estimated to produce
high-scoring students at three to five times the average rate. Again, however, it is difficult to
make statistically significant pointwise comparisons. Certainly, however, the combination of the
low mean number of students scoring 120 and the large mass in the lower tail means that there are
a large number of schools in which it is very unlikely that students will reach the extremely high
levels of math achievement considered here.
3.5.4 Heterogeneity in the full U.S.: ZIP code breakdowns
In this section we reestimate our model using ZIP codes rather than schools as the unit of observa-
tion. In this way, we are able to provide estimates of the unexplained heterogeneity in high math
achievement throughout the country (whereas previous estimates compare schools to other schools
offering the AMC 12 test).
The estimated heterogeneities in this section will reflect both differences in the number of
high-achieving students in a ZIP code and differences in AMC participation rates among such
students. The participation rate differences should be smaller for students at very high percentiles
of achievement. Accordingly, we focus in this section on students scoring at least 120 on the AMC
12.
Figure 3.5.4 presents estimated distributions of ZIP code effects obtained by estimating the
model using a count of the number of students scoring at at least 120 as the dependent variables
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Figure 3-3: Distribution of school effects at a very high achievement level: students scoring 120+
on the AMC 12
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and using ZIP code characteristics as control variables. 29 The top panel gives the PDF for values
of a between 0 and 3 and the bottom panel gives a magnified view of the upper tail of the CDF.
The distribution is similar to many others we've seen. There is a very thick left tail of ZIP codes
in which students are estimated to have a much lower than average chance of scoring 120 on the
AMC 12 (38% of ZIP codes are estimated to produce such students at less than one-quarter of the
average rate.) There is also a very thick upper tail of ZIP codes where many more students reach
this threshold.
We conclude that these features of our earlier estimates seem to be robust to moving to a
full national sample. Of course, part of the reason for this is due to the nature of the data and
estimation. Many ZIP codes that feed into schools that do not offer the AMC contests would
be expected to have few high scorers given their demographics. This limits the information they
provide to the estimation.
3.6 High Scoring Students on the SAT
In this section we examine how likely different schools are to produce students with very high SAT
scores. The primary motivation for this is that differences in the rate at which different schools
produce students with high AMC scores will reflect both differences in educational programs and
the self-selection of high-ability students into particular schools. Such selection effects should have
similar effects on SAT performance. But one would expect that SAT performance will be less
affected by differences in schools' educational programs: we presume that most schools that offer
the AMC tests offer math and English courses that provide good coverage of SAT material. Hence,
comparing estimates obtained from AMC and SAT data may provide insights on selection versus
educational effects.
3.6.1 Data
Our source of data on students with high SAT scores are the announced lists of students who
were named "candidates" for the U.S. Presidential Scholars Program (PSP). Being named as a PSP
candidate can be roughly thought of as indicating that a student was among the twenty highest
scoring male high school seniors or the twenty highest-scoring female high school seniors in their
home state on the SAT Math + Critical Reading combined score.30 Each top twenty is extended
in the case of ties. In California, many more than 40 students score a perfect 1600 on the SAT,
so being a PSP candidate is an indicator for having a perfect SAT score. Scores at or near 1600
are required in several other large states, but the cutoff is much lower in small and low-performing
2 9 The ZIP code characteristics are those in Table 3.3.2: log of population, percent of population with a bachelor's
degree, percent of population with a graduate degree, percent urban, percent of population which is Asian, black,
Hispanic, and female, and log of median income. The model is estimated on the full sample of 31,740 residential ZIP
codes for which characteristics data were available in the Census.
3 0 Students can also qualify via a high ACT score.
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Figure 3-4: Distribution of ZIP code effects: students scoring 120+ on the AMC 12
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states. We obtained the full list of 2,752 PSP candidates for 2007 from the U.S. Department of
Education website. PSP schools were linked to NCES data based on school name and student
location. 31 To make results comparable we will carry out our school-level analyses on the subset
of schools that participated in the 2007 AMC contests. This subsample includes 1,593 of the PSP
candidates.32
3.6.2 Demographic patterns
The regression in the fifth column of Table 3.3.2 is another school-level regression run on our
sample of nonmagnet, noncharter, coeducational public schools that offer the AMC exams using
the number of 2007 PSP candidates at the school as the dependent variable.33 The results are in
many ways similar to those concerning high AMC scorers: parental education matters a lot; median
income remains negatively related to high achievment; and there are fewer high-achieving students
in schools with more students qualifying for the free lunch program.
The ethnic-group effects differ somewhat between the AMC- and PSP-based regressions. The
strength of the Asian American effect is smaller in the PSP regression; and we now find fewer high-
achieving students in schools with a larger Hispanic population. These differences may reflect that
we have switched to a measure that also includes English test scores and requires less knowledge
of math.
A more important observation for our purposes is that the estimated a parameter from the
negative binomial regression is substantially smaller than the corresponding parameters from the
AMC analyses. This indicates that there is less unobserved heterogeneity in the rates at which
schools produce PSP candidates.
3.6.3 Distributions of unobserved heterogeneity across schools
Figure 3.6.3 presents an estimated distribution of school effects from PSP candidate counts com-
parable to our earlier estimates based on high AMC scorers. 34 Again, the top panel shows an
estimated PDF for u's between 0 and 3 and the bottom panel provides a magnified view of the
CDF for high values of u. The dashed lines are 95% confidence bands.
The most noteworthy finding is that the thick upper tail we found in the AMC data is not
3 1 We were able to match the schools attended by 2,520 of the 2,752 PSP candidates to the NCES data.
3 2 The fact that at least 58% of PSP candidates attend schools that offer the AMC contests provides another
datapoint suggesting that the majority of the high-achieving math students in the country probably attend schools
offering the AMC.
3 3 0ur PSP regressions use an additional control variable: AwardRatio is the ratio of the number of PSP candidates
from the state to the number of public and private high school graduates in each state. This is intended to control for
dramatic differences in how hard it is to be a PSP candidate in different states. For example, Wyoming, which has
a population of 550,000, had 43 PSP candidates in 2010, whereas Michigan, with a population of about 10 million,
had just 47.
3 4 Coefficient estimates for the demographic variables are presented in the last column of the Table 3.3.2.
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present in the PSP data. The estimated CDF reaches 0.995 at a point where the CDF estimated
from the AMC data is just 0.97. Unless the selection into schools of students with high math
ability differs from selection of students who score well on the SAT, this suggests that the thick
upper tail in the AMC data is probably not due primarily to unobserved differences in student
ability. Instead, our leading conjecture for what causes the thick upper tail is that there are very
few schools, even among the very high quality schools that produce PSP candidates, that teach
math at the level will result in many students doing well on the AMC 12.
The estimated density in the top panel shows fewer schools with very low values of u - a feature
that is very different from the point estimates from regressions examining students scoring 120+
on the AMC 12. But the confidence bands are fairly wide at the lower end of the density.
Figure 3-5: Distributions of school effects: Presidential Scholar Candidates
PDF of School Effects: Students Achieving PSP Candidate Status on the SAT
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have used data on the Mathematical Association of America's AMC 12 exam to
provide a look at high-achieving math students in U.S. high schools. Our most basic observation
is that they are very far from being evenly distributed across the U.S.
There are very strong demographic predictors of high achievement as one might expect: areas
where there are many highly educated parents and schools with many Asian-American students are
much more likely to produce high-achieving students. Other patterns, however, are not necessarily
what one would have expected. In the full sample of ZIP codes there are more high-scorers in high
income areas. But once we restrict to the sample of schools offering the AMC, the median income
in a community is negatively correlated with the likelihood that students will reach high levels of
math achievement (and similarly negatively correlated with the number of students with very high
SAT scores).
In multiple branches of the education literature there are results that have been roughly inter-
preted as implying that there is only limited variation across schools in value-added apart (perhaps)
from variation that is systematically related to socioeconomic factors. Our results suggest that
things look very different when one examines how likely schools are to produce very high-achieving
students rather than on how schools' effects on average test scores. Our results suggest that there
is a lot of variation among seemingly similar schools. The most notable feature of this variation is a
thick uppper tail of schools in which students are many times more likely to reach high achievement
levels than are students in the typical school with similar demographics. This thick upper tail is
present in all of our analyses of students with high AMC scores, but is not present when we look at
where students with high SAT scores are coming from. This contrast suggests that that the thick
tail is not because of the self-selection of high-ability students into a particular subset of schools.
We suggest that a potential explanation is that almost all schools see it as their responsibility to
provide English and math courses that cover material necessary to do well on the SATs, whereas
there is much less uniformity in whether schools encourage gifted students to develop more ad-
vanced problem solving skills and reach the higher level of mastery of high school mathematics
needed to do well on the AMC.
Two recent papers assessing the causal effects of magnet/gifted education programs via regres-
sion discontinuity designs have a contrasting message: they find that the programs studied have
little impact on marginal students (Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, and Pathak, 2011; Bui, Craig, and
Imberman, 2011). Relative to this literature our findings raise the question of whether the causal
effects might look different if one assessed students using much more challenging tests and whether
the effects on more talented students might be different from the effects on marginal students.
Relative to the literature on the gender gap in mathematics, our comparison of school effects
relevant to girls suggests that schools are perhaps even more important for girls: we estimate that
the 99th percetile high school in our sample is producting high-scoring girls at more than ten times
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the rate of an average school with comparable demographics. We also note that there are many
low-performing schools that will only very rarely have girls reach the AMC performance levels we
have studied.
As we noted in the introduction, there are many ways in which one would like to do more
than we can do with our data. It would be valuable to provide more evidence to separate out how
much of the concentration of high-achieving students that we observe is due to differences in school
value added vs. differences in the selection of high-ability students into different public schools, to
correlate differences in school policies with differences in outcomes, and to identify causal effects.
We hope that our results may stimulate future authors who have data that makes it possible to do
these things to include effects on high-achieving students as another dependent variable.
Our results suggest that the high-achieving math students we see today in U.S. high schools may
be just a small fraction of the number of students who have the potential to reach such levels. This
should probably not be surprising - the U.S. is far behind many other countries in the fraction of
students who achieve very high scores on internationally administered tests. Our finding that there
appears to be a lot of variation across schools with similar demographics could be seen as hopeful:
the number of high-achieving students would increase substantially if low-achieving schools could
be brought up to average; and upper-tail schools might have programs that could be emulated to
produce even larger improvements.
3.8 Appendix
In this appendix we provide additional details on the estimation and simulation results assessing
the performance of the estimator.
3.8.1 Appendix A: Estimation methodology
For any fixed N our model of unobserved heterogeneity implies
oo wiu (io U0 pk a- NProb{yi = kzij} = j C k Eei g L' (ui) dui.
0 k! (=0
The estimated density will integrate to one if and only if go = 1/I'(1 + a). We therefore set go
equal to this value and estimate f, a, and 91,... , gN. The expression in Proposition 1 was used
to compute the likelihood. The orthogonal polynomial term in the density estimation will take
on negative and positive values for some parameter values (and in practice the integral defining
the likelihood will sometimes be larger if the "density" is made negative in some places to allow it
to be larger in others). In our estimation we have therefore chosen to add a penalty function of
log (o max(f (x), O)dx) to the likelihood function for parameter values that do not generate valid
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densities.3 5 The objective function is not globally concave, so we ran our estimation routines from
a large number of starting values for the gi.
We now give a derivation of the formula in Proposition 1. Let the density f(x) be represented
as f (x) = xe- j=0 gjL (). 3 6. The distribution of yi is then described by
Prob{yi = kJzi}
Prob{yi = kJZi}
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To evaluate, first note that we have the monomial formula for Laguerre polynomials
k!
k
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3 5 The motivation for the form of the penalty is that, given a weighting function f(x) that is not everywhere non-
negative, one can define a nonnegative measure by setting (x) = max(f(x), 0)/ f" max(f(x), 0)dx. The likelihood
minus the penalty function is a lower bound to the likelihood that would be obtained from the nonnegative density
f(x). One could impose nonnegativity as a numerical constraint in the estimation, but in practice we found that our
optimization routine did not work well with this constraint and often ended with likelihoods much lower than those
that would result from modifying "densities" that took on slightly negative values in the manner described above.
3 6 The formula for the cdf can be derived as
F (x) f t e-t(dt
0
JO
1 ! 0dt
9( -- ( f ) (a+i+1,) ,
1=0
where -y (.) is the lower incomplete gamma function.
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We can then substitute these formulas into the formula for yj:
Pr{y= kz} =(esit + 1)k+a+1
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Laguerre polynomials are orthogonal with
f 0 e-z La (zi) Lm (zi)
o i
so that the formula for yj simplifies to
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This completes the proof.
Note that for an unrestricted parameter vector we would have
J O 00xae x gj L a) (x) dx = golF(a + 1).j=0
Accordingly we set go so that this value is equal to one. To identify the parameters in the full
semiparametric model we also need to impose the normalization that E(ulz) = 1. This can also
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be imposed by additionally restricting the parameter gi to be equal to a/F(a + 2). For finite N,
however, it is not necessary to impose this for identification and in practice we do not impose the
constraint and simply renormalize the estimated distribution by dividing by its expectation after
the estimation stage.
3.8.2 Appendix B: Simulation results
In this section we present some Monte Carlo estimates to illustrate how well the procedure described
above works in some circumstances that may be roughly similar to the data in our application.
The simulations implemented our estimation procedure on datasets created by drawing each
zi from a uniform distribution with support [0, i]; drawing each ui from the desired error distri-
bution; forming Ai = ezieui, where / = [-4.27,1,1,1,0.1,0.1,0.2]; and drawing yi from a Poisson
distribution with rate parameter Ai. Each simulated variable included 2,500 observations. The
distributions of the simulated covariates and the values for / were chosen so that the mean and
variance of the simulated eziO would roughly match the mean and variance of the fitted values in a
Poisson or negative binomial regression of the count of AMC 12 high-scorers on school- and school
ZIP-level covariates. The ui were chosen from one of three distributions depending on the simu-
lation: an exponential distribution with mean and standard deviation 1; a lognormal distribution
with mean 1 and variance 1; and a uniform distribution on [0, 2]. The motivation for these choices
was to demonstrate the performance of our procedure for a diverse set of underlying distributions:
the exponential distribution is within the class of models being estimated even if N = 0; the log-
normal distribution cannot be fit perfectly with a finite N and has a thicker upper tail; and the
uniform distribution is a more challenging distribution to reproduce with a series expansion.
The estimated coefficients / on the observed characteristics are fairly precise and show almost
no bias. Table 3.8.2 presents some summary statistics on the estimates for simulations with N = 8
Laguerre polynomials.3 7 The first column lists the true values for the coefficients on each simulated
covariate. The next three columns list the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the
estimates across the 1000 simulated datasets for each simulated distribution. There are no notable
differences across heterogeneity distributions in the consistency or precision of estimated /'s.
Table 3.8.2 provides some statistics on how well the model was able to estimate the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity. The rows correspond to the distribution from which the u's were
drawn. The columns correspond to the number N of Laguerre polynomials used in the estimations.
The metric used to measure performance is integrated squared error (ISE) - if the estimated density
function from simulation run i is fA(x), where the true data generation process has unobserved
heterogeneity from distribution f(x), the ISE of that estimated density is f" (fi(x) - f(x))2 dx.
The values in Table 3.8.2 are median ISE across 1,000 simulation runs.
The exponential model fits fairly well for all N. As one would expect, the N = 0 fit is best: the
true model is in the N = 0 class and estimating additional unnecessary parameters just increases
3 7Summary statistics for estimates of Q using N = 0, 2, 4, 6 are similar.
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Table 3.4: Estimated coefficients on observed characteristics in simulations
True Mean and SD of estimated coefficients
Variable Coeffs. Exponential u Lognormal u Uniform u
Constant -4.270 -4.2690 -4.2651 -4.2777
(0.1536) (0.1571) (0.1109)
z1 1.000 0.9971 0.9977 0.9984
(0.1055) (0.0593) (0.0760)
Z2 1.000 1.0010 1.0010 1.0026
(0.0537) (0.0424) (0.0401)
Z3 1.000 0.9995 0.9991 1.0019
(0.0371) (0.0377) (0.0269)
Z4 0.100 0.0994 0.0993 0.0998
(0.0271) (0.0154) (0.0190)
Z5 0.100 0.0997 0.0996 0.1011
(0.0216) (0.0127) (0.0151)
Z6 0.200 0.1996 0.1994 0.2003
(0.0184) (0.0125) (0.0132)
Table 3.5: Goodness of fit of estimated distributions of unobserved heterogeneity in simulations:
median MISE for various models and true distributions
Median ISE for various models
True distribution of u N=0 N=2 N=4 N=6 N=8
Exponential 0.0010 0.0045 0.0140 0.0201 0.0243
Lognormal 0.0133 0.0115 0.0191 0.0148 0.0167
Uniform [0, 2] 0.1055 0.1449 0.0833 0.0795 0.1009
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the scope for overfitting. The fit worsens gradually as N increases, but never becomes terrible; at
N = 8, the worst fit, the median ISE is 0.024. To get a feel for the magnitudes, the MISE would be
0.02 if the density of an exponential distribution were over- or under- estimated by 10% at every
value of u.
The lognormal distribution does not fit as well when N = 0, as one would expect: there is
no a that gives an ISE of less than 0.0107. Larger N make it theoretically possible to fit the
distribution much better (the best fit distributions have ISE 0.00756, 0.00210, 0.00014, and 0.00002
for N = 2, 4, 6, and 8), but again there is the offsetting effect that there is more scope for overfitting.
The tradeoff between the two effects results in fairly similar fits across the range of N. The median
ISE is smallest for the N = 2 model.
The fits to the uniform distribution are much worse. Here, there is no parameter combination
that produces a very good fit when N is small, and overfitting becomes a concern when N is large. 38
The best fit is obtained for N = 6, where the median ISE is 45% lower than the median ISE for
the worst fit of N = 2.
Figure 3.8.2 provides a graphical illustration of the performance of our method. In each of the
three panels we present the true distribution in bold and three estimated distributions corresponding
to the simulations (using N = 4) that were at the 2 5 th percentile, the 5 0 th percentile, and the 7 51h
percentile in the MISE measure of goodness of fit. In the exponential and log-normal cases the
estimated distributions seem to fit reasonably well for values of around the mean (u = 1) and to
fit quite well for higher values of u. The estimated distributions are farther from the truth at low
values of u. This should be expected - once we are considering a population of schools in which all
schools will in practice have zero or one high-scoring student per year, a single year's data will not
allow one to say whether all schools are identical or whether there is heterogeneity.
Also as expected, our method performs somewhat poorly for the uniform distribution with its
bounded support. However, we are encouraged to note that, even for this difficult case, the method
captures some important features of the distribution. The steep slope of the estimates at 0 and 2,
and the double-peaked shape of the distributions in the range [0, 2], allow the estimated functions
to bound much of the estimated density in the correct support region.
3.8.3 Appendix C: Bootstrap procedure
We obtained standard errors for our semiparametric estimates and confidence bands for the dis-
tribution of unobserved heterogeneity using both parametric and nonparametric bootstrapping
procedures. In each iteration j of the bootstrap, we generate a simulated dataset {pij, ijf ,
then estimate the parameters dj,9j1, ..., jiN, / 3j using the semiparametric estimation procedure de-
scribed in Section 4. Standard errors are calculated as the standard deviation of each estimated
3 8 The minimum possible ISE's are 0.0877, 0.0456, 0.0397, 0.0273, 0.0269 for N = 0, 2, 4, 6,8.
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Actual vs. estimated distributions: 2 5th, 5 0 th, and 7 5 th percentile fits in simulations
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parameter across 1, 000 simulations. For example, the standard error of & is calculated as
Z$i 0 (d& - )SE(&) = 1000
1000
Another functional of interest is a 95% confidence band on the estimated density and CDF of
unobserved heterogeneity. For each u c (0, oo) and for each simulation j of the bootstrap, we
calculate the density fi and CDF F3 as those generated by the parameter vector &j, .#j1, ... igjN, Oj-
Denote as fp(u) the p"t percentile of f(u) across 1,000 simulations; then the 95% confidence band
for f (u) is (f2.5(U), f 97.5(U)). The confidence band for F is calculated similarly. Confidence bands
for u C (0, 3) and u E (3, 10) are shown in Section 5 for the production of AMC high-scorers and
in Section 6 for the production of SAT high-scorers.
In each simulation of the parametric bootstrap, we use the parameter estimates obtained using
our semiparametric procedure to generate simulated outcomes. First, we draw a random sample
zj of size 2,051 (with replacement) from the set of covariates z listed in Table 3.3.2. We also draw
a random sample ij of size 2,051 from the CDF F, which we estimated using the procedure in
Section 4 on the true dataset. For each i = 1, ..., 2,051, we then generate Aji = ez;-/4 &i and draw
9 from a Poisson distribution with rate parameter Aji. Finally, we estimate &P, -P ... , /N, on
the simulated dataset (y, j).
The nonparametric bootstrap proceeds similarly, except that we use the empirical distribution
of y rather than the estimated theoretical distribution of y. That is, for each simulation, we
draw a random sample (y ) P, zj) of size 2,051 (with replacement) from the set of outcomes y and
a t z, hen estimate o3 ,N,, f P, on the simulated dataset ( ). As in the
semiparametric estimation on our full sample, the results of each bootstrap estimation may depend
on the starting values chosen; in our results, we present those estimates for which the likelihood
is highest after trying numerous starting values. 39 We begin each bootstrap by running a trial
bootstrap of 20 simulations for several candidate starting values: those resulting in the highest
likelihood in the full sample estimation and the center of each range of starting values for which the
resulting likelihood is close to that of the best starting values. We then use the values that provide
the highest average log-likelihood in the trial bootstrap as the starting values in the full bootstrap.
If our model is specified correctly, then the parametric bootstrap is more efficient; if the model is
misspecified, then the nonparametric bootstrap will be more appropriate. See Efron and Tibshirani
(1993) for a discussion. In our application, neither procedure provides smaller or larger standard
errors or confidence bands across all parameters or outcomes, but parametric standard errors are
39 1n practice, we used 0 starting values from either a Poisson or negative binomial regression, along with one of two
potential sets of starting values for our parameters a, gi, .. , gN. The first set of parameters we tried was the best-fit
parameters of the candidate distributions described in Appendix A.2, so that the optimization would be allowed to
converge to a number of differently-shaped distributions. We also tried setting each gi = 0 and varying a between
-0.9 and 2. The latter approach often yielded the highest likelihood.
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often slightly smaller and parametric bands are often slightly narrower and smoother. In the body
of the paper, we present the results of the parametric bootstrap, but our interpretation of the
results is unaffected by the choice of bootstrap procedure.
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